LANGUAGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS:

Foundations for a Hermeneutic of Black Culture

by

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To: Freida, who entered my life
at a critical time adding her
strength, love, understanding,
and encouragement such as to
make its completion possible,
this work is dedicated.

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INTRODUCTION

> After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, --a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the outer world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, --an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
>
> The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, --this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.[1]

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[1] W. E. B. DuBois, "The Souls of Black Folk," Three Negro Classics, Avon Books: New York, 1965, pp. 214-215.

The strife is unresolved. The 'warring of the selves' continues to constitute a fundamental condition of the being of black peoples and other 'minorities' in America increasing in its complexity and subsequent ramifications on all levels and in all dimensions of the world of sociality. Yet the possibility of resolution, of the 'merger' of the two selves, is distinct. This possibility has its basis in the acutely explicit historical self-consciousness of increasing numbers of black people within this society in particular and other parts of the world in general. We live, one might say, in a time that is significantly self-conscious. It is this factor, along with the fact that the recent history of black people has been that of a rapidly intensifying self-awareness, which helps to account for the distinctness of the possibility that the resolution will be achieved.

This long sought for resolution is, for a great number of people, now still but the anticipated end of an intensive project. The issue of paramount interest to this writer, the foundation and justification for the forthcoming analyses, is the nature of this project, this quest for the "true meaning" of self, with all of its implications, in itself. That is to say, what is involved in the search for identity as far as the philosophical thinker is concerned? Or, to pose the question differently, what is this search, and how might a philosophically informed mode of understanding contribute to the ultimate resolution of the strife born of a sense of fragmented self, a core of meaning which stands at the center of, constitutes the basic structures of, the experiences of black peoples? How are the analyses to follow justified or grounded?

The answer to these questions can be stated here only provisionally: the analyses seek to provide a philosophical understanding of the structures, processes,

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relations, and methodological principles which constitute the consciousness of self, which ground the meaning of self, as it is experienced in the world of sociality, the intersubjective world, with all of the subsequent implications for ethics, hermeneutics, philosophical anthropology, and other modes of inquiry. The relevance of this task, its justification, is grounded in the experience of the divided self which has informed the history of black peoples and others. Of even greater significance, the relevance of the projected task is first and foremost autobiographical, for I too am part of, have my being in, the "war" that stands on the threshold of resolution. The forthcoming labors seek to provide the foundational access, in terms of fundamental modes of understanding, to merger and unity, self at peace with self - by way of a grasp of the structures of consciousness and sociality. To this degree the analysis falls within the context of the project aimed at resolving the strife of consciousness of self, a project informing the lives and consciousness of people from the level of the "ordinary point of view," as Alfred Schutz refers to it,[2] to the specialized, highly reflective modes of thought characterizing the specialized disciplines as in Black Studies, the arts, and human sciences. The analysis, therefore, is an attempt to share in the resolution, in the passage to it by, hopefully, supplying the required fundamental understanding of the problematic and its possible solution via a mode of analysis that sets out, as was said, the constitutive elements of a consciousness of self in such way as to allow for the programmatic formation of projects which tend toward resolution, toward merger and unity.

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[2] Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, trans., Northwestern University Press: Bloomington, 1967; Collected Papers, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, Vol. 1, The Problem of Social Reality, edited with an Introduction by Maurice Natanson, 1967; Vol. 2, Studies in Social Theory, edited with an Introduction by Arvid Brodersen, 1964; Vol. 3, Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, edited by Ilse Schutz, with an Introduction by Aron Gurwitsch, 1966; Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, edited, annotated, and with an Introduction by Richard M. Zaner, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1970. Hereafter referred to as PSW, CP1, CP2, CP3, and Reflections, respectively.

The task, so far stated, is to come to an understanding of all that is involved in the processes of acts of self-awareness and self-affirmation as socially grounded and to do so in such a fashion as to lay the foundation for the resolution of a profound existential problematic the nature of which has been so aptly captured in the words of DuBois as the "strife of divided self-consciousness." Thus the problematic itself demands that this understanding be had on the level of meaning: relations and structures of meaning of self and the social world as revealed in particular modes of discourse and symbolic expression. What is required is a mode of analysis and a pathway of access to such structures and relations. Both of these are to be had in a systematic framework of thought that joins descriptive phenomenology with a philosophy of language and symbolic meaning. The consequence of such a mode of analysis is to join an understanding of consciousness to that of the nature and function of language as discourse and symbolic meaning to achieve the requisite grasp of the meaning structures of the self as they are manifested in discourse and symbols.

Thus the guiding insight for the analyses which can be only indicated here lies in the thought that grasps an essential relation between language and symbols, on the one hand, and consciousness, on the other, such that the structures and relations - the meaning - of the latter are corrolate to or imbedded in those of the former.[3] Thus the key media, both for philosophical understanding and the revolutionary transformative project itself, are language in its fullness as the unity of system and speech, and other symbolic systems such as art and religion, drama, etc. The fundamental understanding at work here, the elaboration of which will constitute the fulfillment of the proposed analytical project, is that language (and symbols or symbolic systems), as constitutive of meaning, is, as typifying medium par excellence,[4] the fundamental determinate of consciousness in terms of its structuration and the establishment, creation, and transformation of meaning. The attempt, therefore, to achieve a fundamental grasp of the revolutionary transformation of the consciousness of black peoples, now in full progress, takes us immediately and directly to the question of symbols and language to be viewed critically: in terms of their meaning and function as related to consciousness, consciousness of self specifically. Thus it is that the black poet/writer/critic Don L. Lee thrust to the very heart of the matter when in discussing the development toward what he terms as a "total black consciousness," he offers that the ". . . most radical instrument of change has come about in the medium that we use to define change: language. The language we use to define our past and present state of being is not the same language we used two or three years ago."[5]

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[3] Cf. David Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology: A Constructive Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1971.

[4] Schutz, CP1, p. 14.

In addition to those consequences mentioned for ethics, philosophical anthropology, specialized studies, and the human sciences emerging from the analysis, the more immediate consequence will be the implications to be drawn for the formation of what many term a "black ideology," that is, "a rational project for the creation of a new order,"[6] a project that is the direct consequence of and the original formative goal of the antecedent project intending the resolution of the situation of fragmented self. Thus this latter implication of the analysis, the informing of the development of an ideological or philosophical stance in terms of providing the radical foundations of thought, speaks to a wider more substantial need in terms of the organization of thought, meaning, and values as the orienting and guiding project of a people. It intends, ultimately, the radical reconstitution of the world of sociality at all levels, in all dimensions; it embodies . . .

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[5] "Directions for Black Writers," The Black Scholar, Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 1969, p. 53.

[6] James Turner, "The Sociology of Black Nationalism," The Black Scholar, Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 1969, p. 24.

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> a counter-movement away from subordination to independence, from alienation through refutation, to self-affirmation. In this respect, such a movement of ideas represents an effort to transcend the immediate conditions of an undesirable relationship by a process of reflection which creates a different (and opposing) constellation of symbols and assumptions.[7]

It is this movement, this transcending, transforming process intending new systems of meaning, symbolic, and otherwise, to the very heart of which the forthcoming analysis seeks to thrust. Even more, to the degree that there will be philosophical and methodological implications to be drawn, there is the over-riding, guiding intention which seeks to offer corrective insights to this process as it is concretely worked out in the intersubjective world via the project of a people.

It is no accident that philosophy enters into the investigation of the transformation of the consciousness and culture of a people, into the foundations of such changes, via a philosophical confrontation with language and symbols. Various aspects of the issue have been--and are being--subjected to scrutiny and not by philosophy alone. The analysis of the social world constitutes a continuing and increasingly important search. The increased importance of this, however, rests on the attempts of many to come to grips with the social world not as an "objective datum" but a realm constituted by and infused with meaning and value. The attempt to set out the structures of this "meaningfully experienced world," the lebenswelt as Husserl came to refer to it, comprised, for example, the life-long project of Alfred Schutz. Thus are his works our primary reservoir of insights.

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[7] Turner, The Black Scholar, Vol. 1, No. 2, December, 1969, p. 18.

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Again, the systematic investigation of consciousness by those engaged in phenomenological philosophy has given us much. Many of the structures of consciousness, of its processes, are now available to us in the way of reflective models. And the method of phenomenology, when appropriately employed in its proper field, continues to give us more. Not least among its recent and continuing contributions are the returns on its encounters with language and symbols. Notable among thinkers along this line is Paul Ricoeur, upon whom we shall draw, though concern with the matter stretches back to Husserl and beyond. Still, the concern with language has become a major one for philosophy and other fields of study as well. As Ricoeur notes:

> . . . there is an area where all philosophical investigations cut across one another--the area of language. Language is the common meeting ground of Wittgenstein's investigations, the English linguistic philosophy, the phenomenology that stems from Husserl, Heidegger's investigations, the works of the Bultmannian school and of other schools of New Testament exegesis, the works of comparative history of religion and of anthropology concerning myth, ritual, and belief--and finally, psychoanalysis.[8]

So too is the investigation of culture a matter of high priority today. Especially is this so among black peoples working their way from under varying degrees of colonization, oppression, discrimination. Thus, to the degree the given problematic (divided self-consciousness) is autobiographical, to the degree that there is a concern for contributing to its understanding and the understanding of language and culture, so have we undertaken to work to this end by drawing together here

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[8] Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, Dennis Savage, trans., Yale University Press: New Haven, 1970, p. 3.

✓.

in a single presentation particular insights toward the constitution of yet another. The contribution to thought by the various lines of thought mentioned now render it possible to construct a model of consciousness, its constitution and transformation of meanings, and to employ this model as a methodological tool in the systematic hermeneutic of the transformation of the culture and consciousness of a people via a hermeneutic of their language and symbolic systems. The assembling of the elements of just such a model and methodological tool toward that end is our aim. We begin with a situation constituted by a sense of self-alienation, and this because it is precisely this condition which, among other things, many of the people in question seek to alter.

The pursuit of the issues raised by the problematic of a sense of divided self leads into a complex of matters. On the one hand we are concerned about the experience of radical alienation and the existential project which seeks to rectify this situation via a transformation of consciousness, i.e., the movement from the sense of divided self to self-affirmation and wholeness of identity and being. Yet, on the other hand, the full philosophical understanding of this requires that we grasp, in terms of the people in question, the concrete situations of self divided against self, self-affirmation, and the process leading from the first to the latter. The fulfillment of this project will necessitate thereby a complete hermeneutic of black culture, past and present. Thus the exigencies of philosophical understanding emerging from these concerns must be met by two interrelated sets of reflective activity. First, the ground must be prepared for

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engaging in a hermeneutic of black culture and for understanding the transformations of consciousness of persons of that culture. What is needed is the development of a framework of understanding sufficient to provide a grasp of the role of language and symbolic systems in the formation of self-identity, of cultural identity, ultimately, and in the process of transformation of consciousness. Secondly, this developed framework will then have to be 'applied' in the way of a hermeneutic of the culture of black people.

Our concern here is that of developing the appropriate framework of understanding sufficient to engage the problematic at hand in all of its complexities. This study will appear, possibly, to be somewhat abstract and theoretical, that is, lacking in the filling out of much in the way of concrete experiences, the concreteness to be had in the presentation of a full and explicit cultural hermeneutic. Thus, while we will be making repeated references throughout to the lives and experiences of black peoples, still it will be within the context of a discussion of the conditions of possibility of the formation and transformation of consciousness and the role of language and symbols in the process _in_ _general_.

In terms of the project of this work we must first achieve a clarified understanding of the problem to be investigated and the method by which we shall proceed. Thus, we must (Part I) raise and settle the question regarding problem, method, and starting point. This first step entails the spelling out of the method of philosophical analysis necessary to gain an understanding of the

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structures, relations, and methodological principles of social self-identity through an intentional analysis of language as discourse and symbolic systems as revealing of the meaning structures of the users of such a language and/or system.

Secondly, we shall be concerned with setting out the structures of ego-consciousness wherein meaning is constituted (Part II) as we are concerned with the constitution of self-reflected meaning, meaning conversion (i. e., transformation of consciousness), and the interpretation of cultural meaning. Our recognition of the intersubjective foundations of all self-consciousness, of self-identification, requires further that we treat the realm of social reality (Part III).

These analyses shall be followed by an investigation of that central activity of consciousness which allows for the structuring and ordering of one's experiences of and in the world (Part IV), and which provides for the dialectical continuity between subjective and social realities.

Further, the manner in which our collective experiences constitute our modes of being-in-the-world, our shared life-world, will likewise be set out indicating that it is the life-world, ultimately, which constitutes the horizon within which transformation occurs (Part V).

Part VI will begin the explication of the foundations for a cultural hermeneutic focusing upon speech and symbolic meaning. It will be followed (Part VII) by an encounter with a concrete hermeneutic of black life already performed as a transition to a full-fledged cultural hermeneutic with some indications of paths to be taken.

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The framework for carrying out the analyses of this work will be drawn principally from a presentation and constructive extension of the theories and investigations of Alfred Schutz to the problem at hand. Thus we are dependent upon Schutz for having uniquely entered into and developed quite well along a phenomenology of sociality. Given the complex and polarized world in which we live, with all of the implications and consequences following this (war, racial, nationalistic conflicts of varying degrees of intensity, revolutions and much talk of revolutions, rapid culture change with the subsequent problems of "cultural shock" and "cultural dissonance"), the necessity of our coming to understand the social world has increased tremendously. Schools, for example, primary, secondary and college/university, are reeling to the impact of the forced necessity to incorporate into its offerings knowledge of other non-white Anglo-Saxon Protestant peoples. Yet this knowledge is not immediately at hand, not "knowledge" that is void of the taint of previous periods of neglect and deliberate disregard. New methodologies are called for, methodologies which will capture _authentically_ the disclosures of meaning of the cultures or phenomena under investigation.

Yet the possibility of developing such modes of analysis is lost _unless_ we can first come to grips with just how it is that persons come to constitute a meaningful world and how any social world, however delineated, is experienced. The foundation for such an understanding is available to us in the works of Schutz. His _Phenomenology of the Social World_, the three volumes of _Collected Papers_, and _Reflections on the Problem of Relevance_, are sufficient testimony

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to the correctness of his insight indicated full well by the continuing influence of his thoughts and method on subsequent thinkers (e.g., Berger and Luckmann readily acknowledge their dependence upon Schutz for the underpinnings of their The Social Construction of Reality[9]; cf. also, Gibson Winter, Elements for a Social Ethic[10]; Maurice Natanson, The Journeying Self[11]). It is our intent to share in furthering this development in the present work.

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[9] Doubleday and Company: Garden City, N. Y., 1966.

[10] The MacMillan Company; New York, 1966.

[11] Addison-Wesley Company: Reading, Mass., 1970.

PART I

I. Preliminary Statement of Problem

- A. Point of Departure, Goal, Methodology
- B. Language as Speech: Element of Primary Access to Consciousness
- C. Genesis of the Conceptual Framework

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A. Point of Departure, Goal, Methodology

The aim of the forthcoming analysis is to bring to light by way of a philosophically informed mode of understanding the structures, processes, and relations which constitute the self-reflective consciousness of a subject within a particular horizon. The ultimate meaning of this mode of consciousness is grounded in that broad province of the totality of relations, structures, and meanings which constitute the world of intersubjectivity, the social world--the world of I and Other, of We, the world of Mitsein.[1] Within this context, i.e., sociality, the problematic comes into focus with the posing of the question "Who am I?" which seeks a personal (socio-cultural/historical) identity. Specifically what is sought is a sense or meaning of one's being, that is, a synthetic unity on the level of meaning of one's existence. The concept of identity thus captures the scope of this radical endeavor as it intends a core of meaning, ". . . a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity . . ."[2] The concept, however, is inclusive of more than a retrospective stock taking of one's biographical situation as the totality of past and present experiences, but also--and most importantly--opens out into the future in terms of anticipations of one's future being. Thus it is, as Erickson notes, that the concept of identity intends a continuity of sense or meaning of self, of the living past and the anticipated future.[3] The problematic therefore is one which is reflected, not so much in the query "Who am I?" taken alone, but in that which seeks also "What do I want to make of myself--and--what do I have to work with?"[4]

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[1] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, MacQuarrie and Robinson, trans., Harper & Row: New York, 1962, "Division One," "Part IV," especially "Section 26."

[2] Eric Erickson, "The Concept of Identity in Race Relations," The Negro American," T. Parsons and K. Clark, editors, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1966, p. 229.

In terms of the pursuit of the question, the questioner intends modes of existence to be had in the finite, factual world which are fundamental for the subject's grasp of himself in the abiding, continuous sense of sameness or identity, for its being in the world of everydayness and sociality. To this degree, i. e., as intentions of modes of existence, the subjective state of affairs given birth to by the raising of the "Who am I?"--What am I to be?" queries is that of radical questioning. It institutes a process of critical self-reflection, a search for foundations, for the most definite modes and possibilities of existence. It anticipates the systematic, reflective pursuit of questions and possibilities brought into being in the field or horizon of the problematic project. Even more, with the raising of the question there is the emergence into thematic, reflective awareness, of what was before the tacit, pre-reflective, taken-for-granted ongoing process of the subject's presence to himself accompanying all intentional processes, namely the unquestioned sense of his being or identity. This process of radicalization, the transformation of consciousness from a state of non-thematic to thematic awareness of the conditions of its existence, has its basis in the loss of the qualitative sufficiency of meaning, of the significance, which pre-reflexively governs the engagements of the conscious subject (its being-in-the-world, its presence to itself thematically) as the mediating factor of consciousness (i.e., meaning or relevance) that unifies living (the totality of experiences past, present, anticipated) and fixes consciousness at the center of its place in a historical, socio-cultural world in terms of its situation.

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[3] Ibid., p. 241.

[4] Ibid., p. 247.

It is this experience of the loss of qualitative sufficiency, the recognition of such a loss, or, more precisely, an inadequacy of meaning or relevancy, on the one hand, and the attempts to reestablish the balance or equilibrium in terms of a continuous self-interpretation by way of thematic, explicit reconstructions of the systems of meanings governing such a self-reflexive evaluation (a process referred to above as the "transformation of consciousness"), on the other, which we wish to subject to the rigors of philosophical analysis, and to do so in terms of the radicalness implicit in the aforementioned queries establishing the horizon of the problematic. The expanses of this horizon lead to considerations not only of the immediacy of subjective consciousness, but of the concrete horizon within which the transformative process occurs, that is, to the correlative pole of subjective consciousness: the world of sociality.

There emerges the need, then, in terms of methodology, of remaining, so to speak, "within the world," a necessity the foundation of which rests in the problematic as posed in its originality. For to the degree that the existential problematic lived by people of color (the problematicity of self-conscious being) has its ground in an adverse social world; to the degree that the projects seeking resolution (via a transformation of consciousness from a torn, divided condition to one of unity) involve an explicit awareness of and confrontation with this same adverse social world, so, too, must the philosophical explication of this entire process and situation be fully cognizant of the intersubjective dimensions involved. Already with the posing of the "Who am I?--What am I to be?" queries in their radicality and the formation of a project seeking resolution on the part of the people in question an epoche has been performed in the way of a suspension of belief in the naive, natural way of regarding the world of sociality. Rather it is this world, its systems of meaning, values, and structurizations, and, most importantly, its relation to the questioning, engaged subject, which is now in question. This total horizon of subject (people), world, and their correlativity must be brought fully into view. In so doing ours will not, cannot, be an endeavor involving all three phases of phenomenological investigation: epoche, eidetic reduction, transcendental reduction.[5] Rather, following the lead of the problematic itself before us, we shall keep to the broader horizon already delineated, namely, the laying out of the condition and processes involved in the transformation of consciousness. It is in this sense, then, that we say that we must grasp the fullness of the world constituting the horizon of the problematic. Thus it is that the task emerges as one of setting out from the questioning subject at both the level of consciousness and objectivity (i.e., socially) the nature of intersubjective being, not in its pure sense, the sense of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation,[6] but in such manner as to allow the "showing forth" in consciousness of self, in the dynamic horizon of living experience, of socio-cultural meanings and values. Thus there is the methodological requirement, in terms of a mode of analysis, of providing the anticipated illumination while preserving the object of inquiry. Also, we must develop and employ a mode of analysis and determine the point of departure for it such that the philosophical disaster of "reductionism" which destroys by "explaining away" and thereby annihilating the meaning and significance proper to the phenomenon in its own right, is avoided. We must avoid those destructive tendencies inherent in modes of analysis which are bent upon explaining a phenomenon, of accounting for its being or meaning by way of reasoning in terms of factors of causality, whether viewed psychologically, economically, or otherwise. However adequate or informative such explanations may prove to be the methodological requirement which we must seek to follow is that which demands at the very least that we participate or share in the validity of the phenomenon through an act of belief. In other words, in terms of the concrete manifestations of the phenomenon we must, with respect to its basis and origin in human experience, accept forthrightly the expressions by the subject of a sense of disunity, of projects seeking resolution, of a sense of unity, as meaningful in their own right. The task will then be that of moving from the expressions to their meanings via the analysis of the intentions which ground them. Thus it is that language as discourse and symbolic systems constitute the central phenomena to which we must go, through which we must think. In this manner the possibility of destructive reductionism will be avoided.

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[5] Maurice Natason, ed., Essays in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1969, pp. 10-13.

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[6] Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Dorian Cairns, trans., Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1960, pp. 89-151.

Language as discourse and symbolic systems thus provide the point of departure for our investigation. Critically viewed the issue is that of determining which modes of experience as expressed in speech and symbols provide access (to reflective thought) to those aspects of consciousness of self and world which when brought fully to light will stand out as definitively intersubjectively (culturally) conditioned. We search therefore for symbols and discourse which reveal, on the one hand, divided self-consciousness, lack of proper identification, and on the other, those revealing self at peace with self. The resolution of the difficulty of selecting the proper modes of discourse and symbolic expression is to some extent provided by the heuristic structure of the analysis itself: there is, first of all, the pre-understanding (i.e., prior to the fulfillment of the complete analysis) guiding the inquiry and expressed in the posing of the analytic task which anticipates the intersubjective dimensions of consciousness. Secondly, there is the anticipation of discourse and other modes of expression as revealing of the intersubjectively conditioned nature of consciousness of self and, further, of the possibilities and realities of the transformation of conscious of self in ways which are likewise revealed in and through language and symbols. The point of departure, its determination, lies given already in these guiding understandings which find

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expression in the formulation of the problematic: the process of moving from a condition of divided self-consciousness to self-affirmation as revealed in language and symbols. Accordingly, we designate these guiding insights anticipatory indicating that full disclosure is to be had only when the task has been completed. Likewise is the planned analysis referred to as a "project"[7] indicating modes of understanding to be had. The progressive working out of the analysis constitutes the "filling out" of these anticipations. Their statement, however, is sufficient to constitute the point of departure.

Finally there is the question of method: what modes of thought shall be employed in the analysis? Like the point of departure, so too the mode of analysis is conditioned by the problematic itself, by its formulation. To this degree, as the horizon of the analysis has been given as the consciousness of self, the mode of analysis to be utilized is one which allows for an analysis of consciousness in terms of its intentional structures and relationships--intentional acts of meaning. Method, therefore, is a correlate of the problematic. They are, both of them, elements of a continuous horizon of reflection and are mutually determinative of each other. More, they are both intrinsically related to the solution, that is, the goal of the analysis. It too is part and parcel of the horizon of the project of analysis constituting its anticipated end. The three factors--point of departure, method, and solution--are but three "moments" of one dynamic horizon (project) reciprocally related one to the other: the grasp and

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[7] Schutz, PSW, "Project and Protention," p. 57.

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formulation of the problematic bring to light certain exigencies the force of which set the criteria for the method to be employed to bring about an anticipated solution. All three moments are but abstractions from a dynamic totality constituted in reflective thought by the problematic phenomenon. Hence phenomenology: the willingness to be led by the dictates and exigencies of the phenomenon encountered. Thus might one refer to this analysis as a "phenomenology of the social self." So it is that I speak of the "standing forth" of a phenomenon "in its uniqueness" and "originality."

This 'originality' and 'uniqueness' is not, nor can it ever be, total in an absolute sense. The phenomenon, its constitution, is still, to a degree, relative to this writer in terms of its meaning for me as constituted by me, by my situation in-the-world--by my world-view, in short. Still, mine is to be, hopefully, an articulated world-view, a situation of thought which is intended as an avoidance of the difficulties inherent in analyses proceeding from unarticulated frameworks. Thus the articulation of the framework from which the analysis will proceed--precisely what is intended in this section. To this degree, and in terms of what has been stated previously regarding the mutuality of the factors within the horizon of reflective thought, the matters of method and starting point are not left to the free, i.e., arbitrary, choice of the inquirer; rather, they are, as we said, conditioned by the subject of the inquiry. It is here in this understanding that the question of method and starting point have their solution. Methodologically the analysis will be a matter of setting out in phenomenological

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terms those aspects of self-consciousness which exhibit the meaning of the presence of self to self within the world of sociality. The elaboration of this meaning constitutes the goal of the inquiry; the elaboration of the intentionalities of language and symbols its point of departure.

As posed, the analysis must include the examination and explication of key concepts employed in this formulation, an explication that is revealing on both the near and far sides: the side of the subject or consciousness, and the side of the world as it is for that consciousness, respectively. Further, the explication must serve as well to provide for the dialectical continuity between the two sides in terms of their correlativity and, moreover, to account for sociality in terms of its foundation in the totality of relations, processes, and structures which have their ground in relationships among subjects.

Foremost among these concepts is that of meaning. The explication of this notion will have its bearing on a number of levels, within a number of dimensions. In terms of the horizon of inquiry as given it will entail an analysis of meaning at its most fundamental level: the level of its constitution within consciousness itself. For the questions "Who am I?--What am I to be?" that found the inquiry are in themselves an attempt to settle an issue of meaning (as the analysis will show) in a radical manner, in a fashion that establishes the being of the self-questioning consciousness within the context of the social world. Even more, in terms of the particular concrete, historical subjects of the analysis it is the attempt to achieve a transformation of consciousness of self.

Thus the analysis of meaning (its constitution and the structurization of consciousness) will lead progressively toward the delineation of those elements which ground and through which this transformation or conversion is carried out.

Another central concept which must undergo investigation is that of "social world." We have intimated already the priority of the world of sociality as the requisite framework within which and in terms of which the radical questioning activity is constituted and carried out, as the framework establishing the boundary conditions of the horizon of the questioning activity and of the inquiry itself as the correlative primary field (correlative to the questioning self-conscious subject as object-pole of the horizon of inquiry).

Further concepts to be explicated as a condition of possibility of the working out of the analysis include those of "self-consciousness," "identity," and "transformation of consciousness," the latter being a most crucial process in terms of the attempt on the part of the subjects to reconstitute the meaning of their existence. Central to this process is the factor of history or, within the realm of consciousness, temporality. In terms of the issue under consideration the factor of temporality emerges at the center of the process of transformation; indeed, philosophically conceived it constitutes a fundamental ground of the process in itself. The exigency of this entails methodologically that we bring to clarity distinct moments from the life of consciousness to which we might refer as pre- and post-transformational, moments the analysis of which will bring to light the passage of self-consciousness from one to another condition of being in terms of meaning or identity.[8] Here it is that the factor of temporality emerges.

Our task, then, so far delineated, involves situating self-consciousness 'within' the 'world' 'socially determined'such that the process in all its aspects of calling 'self' into question for the purpose of establishing, at the level of explicit awareness, the meaning of self by way of transforming a delineated set of meanings and values into another, and to let this entire process stand forth intelligibly via a mode of analysis constituted for just such a purpose.

B. Language as Speech: Element of Primary Access to Consciousness

Understanding that the problematic proposes, in a sense, its own solution, the analysis shall advance via the dynamism of the playing out of the dialectic of method and object of inquiry directed by the heuristic (anticipatory) notion of the solution. As the problematic has been given as that of the meaning of consciousness-of-self-in-the-social-world, the analysis therefore shall proceed by way of an elaboration of the structures of consciousness, the world, being-in-the-world, the meaning of consciousness-in-the-world, by way of those aspects of consciousness which provide a primary mode of access to such meanings.

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[8] Rasmussen, op. cit., Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology.

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And what is it that shall provide us with such an access? We may state now--and leave for the working out of the analysis its validity--that language as speech and symbolic expression[9] is that which provides primary access to the meaning of consciousness in terms of awareness on the level of (radical) self-reflection. The foundation of this statement is the anticipation that from a sufficient analysis of constitution, the constitution of meaning, and its expression via language and symbols it is possible to derive a model from which a hermeneutic can be carried out.

For our analysis, then, language actualized as speech and symbolic expression must be seen as situated as the point of conjunction between the near and far sides, as, in the world of Paul Ricoeur, "mediation; it is the medium in which and by which the subject posits itself and the world shows itself."[10] As such, language, conceived here in its fullness as the unity of system (syntax, grammar, semantics, vocabulary) and speaking and expression (intent, meaning), in terms of its priority, provides the point of departure. The analysis, in this sense, shall involve an examination of the role of language in terms of particular modes of speech and expression which manifest, are the vehicles of, or constitute the "milieu," (according the Ricoeur) or repository of the self-mediated meanings of consciousness to and for itself. The focus then will be upon those modes of discourse and expression (speech, poetry, literature) which convey the explicit (reflexive) presence of consciousness to itself within explicitly (reflexively) the domain of the world intersubjectively constituted in terms of systems of meanings, values, and relationships by which this world is structured (i.e., culture). This phenomenology of language, leading ultimately to a hermeneutic of culture, must proceed necessarily on the basis of a progressively explicated notion of consciousness. Our aim is to move to a hermeneutic of language ultimately based on an appropriate understanding of the relationship of language and consciousness, of the constitution and transformation of meanings. The task will be that of always delineating subjectivity in the fullness of sociality, its intersubjectivity, allowing that sociality to manifest itself as the condition of possibility of self, a condition which stands forth dialectically.

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[9] Cf. Georges Gusdorf, Speaking (La Parole), Paul Brockelman, trans., Northwestern University Press: Bloomington, 1965.

[10] "Structure-Word-Event," Philosophy Today, Vol. 12, No. 2/4, Summer, 1968, pp. 122-123.

C. Genesis of the Conceptual Framework

We have spoken repeatedly of a phenomenologically informed mode of understanding without specifying, to any great degree, of what such a mode of understanding consists. The importance of such specifications lies not only in the acknowledging of sources of knowledge employed in this study, but, as well, in the need, noted earlier, to circumvent the possibility of reductionist explanation by articulating as much as possible the framework from which the analytical process will be conducted. So it is that we must now take time to spell out such a framework at least in outline, if not so much in detail. The accomplishment of the latter involves the progressive working out of the analysis to follow.

The primary foundation of the conceptual horizon of the analysis is drawn from the phenomenological philosophy of the Vienna born scholar Alfred Schutz (1899-1959). The reflections of this original contributor to philosophical insight drawn upon for the present study are contained in five highly intriguing works. First and foremost is his Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (English translation The Phenomenology of the Social World by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, op. cit.) first published in 1932. This work constitutes Schutz's systematic treatment of a core of problems involving both philosophy and the social sciences. As such it intends the philosophical treatment, from a phenomenological point of view (via Husserl), of the basic concepts of the social sciences, particularly the sociology of Max Weber and the latter's attempt to put forth a consistent and rigorous methodological foundation for the social sciences. Central to the thoughts of Weber along these lines were the concepts of "meaning," "action," and "ideal types," all within the context of "interpretive sociology," a sociology based on the interpretive understanding of the subjective meaning of human actions, the latter being the primary unit of sociological study. Schutz, however, having been drawn quite early in his career to the work of Weber,

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perceived what were for him serious logical problems and ambiguities involving these key notions relative to the attempt to grasp by the observing sociologist the "subjective meaning" an act has for the actor. As he put it in the "Preface" of this work,

> . . .I became convinced that while Weber's approach was correct and that he had determined conclusively the starting point of the philosophy of the social sciences, nevertheless his analyses did not go deeply enough to lay the foundations on which alone many important problems of the human sciences could be solved. Above all, Weber's central concept of subjective meaning calls for thoroughgoing analysis.[11]

He therefore set out to, in short, "interpret the actions of individuals in the social world and the ways in which individuals give meaning to social phenomena," subjecting to a thorough philosophical analysis these primary concepts of Weber with the intent of giving them a radical phenomenological grounding.[12] This he sought to achieve by replacing Weber's conception of meaning, a concept central to his (Weber's) entire theory, with the phenomenological notion of meaning articulated by Husserl. For, according to Weber, meaning "was supposed to be distinctive of human action as opposed to mere reactive behavior and which was also supposed to be open to interpretive understanding (Verstehen) by the sociologist."[13] The problem, as Schutz notes it, what he referred to as Weber's

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[11] Schutz, PSW, p. XXXI.

[12] Schutz, PSW, p. 6.

[13] George Walsh, "Introduction," PSW, p. XVII. Cf. also the excellent introductions to each of the volumes of Collected Papers by Maurice Natanson, CP1; Arvid Brodersen, CP2; and Aron Gurwitsch, CP3.

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our understanding."[15] Weber, consequently, failed to distinguish between two levels or dimensions of meaningfulness relative to the social world: meaningful from the standpoint of immediate experience, that is, from the standpoint of the subject socially engaged, and meaningful from the point of view of the social scientist. The context of meaning of the latter is that of "systematizing scrutiny" of the data of already constituted lived experience. The urgent task of a philosophy of the social sciences should therefore be that of clarifying "the complex relations between the different dimensions of the social world, subject them to an analysis so radical that it goes to their very foundations, and fix the boundaries between their different strata."[16] The fulfillment of this project must involve the understanding of the basic elements of the meaning-structure comprising these different dimensions, which elements are "nothing else than processes of meaning-establishment and understanding occurring within individuals, processes of interpretation of the behavior of other people, and processes of self-interpretation."[17] The absence of such understandings constituted for Schutz the primary failure of Weber's notion of meaning: the tracing back to a single basic element all of the meaning-structures of the social world.

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[15] Schutz, PSW, p. 9.

[16] Ibid., p. 10.

[17] Ibid., p. 11.

This single basic element for Schutz is the constitution of meaning in individual consciousness. As such it constitutes a problem of time:

> . . . the problem of meaning is a time problem - not a problem of physical time, which is divisible and measurable, but a problem of historical time. The latter is always a passage of time, filled, to be sure, with physical events yet having the nature of an 'internal time consciousness,' a consciousness of one's own duration.[18]

Thus it is that the understanding of meaning draws one into the subjective sphere, for here in the "deepest stratum of experience" is to be found the source of the phenomena of understanding and meaning. Only in a strictly "philosophical self-consciousness" can this stratum of experience be disclosed to reflection. So then must the analysis of the basic concepts of the social sciences, a task inconclusively undertaken by Weber, be subjected to radical philosophical examination, for "the meaning-structure of the social world can only be deduced from the most primitive and general characteristics of consciousness."[19] The illumination of these, happily said Schutz, has been provided by Bergson and Husserl. Thus *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, setting out from the questions of Weber, and drawing upon these two thinkers, undertakes to determine "the precise nature of the phenomenon of meaning, and to do this by an analysis of the constituting function." Further, "The goal is the clarification of Max Weber's basic concept of interpretive sociology."[20]

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[18] Schutz, PSW, p. 12.

[19] Ibid., p. 12.

[20] Ibid., p. 13.

For Weber, as noted, the basic task of this 'interpretive sociology' is that of understanding and interpreting "social action," an action which

> by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), takes account of the behavior of others, and is thereby oriented in its course. . .[21]

The serious epistemological and, thereby, methodological problems involved in this stance emerge, first, in Weber's notion of meaning as something attached to an action. Again, provisional analysis on the part of Schutz (PSW, "Max Weber's Concept of Meaningful Action,"pp. 15-17 esp.) reveal at least five levels of meaning distinguishable within the concept of "meaningful social action," matters unperceived by Weber. Thirdly, there is the ambiguous distinction drawn by Weber between 'action' and 'behavior,' modes of the latter 'being on the borderline' in terms of meaningfulness. Thus the vagueness of the concept (Weber's) of "action as meaningful behavior."

For Schutz the motivations inherent in the concept are evident. First, he notes, meaningful behavior is for Weber "rational" behavior directed to a system of discrete ends and as such is the "archetype" of action. Secondly, Weber's classification of behavior into different types presupposes that the meaning of an action is identical with the motive of an action (PSW, p. 19). Such a presupposition leads Weber, according to Schutz, into many inconsistencies. Both action and behavior are meaningful, each in its own right, a matter however for which Weber's inappropriate epistemological foundation was unable to account. The establishment of this, of the distinction between the meaning of behavior and that of action, was a matter important to Schutz's analysis. Likewise the question of the manner in which the other self is meaningfully given to us - something Weber failed completely to treat. Rather, Schutz notes, it is presupposed in all instances wherein he (Weber) speaks of the interpretation of the behavior of others. A full and proper analysis of meaning interpretation would demand, however, the elaboration of the manner in which we come to know the other self. It is epistemologically central to any social science having as its goal the grasp of the subjective meaning of the other. Hence, for Schutz, the rationale for the undertaking of the task of the philosophical clarification of processes of meaning establishment and interpretation.

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[21] Schutz, PSW, p. 15; quoted by Schutz from Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 1.

The fulfillment of this task on the part of Schutz constitutes a major achievement of the _Phenomenology of the Social World_ (_PSW_). Further, while drawing heavily upon Husserl's later writings as his main philosophical reservoir, Schutz, as noted, drew also upon Bergson's analyses of the manner in which the stream of consciousness is modified by the phenomenon of attention,[22] of the temporal process of the stream of consciousness (_duree_), the different degrees of tension of consciousness (_attention a la vie_), to mention some elements taken. The _Phenomenology_ constitutes the working through, in the mode of phenomenological analysis, of the philosophical dimension of the notions of meaning, action, and the subjective and objective interpretation of meaning - all central concepts, not only for sociology as conceived by Max Weber, but for all of the "human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) in general. To this degree the complexes of problems, those directly engaged, and those emerging out of the investigations of this work, provided for Schutz the philosophical orientation for the reaminder of his life. The matters pursued by him in all subsequent writings were those which had their ultimate source in his attempt to bring to philosophical understanding the world of social reality, the structures of this world, as well as the manner in which this world is known *naively*, that is, known in a pre-theoretical mode of understanding, the ordinary point of view or "world-taken-for-granted," as Schutz refers to it. All were approached in PSW. These subsequent writings, collected in the volumes of CP 1, 2, and 3, all treat themes growing out of the original project. They have been brought together in these volumes as a fulfillment of the wishes and plans of Schutz in accords to some degree with his own outline. Thus, the first of these is entitled *The Problem of Social Reality* (CP 1); the second, *Studies in Social Theory* (CP 2); and the third, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy* (CP 3). As a whole they constitute the attempt on the part of Schutz to elaborate, first, a consistent philosophical understanding of the foundations of social reality, and secondly, the philosophical foundations (epistemological, methodological) of the social or "human" sciences, in short.

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[22] Schutz, PSW, pp. XVII - XVIII.

In addition to the works mentioned there are two other sets of writings by Schutz which cannot go unnoticed. As noted by a number of thinkers and associates of his, Schutz was, up till the time of his death, in the process of preparing another major work involving the systematic exploration of the world of the 'natural attitude,' the Lebenswelt, as it was termed by Husserl, the world of lived experience. This work, to the degree to which it had been completed prior to his death, was entitled Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt. It is presently being prepared for a German edition with subsequent translation into English (this work was not utilized in the present study). Another piece of writing to be noted is that entitled Reflections on the Problem of Relevance.[23] This latter work represents, in my view, a substantial and original contribution to the philosophical exploration of social reality. It involves the treatment in length of matters only touched upon in PSW, that is, the whole question of relevance systems, their constitution, organization, and interrelation in the subjective sphere. Thus, when combined with the understanding of the constitution of meaning in the dimension of social reality, the grasp of the problem of relevance provides a radical foundation for the philosophical (and social scientific) understanding of the constitution of social reality. As Zaner refers to it:

> The conception of relevance systems thus adds a fundamental dimension to the theory of social reality both in its philosophical and social scientific senses. Beyond this, it gives new force to Schutz's theory of intersubjectivity, his theory of symbolic

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[23] Alfred Schutz, edited, annotated, and introduced by Richard M. Zaner, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1970.

> activities, and the theory of grounding of meaning in the structures of pre-theoretical experience.[24]

Just how important all of these works are with regard to the present study is a matter about which something must now be said.

The life-long philosophical project of Schutz was, as mentioned, the attempt to bring to philosophical clarity both the foundations of social reality as constituted by "common sense understanding" and of the social sciences which seek to study this same dimension. That the social sciences differ from the natural sciences is a matter constituted not by free decision, but, first and foremost, by the fact that the realm of the former, unlike the latter, is constituted by _meaning:_ the world of social reality is preeminently _meaningful_ and is _interpreted_, i.e., understood, as such by its conscious, _experiencing_ inhabitants. Thus the primary task of, for example, sociology, involves the understanding (interpretation) of the meaning which the world of sociality has for its constituents, social actors. For a philosophy seeking to understand this dimension it involves coming to know the manner in which this world _comes to be meaningful_, how meaning itself is constituted, _for_ human subjects. And, further, how this meaning is built up into complexes which constitute the basic structures (subjective - intersubjective) of the social world. We have indicated previously the degree to which the achievement of thses twin tasks was accomplished in the _Phenomenology of the Social World_ primarily with later writings

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[24] Ibid., cover, front flap.

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involving their further amplification. The relationships between these endeavors on the part of Schutz and the present study are readily apparent, however, once it is remembered that our task involves likewise the pursuit of the process, structures, and relationships involved in meaning establishment, interpretation, and transformation in the dimension of social reality.[25] To the degree, therefore, to which we seek to understand philosophically the process of self-explication within the social dimension, thus are we drawn into the complexities of matters which have been systematically explored by the thinker Alfred Schutz. In both cases the problematics focused upon call for phenomena to be understood fully within the horizon of an understanding of social reality in all its dimensions and structures and the means by which they are constituted. So it is then that the philosophy of Alfred Schutz provides the theoretical framework for the explication of the phenomenon being considered here. And as the horizon of inquiry (reflective, conceptual) is constituted primary by the philosophy of Schutz, it is unnecessary at this point to become involved in an extended discussion of this philosophy, of its key concepts. Rather this discussion will be identical to the progression of the analysis itself which constitutes its field and horizon. Suffice it to say at this point that our concern, like that of Schutz, is aimed primarily at the descriptive understanding of the experience of meaning-subjective, self-typifying meaning - in the world of social reality.

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[25] Cf. Schutz, PSW, Chapter 3, Section 25, "Meaning Establishment and Meaning Interpretation."

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Finally, we have stressed repeatedly the fact that while we do seek to understand the experiences of the meanings of social reality, of the self socially conceived in particular, still we do not wish to do so with the degree of radicalness achieved by Husserl via the methodological technique of transcendental reduction. Rather, we said, it was desirable and necessary to keep within view the objective pole of the horizon of consciousness, the world of culture, society and nature, thereby to understand its correlativity to consciousness and the subsequent implication for the understanding of meaning in the social world. The fulfillment of this plan demands, however, recognition of the distinctiveness of these two realms and of the subsequent implications for the modes of understanding appropriate to each. Thus, for purposes of analysis, remaining fully cognizant that the two realms are but abstractions from a continuous horizon frozen into particularity, we shall have to pursue our course with two dimensions. The one is that of the egological sphere, the ream of the self and the constitution and experience of meaning; the other is that of 'objective' social reality, the realm of alter egos, culture, society in general. The continuous zones between these two domains will likewise be discussed. All of this is essential if our task which seeks to bring to philosophical clarity the historic (as a process occurring in time) process of the working out of the problematic of identity on the part of peoples of African descent, particularly in America, the source of the problematic phenomenon as far as this study is concerned, is to be realized. The successful understanding of this process will entail the understanding of how the world of social reality and the individual (and collective racial)consciousness (self-reflectively) are meant by black peoples. Here it is that the thoughts of Schutz and those of this writer become, as he would say, an occasion of the 'simultaneity of consciousness,' of 'growing older together.' So it is that his thoughts become the horizon and background for my own.

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PART II

Analysis of the Egological Sphere

A constructive interpretation of Alfred Schutz's analyses of the process of meaning constitution in consciousness and of the structurizations of consciousness.

A. Reclaiming the Problematic

B. Transition to the Egological Sphere

C. Consciousness: The Sphere of Subjective Reality

D. The Constitution of Meaning in the Sphere of Consciousness

E. The Structurization of Consciousness: Preliminary Considerations

> The black is a black man: that is, as the result of a series of aberrations of affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be extricated.
>
> The problem is important. I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself.
>
> Franz Fanon[1]

A. Reclaiming the Problematic

Having treated the central issues regarding methodology, point of departure, and goal of the inquiry, it is now time to reclaim the problem to be treated. To reclaim it, that is, in the way of its restatement so as to bring it once again into full view. The quote from Fanon above thrusts near to the heart of the matter: the "aberrations of affect;" the black man's self-negations. These 'aberrations,' the self-denials of the black man, have emerged out of the social dialectics in almost all instances wherein he has "lived" in situations of colonial and/or semi-colonial subjugation and dependency on the European - the white man. Upon these we wish to focus our attention. More precisely, however, it is not just the facticity of the 'aberrations' which we wish to view, but, in addition, the more profound instances of the processes (objective and subjective history), the movements to (and the experience of) the establishment of a positive self-identity on the part of peoples of African descent. Thus it is that we specify this analysis as one which seeks to describe the process of the transformation of consciousness within the context of the consciousness of the man of color.

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[1] Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, Charles Markmann, trans., Grove Press, Inc.: New York, 1967, p. 10.

The implications of this transformation (and its analysis) are astounding, individually, socially, politically, culturally. The most immediate ramifications are to be had in the individual consciousness, first and foremost. From here all else follows. Initially, however, the 'successful' transformation, successful to the degree that it brings about symmetry between the reality of the egological sphere and the sphere of objective social reality,[2] serves to bring about the resolution of the problematic of the divided self, a phenomenon noted by DuBois.[3] The notion of symmetry is central as it establishes the goal or term of the transformative project. What the concept intends is a situation wherein the self-appropriated meaningfulness of a subject (i.e., one's identity) is, with relation to its social base (the particular, historical socio-political-cultural conditions of one's self-identity), acceptable (i.e., is affirmed, rather than negated). Such a situation would, in our view, constitute a resolution of the problematic experiences of the sense of divided self. Further implications follow from this in terms of the modifications of social relationships, language, political action, educational processes - in short, modification more or less of the total pattern of the person's life activity, depending upon the degree of transformation.

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[2] Cf. Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, Doubleday & Co.: Garden City, N. Y., 1966, esp. Part III, "Society as Subjective Reality," p. 119f. In the development of the analysis we shall draw freely upon these thinkers. The notion of 'symmetry' between 'objective reality' and 'subjective reality' is taken from this work. Hereafter it will be referred to as Social Construction.

[3] Op. cit., "Introduction."

In order to apprehend adequately just how profound such a transformation and its implications are one would have to have an understanding of and a sensitivity for, first, the history of race relations between black and white people in America,[4] and, more importantly, of the results of these social dialectics with reference to the psyche, the consciousness[5] of black people. Historically, therefore, the foundation of the problematic - the divided consciousness of black people, their self-negation - lies in the original network of social relationships between blacks and whites established and maintained (with modifications, however) since the arrival of the first people of color to the land of the Indians which we may refer to in general terms as slavery and racism. The former (slavery) refers, roughly, to the objective, i.e. economic, social, political, realities of the American social scene; the latter (racism) to the subjective reality, i.e. the meaning, relevance, and value systems of the Europeans as projected upon black people.[6] And while slavery as a form of legal, objective social relationships ended in the 1860's, the subjective reality of racism with all of its subsequent objective social ramifications (the myriad forms of racial injustices) has persisted to this day.

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[4] For our concern, the matter of transformation is being viewed as it occurs within the consciousness of black people in America specifically.

[5] The analysis as proposed is intended phenomenologically, not psychologically; thus is concerned with structures of consciousness and the constitution of meaning and relevance, of reality ultimately.

[6] Cf. Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550-1812, Penguin Books, Inc.: Baltimore, 1969. This work by Jordan constitutes a profound and illuminating analysis of the 'subjective realm' of whites during the period indicated.

The effects of the historically continuous patterns of racism upon the black man, continuous to the degree that racism is an intrinsic aspect of the "American way of life," have received massive amounts of study, with great amounts of effort being directed to the "identity problem of Negroes."[7] As indicated, however, what is intended here is not an analysis psychological in nature but phenomenological description: a description of the process of meaning constituted as exemplified in the transformative process of movement from negative to positive self-affirmation. Thus, the primary dimension of the analysis is that of the egological sphere. By "egological sphere" we refer to the dimension of consciousness, human subjectivity, wherein meaning has its intentional grounding and is constituted and transposed.

B. Transition to the Egological Sphere

The movement into the egological sphere is grounded in the need to grasp the way in which meaning is constituted in consciousness, if we are to grasp the process of self-constitution involved in transformation. Our movement away from

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[7] Cf., for example, the bibliography accompanying the article "The Nature and Meaning of Negro Self-Identity" by Harold Proshansky and Peggy Newton in Social Class, Race and Psychological Development, Martin Deutsch, et. al., editors, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc.: New York, 1968, pp. 178-218.

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the explicit reflection upon the realm of objective social reality will proceed only so far as to bring into relief the structures and processes of the intersubjectively engaged consciousness. This is a matter of crucial importance. For the key to the phenomenon under consideration is its dialectical nature: that is, the fact that a primary moment of the process leading to self-consciousness involves an intimate relationship with the other, namely, the moment of recognition. Thus,

> Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized.'[8]

So it is that we specify the analysis as a limited employment of the techniques of reduction, a methodological choice which thus allows us to retain in view the essentialness of the other for the process of self-affirmation. More so in this case as we direct our attention to the complicated movement from negative to positive self-affirmation as grounded in social realities.

Finally, the rationale for the transition to the egological sphere by way of epoche and partial reduction has its foundation in the formulation of the problematic itself, a formulation not on this side (the side of phenomenological analysis), but on the other side, the side of the concrete, existential subject, the questioning black man seeking "Who am I? - What am I to be?" The exigencies of the questioning process itself embody, on the existential level, a question of meaning. The question might therefore be paraphrased to ask "What is the meaning of my life (as a man of color)?" The answer to this question, commonly enjoying very high currency in the expression "I'm black and I'm proud!" requires that we move, for its understanding philosophically, to the level of constitutive consciousness wherein this set of self-reflective meanings has its source and being. This source is none other than consciousness itself: consciousness aware of its own being and meaning; consciousness turned back on itself in a radical act of self-creation and projection. In following the exigencies to thought and reflection heuristically present in the existentially formulated problematic we are thereby drawn into the sphere wherein meaning has its ultimate source.[9] We say "ultimately" however in recognition of the fact that, from our humanistic, phenomenological point of view, meaningfulness is an aspect not of the natural (i.e. physical science) world but specifically the human world. Meaning, as a fundamental constituent of human existence, is for consciousness, thus can only properly be discussed as such.[10] This is not to overlook the fact, however, that meaning systems are socially constructed.[11] Still, the ultimate foundation of socially constructed meaning systems are the situations of socially engaged individuals. Thus it is that we move into the sphere of the egological constitution

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[8] G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, J. B. Baille, trans., Harper & Row: New York, 1967, p. 229.

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[9] Implied here is the radical humanistic affirmation that meaning humanly grasped is humanly grounded, ultimately, finally, thus has no relationship to or origin in the activities of an extra-human source, i.e., God or gods.

[10] Cf. Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," Collection, F. E. Crowe, S. J., ed., Herder & Herder: New York, 1967.

[11] Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology, Doubleday & Company, Inc.: Garden City, N. Y., 1963, p. 64.

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of meaning mindful all the while of the irreducibly social nature of such meaning though it is not totally so.[12]

C. Consciousness: The Sphere of Subjective Reality

With this movement to the subjective sphere as the realm primarily constitutive of meaning the analysis, subsequently, reaches what might be termed a 'high level of theoretical abstractness.' In so doing we leave the world of the "natural attitude," the level of pre-reflexive, pre-critical understanding, reaching instead the world of descriptive phenomenology wherein the concrete, historicizing processes of transformation existentially played out in concrete life histories are left behind, in suspension, as it were. And this is as it should be as we seek to apprehend (reflectively) the essential aspects of the process of transformation as evidenced in constitutive consciousness rather than the explanation of the process itself (i. e. in terms of psychological causality). Thus, while we will not be referring explicitly very often to our main problematic, that is, it will not remain at this point at the thematic center of our attention, still it is to be remembered that it is still with us as the "surrounding horizon" of the present matter of immediate concern. This follows, however, as a matter of course relative to the demands of inquiry implicit in the problematic and its description.

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[12] Cf. Social Construction, op. cit., on the impossibility of total socialization.

Within the present context of the analysis, what is of interest is the manner in which (subjectively, immanent to consciousness) the consciousness of the self-questioning black man is essentially structured[13] at a 'now' of inner duration at which the meaning of the experience of self (identity)is positively affirmed. We must understand this process as a whole.

The proper analysis of the field of consciousness (proper for our purposes at hand) requires that we secure a full understanding of this field in the way of laying out to view two of its most essential aspects and their relationships: the constitution of meaning and relevance systems. That these are essential aspects requiring our attention follows from the phenomenon being discussed in that it involves the constitution (or re-constitution) of the meaning of the worlds of subjective and objective reality from a radically self-reflective foundation. In laying out these aspects of consciousness we shall be drawing upon, primarily, what we have referred to above as our main theoretical source: the philosophy of Alfred Schutz.

Viewed from the perspective of the problematic in its radicalness the subjective sphere of reality might best be approached initially from the conceptual plane of "self identity" in the sense of the abiding sense (meaning) of sameness (of self-interpretation) mentioned by Erickson.[14] What is involved in this self-identification is what Schutz (and others) refers to as "self-typification,"[15] or the self-reflective structuration of the self in pre-predicative experience. Thus, it is this process involving acts of self-typification, in this case the transformative movement from one to another mode of self-typification as exemplified in particular modes of discourse, at which we wish to get. The full description of this process will take us once again into the world of objective (intersubjective) reality. Still, its basis must be shown as it persists in subjective reality, that is, in the meaningfulness of consciousness to and for itself. What is thus required is the analysis of meaning and its constitution and its organization into complexes and systems to constitute ultimately the total "biographical situation" of the individual.[16] The notion of 'biographical situation' has reference to the unique manner in which each invidivual is located of "situated" existentially in the world, the uniqueness of which is such to constitute the world as "my world." As such this biographical situation is constituted in part by the "sedimentation," or experiential accumulation, of one's personal history (within, of course, the context of a wider world history), of all of the experiences which one has had as preserved in memory and are available in one's

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[13] "Essentially" structured here has reference to the immanent descriptive-phenomenological aspects of consciousness rather than socially derived objectifiable 'contents' as in, say, the use of the socially based meanings of language.

[14] Erickson, op. cit., "The Concept of Identity. . ."

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[15] Schutz, esp. CP2, "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World;" Berger & Luckmann, op. cit., Social Construction; Maurice Natanson, The Journeying Self, Addison-Wesley: Reading, Mass., 1970.

[16] The use of the concept of "biographical situation" in reference to subjective reality is taken from Schutz: Cf. Reflections, and CP1, esp. the introduction by Maurice Natanson.

"stock of knowledge at hand."[17] This latter includes not only the sedimentation of first-hand experience but also knowledge socially derived, i.e. from parents, teachers, etc.[18] The fact (phenomenological) of this aspect of consciousness, that is, the latter's structurization, and the manner in which it comes to be so structured - these are the matters which have come to be our most immediate concern. Their pursuit therefore lands us in the same camp of activities as involved Schutz in the early thoughts of Reflections, namely, the analysis of "the field of consciousness insofar as it is structured into a thematic kernal which stands out over against a surrounding horizon and is given at any 'now' of inner duration."[19] The essential aspects of this process have been investigated in depth by Husserl, as Schutz notes. However, before we can adequately treat this structuration and its processes we must come to some prior understanding of its key aspect, namely, the function of the 'attentional ray' or attentional modification as the central feature of the structurization of the field of consciousness. That we must do this lies in the fact that the activity of this same 'attentional ray' is central also the constitution of meaning. What for now is only implied is the fact that meaning is, in a minimal sense (though different in an important sense for phenomenology) similar to that sense specified by

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[17] Schutz, Reflections, p. 2; regarding the notion of "stock of knowledge at hand" n.b. Reflections, Chapter 3, Section E, Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Susanne Langer[20] to the degree to which she views meaning functionally in terms of term and pattern.[21] Thus, again implicitly, prior to further elaboration, meaning is central to the structurization of consciousness and even to the constitution of systems of relevances and the stock of knowledge at hand at any moment, ultimately. Common to each of these aspects of consciousness is the activity of the 'attentional ray' of the ego.

The analysis of meaning assumes high priority in the present context for another equally important reason. And this is the fact that the problem as posed for reflection is that of attempting to ascertain philosophically the meaning which a set of experiences (the self-questioning of the black man) has for another, or, at the very least, what the essential components of the constitution of such meaning must be (phenomenologically conceived). The attempt at such an understanding is not totally unlike that specified by Weber as the primary task of interpretive sociology,[22] namely, the grasp of subjective meaning. The difficulties and limitations involved in such attempted understandings were adquately pointed out by Schutz.[23] In the present case, however, the extreme limitation, namely, that the understanding of the subjective meaning of another's experiences is at best a limiting concept,[24] is overcome by virtue of the autobiographical aspect of the present analysis. Still, as we noted earlier, a major achievement of PSW is precisely the analysis of the concept (Weber's) of meaning and its precise explication by way of phenomenological philosophy.

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[20] Philosophy in a New Key, New American Library: New York, 1951. The important distinction lies in the fact that Langer sees logic as foundational (p. 54).

[21] Ibid., p. 56.

[22] See above, Part I.

[23] Schutz, PSW, Chapter 2.

D. The Constitution of Meaning in the Sphere of Consciousness

1. The Constitution of Meaning in General

The precise manner in which this phenomenological grounding of the concept of meaning is accomplished by Schutz is to be found in PSW, chapter 2.[25] The radicalness of this explication was noted quite early in the work as Schutz indicated that the full and proper grasp of the constitution of meaning could only be had by going to its very source: internal time consciousness, the consciousness of one's own duration. Thus,

> It is within this duration that the meaning of a person's experience is constituted for him as he lives through the experience. Here and here only, in the deepest stratum of experience that is accessible to reflection, is to be found the ultimate source of the phenomenon of 'meaning' (Sinn) and 'understanding' (Verstehen). This stratum of experience can only be disclosed in strictly philosophical self-consciousness.[26]

It is here, in this analysis of the 'deepest stratum' of experience, that Schutz, acknowledgingly, owes his greatest philosophical debts to Bergson and Husserl.[27] From Bergson he drew upon the notion of consciousness in the form of "pure duration" (duree):

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[24] Schutz, PSW, p. 98.

[25] "The Constitution of Meaningful Lived Experience in the Constitutor's Own Stream of Consciousness," pp. 45-46.

[26] Schutz, PSW, p. 12.

> In 'pure duration' there is no 'side-by-sideness,' no mutual externality of parts, and no divisibility, but only a continuous flux, a stream of conscious states. . . what we experience in duration is not a being that is discrete and well-defined but a constant transition from a now-thus to a new now-thus. The stream of consciousness by its very nature has not yet been caught up in the net of reflection.[28]

According to Bergson, living within this stream of experience as 'pure duration' is to be distinguished from living within the 'space-time world.' The latter world is constituted by acts of reflection wherein the flow of duration has been halted, that is, one no longer is surrendered to it, and aspects of it have been brought into relief, i. e. classified into spatiotemporal concepts with the result being the constitution of 'discrete' units (objects of experience).[29] Thus are there two key levels of consciousness: the flowing experiences of pure duration and the discontinuous discrete images of the world of space and time.[30] As such they constitute (are constituted by) two different "degrees of psychic tension" of consciousness (Bergson's attention a la vie). In the case of living immersed in the flow of my stream of consciousness there are no clearly differentiated experiences at all. There is no 'beginning' and/or 'end.' The flow as such is uni-directional and irreversible. Awareness of this flow presupposes a "turning-back against the stream," an act of "reflection," the key aspect of which is the act of remembrance:

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[27] Cf. Schutz, PSW, notes 73 and 74, p. 36, for lists of works by Bergson and Husserl.

[28] Schutz, PSW, p. 45.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Schutz, PSW, p. 47.

> The awareness of the experience in the pure stream of duration is changed at every moment into remembered having-just-been-thus; it is the remembering which lifts the experience out of the irreversible stream of duration and thus modifies the awareness, making it a remembrance.[31]

The precise description of this process, as well as that of the constitution of meaning is consciousness, was accomplished by Schutz's second and main philosophical creditor, Husserl, in his work Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewustseins (English translation, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, by James S. Churchill, Bloomington, Indiana, 1964). This process of remembering has, for Husserl, two distinguishable aspects: primary retention, or "retention, as the after-consciousness of the primal impression," and secondary retention, or, recollection or reproduction.[32]

> Retentional modification conforms directly to a primal impression in the sense that it is a continuum retaining throughout the same basic outline. . . This feature of the identical basic outline carrying over from impression to retention is missing in secondary

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[31] Schutz, PSW, p. 47.

[32] PSW, p. 48

> remembrance or reproduction. On the contrary, there is a sharp discontinuity between reproduction and impression. . . It is, therefore, by virtue of retention that the multiplicity of the running-off of duration is constituted. . . On the other hand, the identity of the object and objective time itself is constituted in recollection (reproduction). . .[33]

This distinction, Schutz notes, while important to the overall theory of meaning-constitution, has implications also for the concept of 'lived experience.' Thus, as Husserl concludes,

> We must. . .distinguish between the pre-empirical being of the lived-experiences, their being prior to the glance of attention directed toward them, and their being as phenomena. Through the attending directed glance of attention and comprehension, the lived experience acquires a new mode of being. It comes to be 'differentiated,' 'thrown into relief,' and this act of differentiation is nothing other than the act of comprehension, and the differentiation nothing other than being comprehended, being the object of the directed glance of attention.[34]

What is of crucial importance here, in addition to the importance of the distinction itself, is the function played in the process by the ego activity of 'attentional modification.' This modification or redirection of attention, more precisely, the alteration of psychic tension (attention a la vie), is central to the constitution of the meaningfulness of experience. As a second order act, so to speak, it is an act of the ego re-directed (reflected) back upon the having-just-gone-by (retained) or reproduced flow of experience:

> For the act of attention - and this is of major importance for the study of meaning - presupposes as elapsed, passed-away experience,

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[33] Schutz, PSW, pp. 48-9.

[34] Schutz, PSW, p. 50; quoted from Husserl, Zeitbewusstsein, op. cit., p. 484 (English trans., pp. 178-79).

> in short, one that is already in the past, regardless of whether the attention in question is reflective or reproductive.[35]

We may say, then, in a preliminary fashion, that meaning is constituted in the act of attention directed upon an elapsed flow of experience. We may say this in that a meaningful experience implies something other than a continuous flow of experiences which continually run-off, shading into one another - it implies a discrete experential phase. And, as we have just seen, such a discrete experience is to be had only by way of a shift in the tension of consciousness (attentional modification) from a living in the flow, to reflection upon it or its reproduction. Thus,

> Because the concept of meaningful experience always presupposes that the experience of which meaning is predicated is a discrete one, it now becomes quite clear that only a past experience can be called meaningful, that is, one that is present to the retrospective glance as already finished and done with. . . Only the already experienced is meaningful, not that which is being experienced. For meaning is merely an operation of intentionality, which, however, only becomes visible to the reflective glance.[36]

So it is, perhaps, that we speak of "intentions of meaning" or 'meaning intentions,' with, it seems, even more accuracy than might be supposed.

Still, the essence of the preliminary definition of meaning resides in the recognition of the primacy of the act of attention for its constitution and, secondly, of the distinction between the two levels of consciousness: pure duration or lived experience, and reflected upon or meaningful experience. This latter important distinction, pure duration as against discrete units of experience via attentional modification, corresponds to what Schutz terms the "tension between life and thought," respectively, wherein "life pertains to duration," and "thought is focused on the aspects of the spatiotemporal world. . ."

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[35] Schutz, PSW, p. 51.

[36] PSW, p. 52.

> The tension between the two is of the essence of the 'meaningfulness' of experience.[37]

In terms therefore of this 'primordial sense' of meaning (a sense which is limited distinctively, Schutz cautions, to the meaning to which each of us gives to his own actions thus does not include the sense of meaning in the intersubjective sphere), we can say only misleadingly that experiences have meaning or that meaning lies in the experience. Rather,

> those experiences are meaningful which are grasped reflectively. The meaning is the way in which the ego regards its experience. The meaning lies in the attitude of the ego toward that part of its stream of consciousness which has already flowed by, towards its 'elapsed duration'. . .It is, then, incorrect to say that my lived experiences are meaningful merely in virtue of their being experienced or lived through. Such a view would eliminate the tension between living within the flow of duration and reflection on the experience thus lived through, in other words, the tension between life and thought. . . Let us then, reject the position that meaningfulness pertains either to the noematic structure (i.e., lived experience itself) or to the mere fact of belonging to the stream of duration. We shall say rather that each act of attention to one's own stream of duration may be compared to a cone of light. This cone illuminates already elapsed individual phases of that stream, rendering them bright and sharply defined (and as such, meaningful).

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[37] Schutz, PSW, p. 69.

> We conclude, then, that the concept of meaning and its problematic have no application to life considered as duration.[38]

There is in all of this a matter of extreme cruciality yet to be mentioned explicitly. Schutz was aware of this matter from the very beginning; it is the problem of time. As he noted, the problem of meaning is a problem of time, not, as he says, divisible and measurable physical time, but historical time: specifically, for him, internal time consciousness. For us, however, the extreme importance of the factor of time within the subjective sphere, as it relates to our problematic, has to do with the very constitution of the phenomenon which we wish to describe: transformation of consciousness. Transformation is identical with 'passage in time,' is temporality and history; hence time/history (personal/social history) is a central aspect of our concern. We see, however, that it is not in itself a problematic aspect, for the adequate perspective on temporality for our purposes lies in germinal form in the descriptions so far completed. Thus the constitution of meaning, and, therefore, its transformation, presupposes in its primordality temporality as it is predicable only of elapsed duration. We shall have more to say of this when we treat explicitly the process of transformation. Yet we could have had no better time than the present to prepare the groundwork for this later description.

The specification of meaning so far established is, according to Schutz, a laying out of the concept of meaning in general. The subsequent question,

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[38] Schutz, PSW, pp. 69-70.

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therefore, is

> How is. . . specific meaning constituted within the stream of consciousness, and how is the concept of specific meaning derivable from the general concept of meaning. . . How, above all, does it happen that the meaning of one and the same experience can change as it recedes into the past?[39]

2. The Constitution of Specific Meaning

The key to the understanding of the constitution of specific meanings lies implicit in a notion which we have employed rather consistently without our having gone into its systematic elaboration. This is the concept of "attentional modification." The grasp of this concept, of the workings of the 'ray' of attention directed from the ego as the source of all activities of consciousness, is absolutely essential for the understanding of the process of transformation. It is the case, in fact, that the process of transformation itself involves precisely this matter of attentional modification. Transformations of consciousness have their foundation in the redirecting of reflective self appraisal as a mode of attentional modification:

> Let us fix in idea and in respect of its noematic content some thing of which we are perceptively aware or some occurrence connected with it. . . Then the fixing also of the beam of attention in its own appointed circuit belongs to this idea. For the beam also is a phase of experience. It is then evident that modes of attention of the fixed experience are possible which we indicate by the rubic 'alternations in the distributions of attention and its modes.'[40]

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[39] Schutz, PSW, p. 71.

[40] Schutz, PSW, p. 72, quoted from Husserl, Ideen, 3rd ed., Halle: Niemeyer, 1928, p. 190 (English trans., W. T. Boyce Gibson, Ideas, Macmillan: New York, 1931, p. 267).

Thus it is that the transformation of consciousness, more precisely, the constitution of (specific) meanings, rests on the particular mode of attention which is directed upon the elapsed stream of experience. This 'shaft' or 'ray' of attention is and remains personal in the sense of having, as Husserl states, the "character of subjectivity,"[41] or, as Schutz puts it, it "signifies that it accompanies the changes of the ego within the stream of duration. . ."[42]

> it participates in the constitution of the actual Here-Now-and Thus, because Here and Now would be no 'Thus,' that is, it would lack determinate quality of its own were the ego not directing its attention toward it.[43]

And of equal importance for the present analysis:

> Conversely one can say that the actual Here-Now-and-Thus is the basis of attentional modification, for it is from the point of view of the present moment that the shaft of attention is directed backward on the elapsed phases.[44]

The significance of this latter revelation must not be overlooked. It provides a fundamental though primary (i.e. prior to further elaboration and amplification) perspective from which to grasp the process of meaning constitution, not in general, but in terms of particular instances of meaning constitution. What it means is that the meaningfulness of (past) experiences is fundamentally grounded in the present, more precisely, in the attitudes or "modes," (in the

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[41] Schutz, PSW, p. 73, quoted by Schutz from Husserl, Ideen, p. 192 (English trans., p. 270).

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

Heideggerian sense of "existentialia of Dasein"), which inform the modes of attention directed upon the past experiences. In the words of Schutz, "the attitude of the ego toward life - its attention a la vie - determines in turn its attitude toward the past."[45] Thus the meaning of an experience is modified depending upon not only the mode of attention that is given to the experience but also upon the particular moment of personal history from which the past experience is observed by the ego. Depending upon the temporal distance from which the experience[46] is viewed so will its meaning and the depth of the reflection vary. In both cases, as the ultimate foundation of meaning constitution rests in the dimension of the present, the establishment and interpretation of meaning are processes which are pragmatically determined, that is, are based on the exigencies of living in the world.

We have not yet completed our analysis of the constitution of meaning. So far we have laid bare the process of the constitution of meaning in general, and the constitution of specific meaning remaining in both cases within the subjective sphere, i.e. consciousness. What is needed now is an "amplification," in the words of Schutz, of the notion of meaning so far laid out in order to bring into view the manner in which meaningfulness functions or is seen as a condition of the unification of experience. To put it differently, having come to an understanding of the constitution of specific meanings, we must likewise describe how complexes of meaning (or intentional acts of), of experience, are built up. What we intend here is the unification of experiences into larger units of single acts of meaning intentions. From such a description we shall be aided tremendously in our endeavor to bring to view the process involving the questioning and transformation of self-interpretation on the part of the man of color.

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[45] Schutz, PSW, p. 73.

[46] Experience is taken to mean both experience of 'objective' realities, i.e. external to the ego-consciousness, and 'subjective' realities, i.e. experience of the reflective examination of competing value systems: the man of color's deliberations on meaning systems through which the meaning of his own being might be mediated.

3. The Constitution of Meaning Complexes

The modes or 'levels' of unification of experience which may be described are three. There is, first, the personal unification of experiences due to the fact that they are mine. This factor constitutes the "primal unity" of experience.[47] To this is added a second level, the unity of meaning proper, which is derived from the reflective glance (attentional ray), an act which "raises the content of consciousness from pre-phenomenal to phenomenal status."[48] Finally, there is a third and higher stage constituted by the gathering of separate acts into a higher synthesis to constitute a context or configuration of meaning.[49]

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[47] Schutz, PSW, p. 75.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

> We say that our lived experiences E_1, E_2, ... , E_n stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic attention. . . Configurations of meaning. . . consist of meanings already created in more elementary acts of meaning.[50]

An example of the creation of such a meaning context, that is, of the synthesizing of separate acts of meaning into a higher order of meaning, is the act of interpretation of one's "life" (past, present, projected), one's personal history, as to its meaning. In such an instance the notion "context of experience" is taken to mean "the content of the totality of meaning-configurations brought together within one moment,"[51] as against regarding it simply as a "meaning-context of a higher order."[52] Both senses are accurate, however,

The important thing to note here, however, is the fact that meaning-contexts as syntheses (i. e. are the monothetic grasp (reflection) of polysynthetic intentional acts) are in principle amenable to their breakdown reflectively into the separate acts of their constitution, though in reality this process cannot be carried out to its logical extreme there being some experiences, due to their intimacy, or very close relation to core of the ego-self,[53] which are thus not subject to such reproduction of their constitution. For our purpose, however, it is sufficient that we have established the reality of both processes: unification into meaning-configurations and reconstruction (re-interpretation) through reflective reproduction. The ultimate meaning-configuration is constituted by what Schutz terms one's "stock of knowledge at hand,"[54] that is, the stockpiled accumulation of life's experiences as we said present at any moment to recall. As Schutz puts it:

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[50] Schutz, PSW, p. 75. Schutz noted that this process of forming "configurations of meaning" is the same for both internal and external experience.

[51] PSW, p. 76.

[52] Ibid.

[53] PSW, p. 52.

> We can. . . define the total context of experience as the content of all Acts of attention which the Ego as a free being can direct at any given moment of its conscious life toward those of its elapsed lived experiences that have been constituted in step-by-step syntheses. . . *The specific meaning of a lived experience,* and therefore the particular mode of the Act of attention to it, *consists in the ordering of this lived experience within the total context of experience that is present-at-hand* [my emphasis]. . . The intended meaning of a lived experience is nothing more nor less than a self-interpretation of that lived experience from the point of view of a new lived experience.[55]

We noted above that the establishment of meaning and its interpretation, based as these processes are on the Acts of attention of the Ego, is pragmatically determined. The importance of this for us is the fact that, in a case such as that involving the questioning transformation of self-typified meanings, the degree to which the elements of one's total meaning-configuration (i.e. stock of knowledge at hand), the polythetic syntheses, can be traced back to their original constitution in pure duration is a task accomplishable given a suitable Act of attention, and, hence, a suitable governing motive.[56] This is highly important, for it lays

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[54] Schutz, PSW, p. 78.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Schutz, PSW, pp. 80-81.

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bare within the context of consciousness the basis for the degrees of identity transformation experienced by different individuals. This difference is a function of the force (meaning intensity) of the motive which founders the transformative process.

4. The Constitution of Meaning-Patterns

Having worked our way up to configurations of meaning we should note further that these configurations are further built up into "patterns of syntheses" and "schemes" of experience. These are not further additions to the stock of knowledge at hand for the individual but involves a further elaboration of the same. The function, however, of the patterns is the constitution of the world for the subject, the "ordering" of this world and his modes of being in it, for the ego-consciousness.

> The man in the natural attitude 'has,'. . . a stock of knowledge of physical things and fellow creatures, of social collectives and of artifacts, including cultural objects. He likewise 'has' syntheses of inner experience. Among these are to be found judgment contents (or propositional contents) which are the result of his previous acts of judgment. Here also are to be found all products of the activity of the mind and will. All these experiences, whether internal or external, enter into meaning-contexts of a higher order for the man in the natural standpoint, and of these, too, he has experience. . . Let us call these patterns the schemes of our experience.[57]

Further, all of the components of these schemes of "once-lived-through experiences" have coherence with each other, that is, they, first, mutually condition one another; secondly, they are synthetically constructed into higher level patterns; and, finally, they are all elements of the total configuration of experience in the Here and Now and constitute it.[58] Thus,

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[57] Schutz, PSW, pp. 81-82.

> in every here and now there is a total coherence of our experience. This means merely that the total configuration of our experience is a synthesis of our already-lived-through experiences brought about by a step-by-step construction. To this synthesis there corresponds a total object, namely, the content of our knowledge in the Here and Now.[59]

It is to be noted that contradictory experiences can occur within this total coherence without impairing its overall unity. In case of the latter one is faced with the very serious rupture of one's world, a matter of discussion appropriate to psychology and psychoanalysis proper. Still, we shall have more to say on this matter when we come explicitly to the process of transformation. Even so, the schemes of experience should not be regarded as clear and homogeneous; rather they have lights and shadows, horizons and perspectives, depending upon the degree of attention given them by the Ego.[60]

We have viewed through Schutz's work the constitution of meaning in the sphere of consciousness and its organization into schemes. The grasp of this process is crucial to our problematic; its meaning for the analysis of that problematic is obvious as it makes clear the process by which the human subject organizes his experiences into "his world." We have only to move out from the descent into the subjective sphere and to fill in this phenomenological outline with empirical (i. e. psychological, sociological, political, etc.) data in order to round off fully a complete analysis.

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[58] Schutz, PSW, p. 82.

[59] Ibid.

[60] PSW, p. 83.

However, our task of the explication of the process of meaning constitution is only partially complete. For we have so far not indicated the process of meaning constitution in its fullness. In fact, we briefly ran through the matter as we described the constitution of specific meaning as a process in which a new lived experienced is ordered into the organized context of past experiences. Again, references to the importance of the Here and Now, the particular existential situation of the ego-consciousness including his pragmatic motives (intent) at the moment of reflection upon his past experiences - all of these matters point to an important function not yet brought fully to light: the role of the schemes of experience as interpretive schemes.[61] It is to this matter that we must now turn.

5. Schemes of Experience as Interpretive Schemes

As mentioned above, the endowment of lived experiences with specific meaning, that is, their "ordering" within the already established and solidified total configuration of past experiences (i. e., the stock of knowledge at hand), is, in the words of Schutz, a matter of self-explication. What is involved here - what we seek to understand - is a process involving the reflective interpretation of 'new' lived experiences by the ego-consciousness for which the already ordered schemes of experience serve as the interpretive foundation. The understanding of this process is essential if we are to grasp fully the manner in which the ego-consciousness at any Here and Now, within any existential situation, constitutes its world through engagement in the way of giving meaning to it. This process is accomplished in a "synthesis of recognition" which. . .

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[61] Schutz, PSW, p. 83f, Section 16, "The Schemes of Experience as Interpretive Schemes. . ."

> . . . takes the lived experience that is to be classified, refers it back to the schemes on hand, and fixes its specific essence. The lived experience is thus brought back to an objectification already on hand within the store of experience and identified with this objectification.[62]

Further, this ordering via the synthesis of recognition, itself a 'doubly directed' Act of attention directed to both the new lived experience and the total context of the old, can take place via a number of modes including apprehension in the Here and Now and step-by-step logical formulation. According to Schutz, for each of the different types of ordering there are different types of schemes each of which can be known with different degrees of clarity.[63] This process of ordering Schutz formally designates as "the interpretation of lived experience,"[64] including under this notion the act of the connection of a sign with that which it signifies.[65] Thus interpretation (self-explication) involves the 'reference of the unknown to the known,' and schemes of experience are, properly designated, interpretive schemes, and have a unique function in the process of self-explication:

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[62] Schutz, PSW, p. 83.

[63] Schutz, PSW, p. 84.

[64] Ibid.

[65] PSW, p. 84.

> They are the completed meaning-configurations that are present at hand each time in the form of 'what one knows' or 'what one already knew.' They consist of material that has already been organized under categories. To these experience are referred for interpretation as they occur.[66]

A matter to be noted is the manner (the "criterion," as Schutz refers to it) in which one scheme out of many is chosen to interpret a given lived experience. Every lived experience, Schutz tells us, is open to numerous interpretations without detracting from its 'noematic nucleus.' In any case, those schemes which are chosen for self-explication "always bear the mark of a particular Here and Now, since this is true of the syntheses of recognition and the acts of reflective awareness which underlie them."[67] Thus,

> the selection of the requisite schemes is dependent upon the particular attentional modification that happens to be operative at that time. The Ego will of course always undergo different modifications of attention both toward the lived experience which presents itself for ordering and toward the whole stock of its past experience. Paradoxically it could be said that the lived experience itself decides the schemes into which it is to be ordered, and thus the problem chooses its own solution.[68]

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[66] Schutz, PSW, p. 84.

[67] PSW, p. 85.

[68] Ibid.

On the surface this appears to be a matter of extreme circularity. It is, however, only apparent. It is similar to the problem taken up in Part One with reference to the 'meta-scientific' issue of method and starting point, the dialectic of the two. The resolution obtained there is also sufficient here: the interpretation of a lived experience, the meaning with which it is endowed, is a function dialectically of what past experiences have prepared us for. This entire matter will be treated extensively below when we come to the problem of relevance.[69]

Finally, we have stressed repeatedly that the particular attitude of the Ego at any moment at which it directs its reflective attention back upon its past lived experiences is determined or 'motivated' pragmatically. Unless clarified this concept of motive embodies an ambiguity, or, more specifically, the absence of a clear distinction between two different types of motives. On the one hand there is what Schutz terms the "because-motive."[70] Such a motive is one wherein "both the motivating and the motivated lived experiences have the temporal character of pastness."[71] That is, a because-motive of an action is that basis (e.g. psychological) which accounts for the function of the project (i.e., an act phantasied as over and done with)[72] within which the action derives its meaning.

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[69] Cf. also Schutz's employment in this case of the distinction between formal and transcendental logics, pp. 85-86.

[70] Schutz, PSW, Section 18, pp. 91f.

[71] PSW, p. 93.

[72] See below.

The because-motive is thus always an explanation, says Schutz, which is always given after the event.

On the other hand there is action undertaken to carry out a preconceived plan or project, or a segment of the latter. Such a motive Schutz refers to as an "in-order-to" motive. In contrast to the because-motive the in-order-to motive is directed toward the future. Thus. . .

> In the in-order-to relation, the already existent project is the motivating factor; it motivates the action and is the reason why it is performed. But in the genuine because-relation, a lived experience temporally prior to the project is the motivating factor; it motivates the project which is being constituted at that time. This, then, is the essential difference between the two relations.[73]

This distinction is highly important. It allows us to describe with greater clarity the basis of actions undertaken by the man of color living in the process of self-transformation. Again, the importance of both relations resides as well in the fact that each is a meaning-context, hence, is a field for the ordering of experiences (both for us the philosophical observers, and the actor himself).

E. The Structurization of Consciousness: Preliminary Considerations

Our presentation of the description of the process of meaning constitution, unification, and organization within the egological sphere as accomplished by Schutz has brought us a significant way on our philosophical trek involving the laying out of the processes and structures of consciousness at work in the existential project of self-transformation. But the way is not yet complete. As we indicated before, we must specify in greater detail the process and its elements brought into being when one (the man of color, for us) engages in the activity of radical self-questioning. What is needed here is a description of the process by which a problematic situation arises and is dealt with by consciousness. What is being asked is how is it, within the realm of the egological sphere, that a problematic issue or situation is thematized and resolved by a questioning subject. The process of transformation experienced by the black man certainly arises out of a problematic situation, one which brings him face to face with himself imposing the demand that some decision be made. It is out of just such a situation that a new mediating system of meanings emerges (in our case, that is, though this is not a necessary result; one may remain 'what one is' without undergoing transformation). This is the phenomenon or process which we wish to bring into view.

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[73] Schutz, PSW, p. 92.

This process, phenomenologically conceived, involves the structurization of consciousness, its articulation into thematic topic and surrounding horizon, not an unimportant matter for us. In pursuing it we take up again a theme which we hit upon briefly earlier but had to lay aside until such time as we could take it up for full and adequate treatment. Thus it is that we seek now to get into what we have referred to, following Schutz, as the problem of relevance.

Initially, even prior to explicit analysis, the concept of relevance has wide ramifications within the context of the problematic under scrutiny. As such

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it is pre-reflectively employed in a manner which exhibits freely its intersubjective dimensions. As any number of instances will suffice to show, the problem of relevance has become just that - a problem - as people, people of color and the young especially, are going to great, sometimes extreme, lengths to reconstitute a *relevant* world (of meaning, value, etc., as manifested in dress codes, behavior patterns, educational reforms, etc.; particularly by people of African descent, in the great emphasis now being directed to the articulation of "black culture") for themselves in contrast to worlds constituted in the majority by older and/or non-colored peoples (their systems of value and meaning, their "culture"). So it is that the cry of *relevance* has become, for my people especially, a serious watch-word!

Yet what we desire here is the raising to philosophical clarity of this question of relevance. In so doing it is to be remembered that what we here refer to provisionally as relevance, prior to formal specification, is not to be regarded as something distinct from and unrelated to the problem of meaning just treated. Quite the contrary. There is a sense in which we can say quite safely that the concepts of meaning and relevance make up, to a great degree, the same processes of consciousness, constituted by essentially the same Acts. What is involved in this discussion of relevance is, as Schutz characterizes it, *an analysis of a set of problems dealing with the mind's selective activity.*[74] The key to understanding this selective process we have provided already in our discussion of the function of

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[74] Schutz, *Reflections*, p. 13.

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the "attentional ray," or reflective consciousness, in the constitution of meaning. It is this same process, the attentional modification of the tension of consciousness, which makes for the structurization of consciousness into a thematic kernal and a surrounding horizon. What we intend in this section is the explication of this structuring process as it relates to the process of self-transformation. Just how it relates will be a matter of continuing explication. We may, however, point out here that the process of self-transformation is a problem of relevance and meaning par excellence. In the case of meaning, we already have theoretical insight into this. In the case of the problem of relevance, however, a problem having to do with the relations holding between the theme and the horizon of consciousness and the process by which it becomes so structured, the phenomenon (both publicly and subjectively) of the self-questioning, self-transforming man of color is one which brings forcibly to light an instance in which the consciousness of an individual undergoes radical structurization, radical to the degree that in the process the meaning of life as a whole has become problematic. An aspect of this process is thus of extreme importance to those of us who wish to grasp this phenomenon in its radicalness, namely, what Schutz has (and others have under different concepts) referred to as the "fragmentation of the Ego," that is, the "splitting" of the Ego which results from Acts in which the Ego turns back upon itself in radical self-reflection. This phenomenon of ego splitting, of the "schizophrenic ego," has as its counterpart what Schutz terms the "counterpointal structure of the mind."[75] The grasp of these matters is essential to a proper understanding, on the philosophical level, of what is involved in the "quest for identity" on the part of people of color, of any people, for that matter.

Again, this problem of relevance is inextricably interwoven with that of meaning and another which we have yet to discuss: the constitution of reality. The relevance of the latter concern to our present efforts has to do with the fact that what we have referred to on the one hand as the transformation of meaning, involves, on the other hand, a transformation of reconstitution of reality for the individual or persons involved. It involves, therefore, their understanding of what is real for them. So it is that reality itself becomes problematic in such a case. The explicit treatment of this issue must await, however, the completion of our discussion of relevance, a matter the grasp of which is essential to understanding the process of reality constitution.

These few thoughts are merely offered in the way of 'markers' or guideposts to thought as we proceed, particularly for the forthcoming section, for they lay out the issues to be treated. It is again our way of laying the groundwork for future reflections. As we proceed it will be the case that the notions of meaning, relevance, and reality are used interchangeably. This is not unintentional. But the clarification of the matter should become more apparent once we have dealt at some length will all of these notions.

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[75] Schutz, Reflections, p. 12.

1. Theme and Horizon-Topical, Interpretational, and Motivational Relevance Systems

One of the first matters to be noted regarding the structurization of consciousness is the fact that this structurization into theme, i.e., the prominent focus of consciousness (say, the "Who am I?" question) and horizon, or, all other related issues or aspects of the question though unthematized, occurs across several levels of the life of consciousness. As in the case of the man of color engaged in radical reflection, this activity occurs as the primary aspect among a number of activities (writing, or, talking while driving an automobile, while working, etc.). Each of these levels has its own particular time dimension, its own particular tension of consciousness, its own particular articulations into theme and horizon. And, importantly, I live in each of them simultaneously:[76] I reflect upon the meaning of my life as a man of color while driving, walking, working, etc. Further, all of these activities are experienced as unified, as having a unified meaning. Still, Schutz notes, these are not homogeneous but heterogeneous activities, each occurring in its own medium of experiential context. But it is the focusing of consciousness upon its theme which provides the unification:

> It is the predominance of the theme which creates the apparent unification of this set of activities, and bestows the main accent of reality upon the realm of theoretical contemplation [in the case discussed by Schutz]. Seen from this perspective all the other activities simultaneously performed in other dimensions seem to be not irreal but subordinate and ancillary.[77]

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[76] Schutz, Reflections, p. 10.

[77] Ibid.

While Schutz was referring primarily to the activity of theoretical contemplation, the analysis is good for all similar activities of consciousness. Still, the important point here is the fact that, though we may live in all of these different dimensions simultaneously, the selection of one as the theme is, as Schutz says, merely to make one of them our "home base," or paramount reality, in relation to which all others are horizonal and subordinate.

There is another very important aspect to this process, however. It goes back to what we mentioned earlier about the "fragmentation of the ego:" in living simultaneously in these various "provinces of meaning"[78] we bring into play various levels of our personality.

> The delimitation of the field itself (and within the delimited field the structurization into thematic kernal and surrounding horizonal levels) is itself a function of the level of our personality involved . . . It is this 'counterpointal structure' of our personality and therewith of our stream of consciousness which is the corollary of what has been called in other connections the schizophrenic hypothesis of the ego - namely the fact that in order to make something thematic and another thing horizonal we have to assume an artificial split of the unity of our personality.[79]

Not the least important consequence of this finding is the fact that it renders clear a process discussed previously which seemed plagued by reasoning circularity, namely, the process by which schemes of experience are selected as interpretive schemes for new lived experiences. The source of this selectivity is, we now see, the bringing into play of different levels of our personality. This in itself is the problem of relevance. All of these matters, the simultaneous living in various dimensions of time, the putting into play of different levels of our personality, the articulation of consciousness into these different levels or realms - all of these, says Schutz, are but expressions of the single basic phenomenon: the interplay of relevance structures of which there are three: topical, interpretational, and motivational.[80] It is the nature of these relevance structures and their interplay which we wish now to explore.

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[78] CP1, "On Multiple Realities," p. 230.

[79] Schutz, Reflections, pp. 11-12.

Schutz himself uses interchangeably the terms "structures" and "systems" to describe relevances. In either case the reference is to the elements of the process by which consciousness is structured into theme and horizon and the relations between the latter two. In the case of self-reflecting subject, this structurization has as its theme the questioning of the meaning of self, i.e. what it means to be, say, a man of color, in the concrete socio-cultural situation of American society. The horizon of consciousness is thereby composed of all aspects of his (the man of color's) sedimented past experiences which might be relevant (of meaning) to the primary issue. Collectively these aspects constitute a part of his "biographical situation" (that is, his personalized historical existence as a "situated" being) with its immediate concrete existential dimensions sedimented into his stock of knowledge at hand (i.e. the totality of past experiences organized into contexts and layers or schemes). Thus, this issue, the meaning of self, as the primary focus of attention of the self-questioning subject, constitutes within the consciousness of this subject the system of *topical relevance*, that is, "that by virtue of which something is constituted as problematic in the midst of the unstructuralized field of unproblematic familiarity- and therewith the field into theme and horizon."[81]

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[80] Schutz, Reflections, p. 15.

It should be noted that this reference to 'the constitution of something as problematic in unstructuralized consciousness' is misleading. As Schutz himself notes a bit further on: "*there is no consciousness conceivable without structurization into theme and horizon*. . . Thematic structure. . . is essential to consciousness. . . *there is always a theme within the field of consciousness*. . ."[82] Thus, what is involved in the case under view is the "substitution" of one theme for another the latter being *problematic*, or, in the words of Schutz, "no-longer-taken-for-granted." In the case of the man of color the question of who he is, of his social and self-typification, has become problematic in the face of competing difinitions of his being (i.e. its *meaning*). One interpretation is, perhaps, his own; the other is socially derived (i.e. is "imposed" upon him from a source outside of himself, namely, social others), say, that of a racist society which sees him as "nigger." Through the sedimentation of past experiences of being regarded as a "nigger" in myriad ways there is some degree to which some of these ways of regarding him have become, through the dialectics of social recognition,[83] a part of his self-conception. The extreme form of this is radical self-negation, the negation of his heritage, culture, and physical characteristics. Witness the black man (and woman) who "straightens" his hair to make it "good," i.e. like the hair of the white man. Still, the 'average' man of color goes along (or has done so) with a world and situation self-conceived having varying numbers of elements which are essentially self-denying. Such a mode of existence becomes to some extent "normal," that is, non-problematic, taken-for-granted. On the other hand, there has emerged in contemporary times (a reemergence in terms of the history of the modes of self-conception lived by black peoples) a competing system of meanings for the self-interpretation of people of color, for the way in which we now view ourselves. The most obvious and prolific examples are the many different modes of declarations of "I'm black and I'm proud!" which have emerged out of the formation of alternative ideologies and views of black people through the concepts of Black Power, cultural nationalism, Pan Africanism, to mention a few. The importance of this for us is the fact that this change or transformation of consciousness of the man of color's self-conception has as one of its fundamental aspects the break-up of the previously unproblematic field of his consciousness into a new orientation of theme and horizon; more precisely, perhaps, for the black man, we should say, what occurs is not the break-up of a non-problematic field, if we hold to the view of DuBois, but, rather, the

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[81] Schutz, *Reflections*, p. 26.

[82] *Reflections*, p. 34.

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[83] Cf. Hegel, op. cit.

re-organization of the field of consciousness so as to bring about the resolution of what has been a history of problematic consciousness. This, however, takes us a bit far ahead in our analysis. What is important though is that via the process of radical self-reflection a new theme or *topic* (topical relevance) becomes the unitary center of the field of consciousness relative to the issue of existence, transforming it from one to another state or unified context of meaning (self interpreted). The degree to which this occurs is dependent upon the degree of radicalness of the self-reflections and upon the degrees of intimacy of the levels of personality involved. Total (or near total) involvement of all aspects of the personality would involve the transformation of the individual's total life *plan* (or one's life as projected or anticipated in the future perfect tense), that is, the transformation of the meaning of life itself.[84] However we shall deal with this matter when we take up the notion of transformation explicitly.

This constitution of a new theme of consciousness, the thematizing of the meaning of self in a new light, the development of a new topical relevance in consciousness, has its genesis in two sources: the topical relevance may be *imposed* (hence, *imposed topical relevance*) as, for example, in the case of social interaction in which the man of color thematizes himself as such and such as a result of the manner in which a social Other views him.[85] On the

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[84] Cf. Berger & Luckmann, *Social Construction*, op. cit., "Maintenance and Transformation of Subjective Reality," p. 135f.

[85] Schutz, *Reflections*, pp. 28-29.

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other hand, the topical relevance may be an *intrinsic* one (*intrinsic topical relevance*), that is, it may come into being as a result of the voluntary selective activity of the mind. In this latter case the topical theme (intrinsic) emerges as consciousness explores the inner and/or outer horizons[86] of a thematic object. For example, it may arise as the man of color, in exploring all aspects of the total meaning of the experience of some mode of social prejudice or discrimination, or, of the histories of peoples of African descent in general, brings to the center of consciousness the meaning of his life *as a man of color.* With the emergence or constitution of the new theme or topical relevance consciousness is thereby restructured in its theme-horizon aspects so that the new topical relevance becomes the *paramount theme* for consciousness (or, more precisely, its primary intentional object), and subsequently the primary basis for all other relationships (intentional) relative to this main topic.[87]

Further, we have mentioned the fact that the degree to which the self-questioning process is carried out (that is, the degree to which the inner and outer horizons of the topic are explored) is important for the degree of transformation. The foundation of this was, in more precise terms, in what Schutz terms the "set of actual interests" which govern the formation of the topical relevance, (interest being itself, for Schutz, a category of relevance). He notes:

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[86] Schutz, *Reflections*, pp. 30-31.

[87] *Reflections*, p. 33.

> It is the set of 'actual interests,' which itself depends upon the autobiographical and situational circumstances of the individual that limit what is commonly called the level of investigation (that is, the borderline up to which a segment of the world has to be put into question), whereas everything beyond this borderline remains unquestioned (although not unquestionable and, so long as it is not questioned, simply taken for granted).[88]

With the emergence into the field of consciousness of a new theme or topical relevance there arises the problem of ascertaining its meaning. The man of color must come to some understanding regarding the alternative way(s) of viewing himself offered through the meaning systems of the new theme.[89] This process is also the same as that involved in attempting to fix the meaning of a new lived experience discussed above. In this case, however, we have a greater and more precise clarification of that process. Thus, as we said in the case of meaning, so too here the matter involved is that of interpretation: the new topical relevance must be subsumed, according to its typicality (i.e. type, familiarity), under the various typical, prior experiences which constitute the individual's stock of knowledge at hand, though not everything in this stock of

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[88] Schutz, Reflections, p. 35.

[89] We speak correctly here of 'system' of a theme; as Schutz observes, "The theme is always not only within a field but also connected to other themes which together form a system. There is no such thing as an isolated problem but rather systems of problems, each interrelated with the other," Reflections, p. 35.

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knowledge is used as a scheme of interpretation.[90] Again as in the case of meaning constitution, here too the process of interpretation involves what Husserl termed the "passive synthesis of recognition,"[91] wherein the present conception is 'superimposed' with similar ones. The latter set of conceptions are, however, drawn from the stock of knowledge at hand in terms of their relevance (i.e. relationship in terms of typicality) to the new topical theme, i.e. their similarity, likeness, sameness, familiarity, to the topical theme. The system of such elements constitutes, in the words of Schutz, the system of interpretational relevances.[92]

It is observed by Schutz that the system of interpretational relevances has a double function; not only are some aspects of the stock of knowledge at hand relevant for the interpretation of the new thematic object, but, as well, certain 'moments' of this object become characterized as of major or minor interpretational relevance for the task of interpreting and recognizing the segment of the world actually experienced.[93] Thus, he notes, which elements of the new thematic 'object' and which elements of the stock of knowledge at hand are interpretatively relevant to each other are matters which are determined by the

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[90] Schutz, Reflections, p. 36.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Reflections, p. 36.

[93] Reflections, pp. 36-37.

"whole setting" in which the theme to be interpreted appears, its local (i.e. spatial), temporal, and autobiographical aspects.[94]

Again, interpretational relevances, like topical relevances, may be imposed or intrinsic. In the former case the imposition occurs by way of the synthesis of passive recognition mentioned above in that this synthesis as passive does not involve the volitional direction of the mind of the subject. The man of color, for example, may quite 'automatically' interpret himself as being socially inferior if in a social situation he is refused a dance by a white woman. He invokes for the interpretation of this experience the relevant aspects from his sedimented experiences which say that men of color are inferior (to the white man) and must not socialize with the white woman. Thus the relevant system for the interpretation of the experience of refusal is drwan from a source 'outside' the man of color with respect to its origin (the socially distributed knowledge - attitudes, prejudices, beliefs, etc. - of racism) though it has become "internalized" by him as part of his habitual possessions. On the other hand, however, the man of color may interpret the experience as having its basis not in his own inferior being but for what it is: an instance of the ignorance and prejudice of the racially biased interpretive system of the white woman. In so doing he consciously rejects the imposed interpretation of his being arriving instead at his interpretation through a process of reasoning, questioning, "weighting" of the alternative interpretations. In this case the interpretational relevances are intrinsic; they emerge out of the examination of the plausibility of the competing interpretations, the examination being a volitional activity. The imposed moments of the social experience become transformed thereby into intrinsic interpretational relevances.[95]

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[94] Schutz, Reflections, p. 37.

Further, as in the case of topical relevances, so, too, interpretational relevances are not isolated; regardless of their type they are integrated into groups and systems:

> The interpretatively relevant moment of both--the experience to be interpreted and the scheme of interpretation (i. e. the applicable previous experiences as found in our stock of knowledge at hand)--are integrated into systems, and these systems, at least as to their type, are within the stock of what we have already experienced.[96]

And both topical and interpretative relevances are, as Schutz notes, "situationally conditioned;" they must be learned:

> We have to learn what is interpretatively relevant; we must learn in the course of our actual experiences how to recognize interpretatively relevant moments or aspects of objects already experienced as typical. . . we have to learn how to 'weigh' the outcome of our interpretations. . .[97]

Finally, it was observed in the case of topical relevances that the degree to which the case of topical relevances is followed is also situationally conditioned. Specifically it is determined by the system of then prevailing 'actual interests.' According to Schutz, the same is the case for intrinsic interpretative relevances: the point at which such an examination is ended is that at which one can "assent" to the interpretation, the point at which one can give credence to and "live with" a given mode of self identification, an assent which might have different degrees of certitude depending upon the sufficiency of the interpretation for the typification of the self as grasped in reflection. Whatever the case the interpretation remains, Schutz tells us, tentative: it may be subject to revision by supervening interpretatively relevant material.[98]

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[95] Schutz, Reflections, p. 42.

[96] Reflections, p. 43.

[97] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

There is yet another system of relevance described by Schutz which we must consider. This is the system of relevances upon which an individual bases his actions and is designated by Schutz as the system of motivational relevances.[99] Structurally the motivational relevance is a carry over of the interpretive decision into the field of projected acts as a foundation for the pursuit of such acts. As Schutz puts it, "The importance of interpreting correctly (and this means here to a satisfactorily plausible degree) consists in the fact that not only the means but even the ends to be attained will depend upon such a diagnosis."[100]

Motivational relevances may be of two kinds: because motives or in-order-to motives. The distinction between the two types of motives is the same as that discussed with reference to contexts of meaning, hence, is further indication of our earlier statements to the effect that meaning and relevance, as products of constitutiong Acts of consciousness, are essentially one and the same but viewed from slightly differently perspectives. The basis of the distinction between because and in-order-to motives lies in the difference between motivating and motivated experiences. The in-order-to motive has to do with the ground of actions deliberately, consciously executed to bring about a projected (i. e. planned) state of affairs which so far has not been realized. This 'state of affairs to be brought about,' (a new self-interpretation, say) becomes the 'paramount' relevance for all actions taken to bring it into being. On the other hand, once the action has begun, the conceptualization of the basis of this action takes on, as Schutz says, the "character of pastness," and its motive a "because" motive. In our terms, my present mode of self identity has, upon reflection, been found to be insufficient for the maintenance of my egological stability; the effort to regain this stability thus is the because motive of my project aiming at self transformation. In the realm of human conduct, therefore, any statement addressing itself to the causality of conduct can be translated into terms of motivational relevance, specifically, because motives.[101] The distinction between the two types of motives Schutz formally gives as follows:

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[98] Schutz, Reflections, pp. 44-45.

[99] Reflections, p. 45f.

[100] Ibid., p. 46.

> Whereas the in-order-to relevances motivationally emanate from the already established paramount project, the because

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[101] Schutz, Reflections, pp. 47-49.

> *relevances deal with the motivation for the establishement of the paramount project itself.*[102]

As with both previously discussed relevance systems, motivational relevances may be imposed or intrinsic. All motivations derived from the paramount project are experienced as imposed.[103] Also there is the case whereby motivational relevances may be socially imposed. This is especially noteworthy in the case of the basis for the self-transformation of the man of color. Intrinsic motivational relevances arise, on the other hand, as in the two previous systems, namely by way of volitional, rational acts.

With the laying out of these three systems of relevance we have in view the foundational elements in terms of which consciousness is structured, structured specifically into a "thematic cover" surrounded by a non-thematic "horizon." The achievement of this structurization is a result of the inter-workings of all three systems operating interdependently. Thus they represent not isolated moments of life of consciousness, though they have been "frozen" into view through descriptive investigation. In the words of Schutz. . .

> We may say that the category of relevance--topical, interpretational, motivational--establishes merely a correlation between two terms having reciprocal import as regards one another.[104]

Even more, this description of the systems of relevance constitutes a more refined investigation of the process of meaning constitution. For now we can begin to see this "constituting process" with greater clarity as one further analyzable into operations of three distinct yet related moments of consciousness. The group of these operations, that is, the description of interdependency of the systems of relevance, takes us, following Schutz, into an investigation of the constitution of the store of knowledge at hand. And as we have previously referred to this "store of knowledge at hand" in our discussion of the constitution of meaning as the totality of (past) experiences, organized into schemes, complexes, and patterns, which are available to recall by the subject at any given moment, thus does it become progressively clearer that the notions of meaning and relevance are one and the same in terms of the aspects of consciousness to which they refer. The former (meaning) has reference to the manner in which consciousness directs its attention (reflects) back upon its elapsed experiences; the latter (relevance) to the relationship in consciousness which exists between a theme (topical relevance) and its horizon (interpretational relevance). Thus the investigation of the issue of relevance is but a more refined description of the manner in which meaning (or relevance) is constituted by consciousness. This will be further clarified by the description of the constitution of the store of knowledge at hand itself. It is crucial that we set out this process and its importance relative to the life of consciousness if we are to prepare properly for an understanding of the transformation of consciousness. For to the degree that one undergoes self-transformation as we have been projecting it, this will involve a re-ordering, to a greater or lesser extent, of the schemes of

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[102] Schutz, Reflections, p. 50

[103] Reflections, p. 52.

[104] Reflections, pp. 64-66.

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experience (those aspects of the stock of knowledge at hand) involved in self-identification. Thus do we move to a discussion of the description of the constitution of the stock of knowledge at hand as given by Schutz, a process of constitution which is one and the same with the operating interdependency of the systems of relevance.

2. Analysis of the 'Stock of Knowledge at Hand'

The stock of knowledge at hand at any autobiographical moment is, as we said above, the totality of the sedimentation of previous experiences or 'activities of our mind,' as Schutz refers to the matter, which are available to the reflective recall of the subject. The sedimentation process, the choice of those experiences to be included in this knowledge stockpile, is guided by the different kinds of relevance which are prevailing as "actually operative" at the time of the experience.[105] Such experiences are organized into the knowledge framework by way of their typicality, that is, their idealization as 'similar to,' 'like,' 'the same as,' previous experiences. Once so organized these experiences persist in the organized storehouse of experience as "expectations" as to the nature of future experiences. As Schutz puts it:

> . . . typicality, not only refers to already acquired knowledge but at the same time to a set of expectations, . . . adhering to such knowledge - namely, typicality refers to the set of

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[105] Schutz, Reflections, pp. 64-66.

> expectations that future experiences will reveal these and those typical traits to the same degree of anonymity and concreteness.[106]

The fulfillment of these expectations by subsequent experiences is the foundation of the concept of *familiarity*.

> Familiarity. . . indicates the likelihood of referring new experiences, in respect of their types, to the habitual stock of already acquired knowledge.[107]

All of these activities, including the function of familiarity, lead to the acquisition of "habitual knowledge," that is, knowledge which, in terms of its contents and their constitution, is "taken for granted," i. e. not in need of further analysis.[108] As 'habitual' knowledge it is, says Schutz, "dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated."[109] Further, the conscious subject existentially engaged is directed in his existential activities by way of this storehouse of knowledge as his ultimate "frame of reference." These activities have as their source *motivational relevances*; they lead to the constitution of what Schutz terms the "interest situation," or "*the set of motivational relevances which guide the selective activity of my mind*."[110] This 'interest situation,' or particular set of motivational relevances, determines in turn the constitution of the system of topical relevances which brings into the thematic center of consciousness material that was before horizontal or marginal. Thus is constituted the problem for thought and action selected for further investigation out of the background, i.e. ultimately 'the world which is beyond question and taken for granted.' Further,

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[106] Schutz, *Reflections*, p. 58.

[107] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[108] Cf. PSW, pp. 69-74: "The taken-for-granted (*das Fraglos gegeben*) is always that particular level of experience which presents itself as not in need of further analysis," p. 74.

[109] *Reflections*, p. 66.

[110] *Reflections*, pp. 64-65.

> These topical relevances also determine the level of limits for such investigation required for producing knowledge and familiarity sufficient for the problem at hand. Thus, the system of interpretational relevances becomes established, and this leads to the determination of the typicality structure of our knowledge.[111]

And here we have a typology of consciousness, of its structurization, in terms of the interworkings of the systems of relevance, interrelationships which, Schutz cautions us, are experienced as unseperable, as an undivided unity, and are dissected into three types only as a result of analysis. We can reiterate these interrelationships schematically: activities of mind (guided by) systems of prevailing actually operative relevances (produce) stock of knowledge at hand (i.e. habitual knowledge, sedimented activities of mind or 'experiences'); from the life situation 'framed' by the stock of knowledge emerge motivational relevances (which constitute) the interest situation (which determines) the system of topical relevances (leading ultimately to) the establishment of a system of interpretational relevances (which determine) the typicality structure of our knowledge. Thus in our attempt to reach philosophical clarity regarding the structurization of the consciousness of the self-questioning person, we can, using our schematic outline, and the understandings obtained previously to fill it out, reach (preliminarily) some degree of clarity by way of moving 'backwards' from the last element of our schematic outline filling in as we go: the structure of the self as typified in reflection (radical self query) has its basis in a system of interpretational relevances (e.g. Pan Africanism's view of the man of color) having direct relation to a system of topical relevances (the framework of the questions "Who am I? - What am I to be? - What is the meaning of my life (as a man of color)?' in short). This latter relevance system (i.e. topical) has its basis in an 'interest situation' (broadly characterized as the total socio-historical situation of the people of color in America as manifested in the individual consciousness in virtually an infinite number of ways, say, our previous example of the refusal of a dance by the white woman); it (the interest situation) in turn is based on motivational relevances (to dance with a white woman because. . . she is something 'special' (as a white woman), in order to. . . realize my goal of 'having' a white woman).

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[111] Schutz, Reflections, p. 66.

So it is that we have here a rather fully described case of particular structurizations of the consciousness in general, of the man of color in particular. Our task, however, involving the illumination of the egological sphere is far from finished. We may say, therefore, along with Schutz, that the presentation of the three systems of relevance and their interworkings are as such only for us as ones engaged in reflective analysis. In addition to their being a unitary phenomenon to consciousness living in its acts, either of them can be, furthermore, experienced as home base; that is, the three systems are totally reciprocal and interlocked. It makes little difference which system we chose as the point of departure for analysis, for we invariably must cover the other two. So too in living in them pre-reflectively:

> . . . We cannot bestow a privileged position upon one of the three systems of relevance. . . any of them may become the starting point for bringing about changes in the other two. . . The three systems of relevance are therefore but three aspects of a single set of phenomena.[112]

We observed above with Schutz that the analysis of relevance involved in effect an analysis of the stock of knowledge at hand, i. e. its constitution and structurization. Thus we must, with the aid of Schutz, direct our attention specifically to this phenomenon. This for us is a crucial matter as the stock of knowledge at hand constitutes the totality, the ultimate horizon, of the field of consciousness open to the reflective view of a self-questioning consciousness. As such it constitutes for us the horizon within which the consciousness of the black man undergoes its transformation. Within this context our earlier expressed need to keep within view the objective pole of consciousness will be clarified. This clarification lies in the origin of a great many aspects of the stock of knowledge. In the examination of these origins, of their relevance to the sphere of consciousness, that is, we shall see at work within the subjective sphere what we referred to quite early in the analysis as the correlativity or dialectic of subject and world of Others, more specifically, the facticity of intersubjectivity or sociality.

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[112] Schutz, Reflections, pp. 70-71.

a. "Genetic Analysis" of the Stock of Knowledge at Hand

This particular analysis of the stock of knowledge at hand is of particular importance for our study, for, following Schutz, it effects the bringing to clarity the manner in which this knowledge is constituted. In his words it constitutes the "genetic analysis" or "interpretation" of the stock of knowledge at hand.[113] It involves the analysis of the history (thus enters the dimension of temporality) of experiential sedimentation, though, it must be noted, there is no "first" or "primordial" experience upon which all others is based. Rather,

> If we analyze the constitution precess of sedimentation of our knowledge which is actually at hand, we are always led to a preceeding biographically determined situation with its pertinent stock of knowledge then at hand - but never to a first experience (first in the chronological sense or in the sense of foundation) which would be constitutive for all following experiences.[114]

Still, the importance of the matter for us lies in the fact that a grasp of the sedimentation process of consciousness in general will allow us thereby to grasp more precisely the process of self-transformation. Our purpose in this

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[113] Schutz, Reflections, Chapter 4, "The Stock of Knowledge at Hand Genetically Interpreted,"p. 75f.

[114] Reflections, p. 75.

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case is, subsequently, identical to that of Schutz in his 'genetic' analysis, namely to treat "some of those events in the process of the sedimentation of knowledge that lead to a particular typicality of the sediment itself," - ultimately for us the man of color's self-typification.[115]

To begin with, the experiential stockpile which we have been referring to (following Schutz) under the rubic "stock of knowledge at hand" is, as he points out, by no means composed of integrated or homogeneous elements. Rather

> they are arranged in various degrees of plausibility. . .from the conviction of certainty through all the modilizations of opinion, including that of blind belief or indifference in which 'I let things stand as they are.'[116]

The concept of knowledge thus, for Schutz, includes all forms of opinion and acceptance as well as well-formulated insights. The way to the understanding of the constitution of these heterogeneous elements is to be had, according to Schutz, through the explanation of the various processes leading to their sedimentation.[117]

Thus sedimentation, the acquisition of knowledge is any and all of its forms, is a process in time articulated in various steps.

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[115] Schutz, Reflections, p. 76.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Reflections, p. 76.

> When we enter gradually into the inner and outer horizons of the topically relevant theme, bringing more and more material from the horizonal margin into the thematic focus (making the manifold implications hidden in the horizon increasingly explicit), we are engaged in a process consisting of many seperate steps of mental activity which lead to the sedimentation of our habitual possession called knowledge at hand.[118]

The grasp of this sedimentation process, an activity requiring that we transform the structurization of our consciousness from living in the 'flow' to reflection upon it, may, according to Schutz, be accomplished in two ways. In both the task is that of ascertaining, as previously shown, the meaning of my past experiences, their step by step, phase by phase build-up in the processes of inner time (i. e. polythetically or many stepped or phased construction, in Husserl's words). On the one hand, I may, under ideal conditions, i. e. barring obstacles and disturbances, reflectively "reconstruct" this step by step, phase by phase (polythetic) build-up of experiential meaning: "I may reconstruct the process in memory, again run through all the steps and phases in and by which the meaning of my experience became constituted."[119]

On the other hand, I may, in a "single ray" of reflective attention (monothetically, in Husserl's terms, i. e. a single act of remembrance or reconstruction), grasp the meaning of an experience which has been built up polythetically. In so doing I do not go through the process of constitution wherein the meaning of the experience was built up. This is especially so in the case of experiences formulated conceptually by a process of ratiocination[120] and in the case of knowledge socially derived, i. e. has its origins in the experiences of others and communicated to me by others (parents, teachers, etc.).[121]

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[118] Schutz, Reflections, p. 78.

[119] Ibid., p. 81.

This polythetic - monothetic distinction regarding the grasp of experiential meaning is important. At the very least it gives foundation to the notions of clarity and distinctness of knowledge as these are issues which depend upon "the possibility of our being able to refer the monothetically grasped meaning of an element of our knowledge to the polythetic steps by which such knowledge was acquired."[122] Again, the distinction may be, according to Schutz, translated into terms of relevance structure:

> The habitual possesion of knowledge grasped monothetically disregards the system of motivational relevances (both the in-order-to and the because relevance) which lead to the establishment of topical relevances.[123]

Ultimately, the monothetic grasp of the meaning of an experience takes place after the process of its polythetic construction has come to a standstill. Thus it is interpretationally different from the moments of its construction.

Finally, the distinction is of importance to three interrelated problems which are of interest to us. First, it clarifies the meaning-structure of actions in terms of projected conduct directed at solving a certain theoretical or practical problem (a topic - project - to be taken up below).[124] Secondly, it is of significance to the matter of the socially derived aspects of our knowledge just previously mentioned, for the greater amount of this knowledge as socially derived cannot be broken down and polythetically reconstructed in terms of its step by step build-up (e.g. mores, customs, etc.). And, thirdly, the distinction between polythetically and monothetically grasped elements of our knowledge aids in the understanding of the process of communication, a process presupposed by any form of socially derived knowledge as communication is possible only by what Schutz terms, "gearing into the outer world,"[125] that is, by becoming actively engaged in the world of intersubjectivity. For communication is a polythetic process (e.g. grasp of the meaning of a spoken statement the elements of which are individual words each having its own meaning).

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[120] Schutz, Reflections, p. 81.

[121] Ibid., p. 84.

[122] Reflections, pp. 81-82.

[123] Reflections, p. 82.

Still, it is imperative that it be understood that the process of polythetic reconstruction, involving as it does the breakdown of an experience into its component steps of genesis, is a process which is impossible to execute to extreme limits. We noted this earlier in our discussion of meaning when we observed that certain experiences which were close to the 'core' of the personality are beyond interpretation. Along the same line, there is, according to Schutz, the impossibility, beyond certain limits, of breaking down consciousness, its sedimented experiences, analytically, of "atomizing" it, into 'quantitatively homogeneous units.'[126] The *duree* or flow of consciousness, divisible only in terms of *intensities* (or different degrees of tension of consciousness), has no "yardsticks" by which it can be measured; rather, it has (in the words of William James employed by Schutz) only "flights and resting places," exemplified for example, in writing by the mechanics of punctuation, and in speech by tonal inflections.

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[124] Schutz, Reflections, p. 83.

[125] Ibid., p. 85.

However, the key to conceptualizing these distinguishable flights and resting places of the flow of consciousness lies in a term employed previously, namely, *meaning-contexts*, the units of experiential organization. From the outset, notes Schutz, our experiences stand to us within meaning-contexts there being no such thing, as we said, of an isolated experience: "any experience is experience within a context,"[127] a fact clearly established in our descriptions of the process of meaning constitution above. Thus the meaning-context is, in the words of Schutz, the first form of units meaning into which consciousness is distinguishable in the way of grasping the sedimentation of experiences.

There is, as a second form of meaning-context, what Schutz refers to as the continuous experience of "our own organism as a functional whole which is always within a concrete situation with which. . . it must 'come to terms.' "[128] In this sense I am my hand, mouth, eyes as involved in the process of reaching for, raising and drinking a glass of water.[129] The importance of this is that it makes clear the relationship between consciousness and its environment which is not just something imposed on us from the outside to which we must adapt, but is as well, subjectively, "the outcome and product of our selection of that sector of the world which we consider and acknowledge as relevant for the functioning of our activities - organic as well as mental - as a whole."[130] This is but another perspective on the "situatedness" of human existence, a notion which highlights the process by which our being in the world is defined by us, this definition being our way of 'coming to terms with it.'[131] This matter of the 'definition of the situation' is, obviously, highly relevant for our present concerns.

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[126] Schutz, *Reflections*, pp. 86-87.

[127] *Reflections*, p. 88.

Again there is the meaning-context which emerges in the experience of the unity of objects in the outer world, which unity, says Schutz, appears to originate in the objects themselves. The importance of this meaning-context is the fact that it cannot be further broken down into single phases of constitution being as it is a Gestalt configuration, to use the words of Schutz.

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[128] Schutz, Reflections, p. 89. Cf. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul: New York, 1962, Colin Smith, trans.

[129] Reflections, p. 90.

[130] Reflections, p. 91.

[131] Ibid.

Still further, there is the unit of a meaning-context which is to be found in the symbolic systems which serve as vehicles of thinking (e.g. language, mathematics, music, mental life in general).[132] And, finally, there is the unification of projected conduct, i.e. action, by the span of the project itself; while the project is subdivisible into sub-units, it resists, on the other hand, atomistic treatment.

All of these 'units of meaning-contexts,' as Schutz refers to them, represent 'basic units of experience' in that they cannot be broken down into homogeneous units. As such they constitute the basic units of experience the groupings of which comprise the meaning-context of our stock of knowledge at hand viewed in its totality: they represent the "genetic features" in the history of our knowledge and are of 'decisive importance' for the structurization of the world in which we live.[133]

The build up of our stock of knowledge at hand, in addition to the 'genetic features' just described, involves yet another historical aspect, namely, it is autobiographical. What is of issue here is the task of knowing "what chronological order and at which moments of our conscious life the single elements of our knowledge were acquired," of grasping the autobiographical "profile," as it were, of the elements of this knowledge stockpile.[134] This is an extremely crucial matter for us as it should be obvious that part of the process of transformation will involve the interpretation of previously acquired elements of one's stock of knowledge at hand as to their meaning in terms of self-typification. This is, in fact, one of the important moments of the autobiographical aspects of the stock of knowledge at hand, namely its "function in the typification of the personality structure, its typical successes and failures. . . explained by the biographical sequence of its experiences."[135] We shall return to this matter at a later time.

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[132] Schutz, Reflections, pp. 92-96.

[133] Reflections, p. 97.

b. 'Static Analysis' of the Stock of Knowledge at Hand

We shift now, following Schutz, from "genetic" to the 'static'analysis of the stock of knowledge at hand, that is, to the description of its various dimensions, not in terms of their genesis, but as they are given at any moment of individual consciousness.[136] In so doing we leave in abeyance a particularly important piece of analysis, i.e. of the interruptions which can occur during the process of sedimentation.[137] This matter will be dealt with as necessary when we come to the section of the explication of the meaning of transformation

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[134] Schutz, Reflections, p. 98.

[135] Reflections, p. 102.

[136] Reflections, p. 134.

[137] Reflections, Chapter 5, "Disturbances of the Process of Sedimentation," p. 103f.

However, it should be noted that just this phenomenon, what we term transformation, was a matter of concern to Schutz in this section. In his terms the phenomenon was that of crisis:

> . . .it may be that the revision of habitualities and of dissolving the sedimentation underlying it refers either to a relatively well-circumscribed sector of our knowledge at hand or to factors determining its structurization as a whole - that is, to our typical way of forming systems of topical, interpretational, and motivational relevances which themselves belong to our stock of habitually possessed knowledge at hand. An example of the latter might be the need to regroup our system of in-order-to motives as a whole, namely our plan of life. If such a situation occurs - by imposition or intrinsically - then a turning point in our entire life has been reached which is commonly called a crisis.[138]

This is for us the crux of the matter; thus it is that we have entered into the description of consciousness, its structures and its processes. Our brief excursion with Schutz into static analysis will essentially round off this description.

The 'static' analysis of the structurization of the stock of knowledge assumes, it seems with Schutz, greater generality and wider implications than one would first suspect with a cursory grasp of the notion "stock of knowledge at hand." For the concept, its analysis, involves the exploration of the structures of the life-world, in the Husserlian sense, i.e. the structures and Acts of consciousness governing our being in the world, so to speak.[139] Thus, in this sense, a truly phenomenological sense, the exploration of the structures of consciousness in terms of meaning involve the exploration of the manner in which the world is constituted _for me_, _for_ consciousness. In the words of Schutz:

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[138] Schutz, Reflections, p. 123.

[139] Reflections, p. 134f; CP3, "Some Structures of the Life World," p. 116f.

> At any moment of my existence I find myself in possession of knowledge of a certain sector of the universe which in the natural attitude I call. . . 'my world.' This world consists of my actual and previous experiences of known things and their interrelations - known to me. . . to different extents and in manifold degrees of clarity, distinctness, consistency, and coherence - and certain more of less empty anticipations of things not experienced thus far, and therfore not known but nevertheless accessible to my possible experience. . .[140]

Further, the mode of experience of this life world is, in the words of Schutz (and Husserl) _taken for granted_: "In this attitude the existence of the life-world and the typicality of its contents are accepted as unquestionably given until further notice."[141] As such it constitutes the ultimate framework or background out of which emerges any matter requiring attention in the way of decision-making, whether emotionally, pragmatically, or otherwise, a process we have observed previously in terms of the interrelations of the systems of relevance.

Again, the life-world is definitively characterized by its degrees and modes of _openness_. Initially this means that the life-world is but a "sector" of a larger, higher unit, namely, the universe, which constitutes the ultimate open 'outer' horizon of my life-world.[142] Thus this openness, with the implication of its possible transcendence, is, in the words of Schutz, an aspect of the ontological situation of human existence.[143] Spatially the life-world is open with regard to all the objects within actual and potential reach in the 'outer' universe.[144] In terms of time it opens into both past and future with respect to experiencing the world as having existed prior to my birth and as going to continue after my death.[145] Further, the life-world is open by way of different levels of reality or "dimensions of meaning" (i.e. the worlds of myth, dream, science, philosophy, religion, etc.).[146] And, finally, it is open in terms of the dimension of sociality in that an essential component of the life-world is the experience of the structurization of the social world into different zones of intersubjectivity composed of fellow-men, or, persons with whom I am socially engaged in a 'face to face' situation; contemporaries, or, persons occupying essentially the same time and geographical dimensions as I, e.g., my neighbor across the street, my 'fellow citizen of Boston,' all other

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[140] Schutz, _Reflections_, pp. 134-135.

[141] _CP_ 3, p. 116.

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[142] Schutz, Reflections, p. 135.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Reflections, pp. 135-136.

[146] Ibid., p. 136.

'Americans;' *predecessors*, or persons whose existence preceeded my own; and finally, *successors*, persons whose existence will come after my own.[147]

While it is the case that the life-world exhibits these zones of openness as dimensions of potential transcendence, i.e. beyond immediate experience, still, Schutz points out, "*it is experienced by each of us as the world with which he is or may become sufficiently familiar in order to carry out the business of living*."[148] And though this world cannot be known in its entirety, it is nonetheless a world of "determinable indeterminacy:"

> It is the frame within which possibilities are open to us, the locus of realization of all our open possibilities, *the sum total of all circumstances to be selected and defined by our autobiographical situation.*[149]

Thus "knowledge," in the sense in which this concept is employed by Schutz, has, in his words, various 'degrees' which refer to the several "provinces" into which the world is structured, socially and objectively.[150] Here we have a rather precise indication of the correlativity or dialectic of the realms of subjective and objective reality to which we have been referring. An example of this dialectical structurization given by Schutz in *Reflections*

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[147] *Reflections*, p. 136; Cf. esp., *PSW* Chpt. 4, "The Structure of the Social World," for the complete analysis of these dimensions of intersubjectivity.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

[150] For the precise description of these provinces cf. *PSW*, Chpt. 4 and *CP* 1, Part II, "Symbol, Reality and Society."

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is drawn from the world of working, a world, he says, that constitutes the "paramount reality" of our life-world and corresponds to the 'highest tension' of our consciousness.[151] This world is structured into different segments or strata. First there is the zone of world within actual reach (of hearing, seeing, manipulation, etc.), "a world of which I have or can have direct perception with or without the aid of instruments of all sorts, of which I can know that it acts upon me immediately, and upon which I can act immediately - with or without the aid of instruments."[152]

There is a second zone or world within potential reach, a segment of which was within reach formerly and can be brought into reach again (world within restorable reach), and/or another segment which has never been within reach but plausibly can be brought within reach under ideal conditions (world within attainable reach).[153]

In addition to the fact that these structurizations of our stock of knowledge at hand are experienced by us "naively," as unquestionably given (unquestionable, that is, until some aspect or element of it becomes problematic, i.e., is no longer in accords with our expectations and/or anticipations), there is the even more important issue for us of the socially derived character of the greater bulk of this knowledge. In the words of Schutz:

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[151] Reflections, p. 137.

[152] CP 3, pp. 117-18.

[153] Ibid.; Reflections, p. 137.

> Even the typifications and symbolizations on terms of which we distinguish the several strata of our social world, construe and interpret their contents, determine our action in it and upon it and its action upon us according to all degrees of ability, are pre-defined as unquestionably given by virtue of the socially conditioned schemata of expression and interpretation in the group to which we belong and which we used to call the 'culture' of our group [my underline].[154]

This matter, referred to previously many times, of the socially conditioned nature of our stock of knowledge at hand is extremely crucial for us as it highlights the nature of the dialectic between the egological sphere and the 'external' world. It is here, in the sense of the socially conditioned nature of knowledge, that we find what we could only point to earlier in the analysis, namely the presence of sociality within the subjective sphere. In the context of our problematic it provides the precise philosophical foundation for spelling out in concrete terms the dialectical nature of the man of color's self-identification. This is the ultimate justification of our repeatedly expressed need to keep in view within the subjective sphere consciousness's relations with the external world. Our knowledge, including self knowledge, is socially conditioned. Further, the many forms of this knowledge (subdivisible into states of affairs of which we are merely marginally aware, of which we are conscious, and of which we are informed, i.e. of which we have some degree of 'expertise')[155] are far from homogeneous; rather, they are differentiated in "manifold ways," and. . .

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[154] CP 3, p. 119; Cf. also CP 2, "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," p. 226f.

[155] Reflections, pp. 141-42.

> they perpetually change for the individual, from individual to individual, from individual to the social group, for the group itself, and finally from one group to the other. *The content of what is known, familiar, believed and unknown, is therefore relative: for the individual relative to his biographical situation, for the group to its historical situation* [my emphasis].[156]

This is for us the crux of the matter as it relates to the understanding of the transformation of the consciousness of a person in terms of the changes in the stock of knowledge at hand.

In general ~~terms;~~ however, the examination of the way in which this structurization of the social and objective worlds and of individual consciousness is experienced by an individual consciousness reveals corresponding zones of interests by which the individual is motivated.[157] We have examined these in depth just previously in the genetic analysis of the stock of knowledge. There we observed with Schutz that the structurization process has its basis in an interest situation which determines the system of motivational relevance. This latter system of relevance determines the topical system of relevance, the thematic core of consciousness, which is the basis of determination of the system of interpretational relevance, the system of relevance which organizes and classifies new lived experiences thus is responsible for their "profile" in sedimentation.

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[156] CP 3, p. 121.

[157] Ibid.

The acts, however, are, according to Schutz, all lived through naively, or, pre-reflectively. The individual experiences himself as being within a certain situation which he has to define.[158] Of this 'situation to be defined' there are (for reflection) two principal components. There is, on the one hand, what Schutz refers to as the component having its origin in the "ontological structure of the pre-given world."[159] This component is experienced by the individual as imposed upon and occurring to him from without, hence, as 'not of his making,' thus is constituted by those aspects of one's situation which are grounded independently (objectively) of one's own being (e.g., in our case, the racial prejudices lived through by the man of color). There is, on the other hand, a component originating in the 'biographical situation' of the individual. This component, according to Schutz, makes it possible to single out certain elements of the ontologically pre-given structure of the world for definition.[160] This process is the same as that just reiterated in terms of the operations of the three systems of relevance and their interrelations. Statically viewed, however, i.e., with respect to their structurization at any given moment, all of the elements singled out by the selective acitvity of the mind are linked together in "sense connections,"[161] which are further organized into systems of complexes or project (a consciously formulated, futurally oriented plan of action). The "supreme system" of all projects is, in the words of Schutz, the "life plan:" it is the ultimate field of the determination of particular plans (of the hour, day, week, year, etc.) which in turn constitute the determinative bases of the interests prevailing at any given moment. These latter are, finally, the foundation for the selection of elements from the objective world in the process of 'defining the situation.'[162]

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[158] CP 3, p. 122.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Ibid.

With this we have, I think, a near sufficient basis for an adequate philosophical description of the process of transformation as experienced by the self-questioning man of color. We have only to move, when the time comes, to the explicit 'filling in' of this general, theoretical framework with matters of greater specificity with reference to the concrete experiences of people of color. Our analysis of the sphere of subjective reality is now all but complete. We have but a few words to say about matters which have been mentioned repeatedly during the course of the present stage of the analysis: the "biographical situation" and the constitution of "reality." This discussion shall serve to round out our analysis of the subjective sphere by pulling together the various notions we have treated thus far into a concise context of descriptive understanding.

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[162] CP 3, pp. 122-123.

3. The 'Biographical Situation

This notion of "biographical situation" which we have utilized in laying the groundwork for our specific analysis is but a further development by Schutz of a central concept of existential philosophy. In his words:

> At any moment of my conscious life I find myself within the world, and my position in it - in time, space, nature and. . .as a man among fellowmen - as it appears to me in what I call my situation within the world. . . But this situation has its history, and certain of its elements are exclusively events within my own biography.[163]

The elements of this biographical situation are the combined totality of all those things just discussed, namely, my stock of knowledge at hand, including opinions, convictions, and beliefs of all degrees of plausibility.[164] In addition there is included the particular unique structure and genesis of my stock of knowledge at hand, the fact that, though socially derived and therby socially shared, the particular order in time in which this knowledge has been acquired and the intensity with which it has been experienced, the history of my conscious life, in short, has not been shared.[165] Still further, this biographical situation has as one of its components the system of my 'habitualities' inclusive of "my reactions, skills, abilities, gifts, as well as my ability to act, my power."[166] In short, the 'biographical situation'constitutes the ultimate, all inclusive *frame of reference and being* for the existing individual. The central and most primary experiences associated with it is the experience of my own body, the first set of experiences to be taken for granted without question.[167] The lived experience of my body becomes in turn the primary "center 0" for all other coordinates in terms of which the 'external' world is organized.[168] This constitutes the 'spatial orientation' activities of the biographically situated individual. On the other hand, *temporal* organization has its basis in the profound experience of "growing older." In Schutz's words, "I was born, I grow older, and I have to die are three expressions for a single metaphysical fact determining the experience of our existence within this world."[169] Awareness of this 'metaphysical fact' thus constitutes the utmost relevance of us dominating our life plan, the highest interrelation of the system of motivational relevances.[170] Thus:

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[163] Reflections, p. 167.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Reflections, p. 168.

[166] Ibid.

> Experiencing our future as an undisclosed open horizon of the present (from which one single fact stands out in certainty, namely that we have to die, not knowing when); our conviction of this certainty eventually translated into

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[167] *Reflections*, p. 171f.

[168] Ibid., p. 173.

[169] *Reflections*, p. 179.

[170] Ibid.

> the feeling of finity. . . these are perhaps the experiences of each human life which are of paramount importance. This relevance is imposed upon us in virtue of our human condition as in the awareness of the irreversibility and irretrevability of time as such imposed upon us.[171]

Added to this "constant" of the biographical situation is yet another fundamental imposed relevance: this is the fact that we are born into an already existent world and specific situation (e.g. my being born a black man in America). This factor, as with that of the certainty of death, is, in the words of Schutz, one of the basic relevances imposed upon us which determines our life in many respects. He sums it up quite adequately:

> Our biography starts with our birth, and the situation into which we are born enters, therefore, as an integral element into all succeeding stages. It is the origin of our system of topical, interpretational, and motivational relevances which now start to be built up. In a certain sense, we may say that the imposed relevance of our human condition - that we are born into a world and a situation not of our making, that we inescapably grow older together, that within the essentially undetermined fact of our future one simple certainty stands out, namely that we have to die, uncertain when and how - we may say that these imposed relevances are at the foundation of the counterpointal structure of our consciousness. . . All our interest in life, our building up of plans, our attempts to understand the world and our condition in it, in brief, the whole system of our topical, interpretational, and motivational relevances, can be conceived of as being intrinsic to these imposed relevances.[172]

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[171] Reflections, pp. 179-80.

[172] Ibid., pp. 180-81.

4. The Constitution of Reality

What Schutz means by reality, its constitution, is, as we have stated previously, identical with what he understands as meaning and its constitution. As he put it, ". . . it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes reality."[173] Thus, aside from the widespread and continuing concern with the notion of reality throughout the history and community of philosophy, our interest is not that of entering explicitly into the debate to argue any particular side. Rather, we are concerned with the notion, in all of its importance, for matters of preciseness and clarity within the context of the present discussion. The need for this is grounded in the manner in which Schutz develops the notion and employs it in his descriptions of human experience in the social world - a matter of no small importance to us.

The key to this conception of reality on the part of Schutz is based on the thought of William James to the extent that "Reality. . . means simply relation to our emotional and active life. The origin of all reality is subjective, whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real."[174] Further, according to James, there are several, perhaps an infinite number, of various "orders" of reality each of which has its own special and separate style of existence,[175] its own special cognitive style or 'tension of consciousness.' Schutz refers to these "sub-universes of reality" as provinces of meaning for the reason quoted above. Thus each province of meaning (dreams, religion, science, philosophy, the state of working in daily life, this latter constituting the 'paramount reality') is constituted by its particular 'cognitive style' or 'tension of consciousness' which tension is regulated by the system of motivational relevances growing out of the particular prevailing situation of interest.

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[173] CP 1, "Symbol, Reality, and Society," p. 230.

[174] CP 1, p. 207, taken from William James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, Chapter XXI, pp. 283-322.

Again, all of the experiences which go to make up each of the provinces of meaning (reality) are compatible and consistent with each other, though not with those of another realm (e.g. the world of dreaming with that of the world of 'wide awakeness,' or with religion, or, science, etc.). Thus it is that they are termed finite provinces of meaning.

> This finiteness implies that there is no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a formula of transformation. The passing from one to the other can only be performed by a 'leap,'. . . which manifests itself in the subjective experience of a shock.[176]

This 'leap' or 'shock' is, in the words of Schutz, nothing more than a radical modification of the tension of consciousness founded in a different attention a la vie. Thus, as our early presentations demonstrated, such an attentional modification has the effect of constitution a new and/or different experience of meaning, hence, carries the subject from one to another meaning province. In terms, therefore, of the "cognitive style" of each of the different provinces of meaning, what is referred to is "a specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific epoche, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective."[177] Finally, for Schutz the realm constituted by what he terms the 'world of working,' that exhibiting the "highest tension of consciousness," i.e. 'wide awakeness,' in his words, is the paramount reality in the sense of being the "archetype of our experience of reality," all other provinces of meaning being considered modifications of it.[178]

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[175] Ibid.

[176] CP 1, p. 232.

These few brief observations should be sufficient to establish the clarity needed in our use of the terms 'meaning,' 'relevance,' and 'reality' as constitutive processes of consciousness all having their origin in essentially the same Acts of consciousness, namely the tension of consciousness as grounded in the attention to life (this tension itself being grounded in the system of motivational relevances operative in a prevailing interest situation). This clarification is invaluable for an understanding of the man of color, his living within the world of sociality, of the philosophical foundation of his endeavors explicitly undertaken to transform realities. The clarification enables us to transcend in philosophical understanding the limitations of whatever cultural or reality biases which might prevent us from understanding the activities of people of color as to their meaning, their reality for them. This is crucial. For it prevents us, by way of setting out the relativity of knowledge due to the uniqueness of its sedimentation profile, the manner and intensity of experiences in which it was lived and accumulated, for individuals, groups, societies, and nations. Such an understanding is of no small value in the times in which we live.

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[177] CP 1, p. 232.

[178] Ibid., p. 233.

Even so, the relativity is not absolute as knowledge is socially derived and distributed, as we noted. And as we have referred to the ultimate field of consciousness in terms of its major component, the stock of knowledge at hand (with its complexes of meaning, systems of relevances, and provinces of reality), this becomes the context within which the process of transformation must be viewed. Thus, having completed our description of the subjective sphere, we must now turn to a review of the objective sphere by following up the clue of the social condition of personal knowing or consciousness, especially self-knowing. Only then will we be sufficiently prepared to discuss fully the problematic before which we stand.

PART III

III. The Sphere of Social Reality

A constructive presentation of the analyses of the social foundation of reality, of the appropriation of this reality in the processes of socialization, of the formation of self-identity, as set out by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.

A. Transition from the Realm of Egological Subjectivity to the Sphere of Sociality

B. Objective Reality as the Realm of Objectivated Meanings

C. The Subjective Internalization of Social Reality

D. Socialization, Its Modes

E. The Emergence of Self-Identity

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A. Transition from the Realm of Egological Subjectivity to the Sphere of Sociality

The two spheres of subjective and objective reality to which we repeatedly refer exist as distinct realms as a function of reflective thought. The immediacy of concrete living experience is a totality, a whole, encompassing in varying degrees, without radical separation, all that we might set out as belonging properly to one or the other realms. Yet in the province of meaning constituted by theoretical thought, specifically philosophical reflection, the divisions assume a degree of 'reality' and validity consistent with the operative, governing motives of this realm: to come to some radical understanding of the life of consciousness, of human existence. It is here, ultimately, that the distinction drawn has its foundation.

Granting ourselves the reality of the activity of philosophical reflection we must, nonetheless, undertake to establish for ourselves the worth, meaning, and validity of distinctions so made. In the present case this demands that we provide further elaboration of what we have been advancing as though it were self-evident, in need of no further clarification: that human existence is first and foremost social, that the influence or manifestation of this sociality can be found in the deepest strata of subjectivity or consciousness. The clue to the understanding of this matter lies, as we said, in the recognition of the "socially conditioned" nature of my stock of knowledge at hand, the latter being the totality of sedimented experiences, their congealment in recollection as entities recognizable and memorable.[1] The continued evidence of this factor of sociality uncovered in our analysis of the egological sphere as continuously present in that realm prevented us from assuming a total reflective detachment from the objective world. Its prevasiveness is such that it demands continued recognition, especially so in our case. Thus the movement from the sphere of subjectivity to the explicit treatment of objective reality follows as a matter of course, that is, as a matter of being led by the exigencies of thought uncovered in the analysis of the constitution of experiential meaning. For in the course of that analysis we found that the constitution of meaning is based upon the "attitude" of the ego as it directs its attention back upon its elapsed experiences, this attitude being but another name for the system of then operative motivational relevances which ground the structurization of consciousness into theme and horizon and directs the selection of those organized schemes of experiences which will serve as interpretive schemes (interpretive relevances) for the interpretation of the new experiences. This entire process takes place within the context of the stock of nowledge at hand, which knowledge is, for the most part, socially derived, i.e. comes to one through the mediation of others. Thus the ego-subject has its being not in isolation but within numerous systems of relationships of all types and degrees with other ego-subjects. The totality of these relations, their meaning and value, constitutes sociality.

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[1] Berger & Luckmann, op. cit., Social Construction, p. 65.

Relations among ego-subjects (i.e. intersubjectivity) constitute, therefore, a fact to be recognized and affirmed, not a "problem" requiring explanation. It constitutes one of the highest anthropological facts of human existence on equal par with that of death. We thus begin with the shere facticity of the sharedness of the world with others. Our primary concern is to explicate the meaning of this for the problematic at hand. And for us this means that "The formation of the self. . . must also be understood in relation to the ongoing organismic development and the social process in which the natural and the human environment are mediated through the significant other (my emphasis)."[2] Thus the proper understanding of the self-transformative process experienced by the man of color (in particular, any man, in general) must include the grasp of the dialectic of self and society, the dialectic of 'individual biography' or "subjectively real meanings," and 'historic society,' or "socially objectivated meanings."[3]

This notion of "socially objectivated meanings" is the key concept for a radical understanding of the realm of objective (social) reality. The notion intends the processes in and through which the realm of objective reality is intersubjectively constituted and shared. This process involves, on the one hand, what Berger and Luckmann refer to as the "objectivation of meaning." This process, the "objectivation of expressivity," is clearly evidenced in language and speech. What is essential in this notion of the objectivation of meaning via expression is the quality of sharedness into which meanings are transformed, a sharedness having its basis in the availability of such meanings to both producers and others as elements of a common world.[4] Speaking - communication in general - is a prime example of such a process. We shall have more to say of this.

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[2] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 47.

[3] The distinctions are Berger's and Luckmann's.

Yet the process by which meanings are objectivated, i.e., become shared, involves, on the other hand, more specifically presupposes as its condition of possibility, the possibility of reciprocity among ego-subjects. This reciprocity is provided for through what Schutz terms the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives.[5] For the most part, that is, in terms of the attitude of common-sense thinking, this thesis is manifested in the 'taken for granted attitude' that fellow-men exist and that, as a matter of principle, the objects of the world are accessible to their knowledge either as known to them or knowable by them. Still, one also takes for granted that an object common to me and others must mean something different to each of us due to:

> i) I, being 'here,' am at another distance from and experience other aspects as being typical of the objects than he, who is 'there.' For the same reason, certain objects are out of my reach (of my seeing, hearing, my manipulatory sphere, etc.) but within his, and vice versa.

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[4] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 33.

[5] Schutz, CP 1, p. 12.

> ii) My and my fellow-man's biographically determined situations, and therewith our respective purposes at hand and our respective systems of relevances originating in such purposes, must differ, at least to a certain extent.[6]

But the differences in individual perspectives, with possible subsequent intersubjective difficulties, are overcome, according to Schutz, by two basic idealizations:

> i) The idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints: I take for granted - and assume my fellow-man does the same - that if I change places with him so that his 'here' becomes mine, I shall be at the same distance from things and see them with the same typicality as he actually does; moreover, the same things would be in my reach which are actually in his (the reverse is also true).
>
> ii) The idealization of the congruency of the system of relevances: Until counter-evidence I take it for granted - and assume my fellow-man does the same - that the differences in perspectives originating in our unique biographical situations are irrelevant for the purpose at hand of either of us and that he and I, that 'We' assume that both of us have selected and interpreted the actually or potentially common objects and their features in an identical manner or at least an 'empirically identical' manner, i. e. one sufficient for all practical purposes [my emphasis].[7]

These idealizations - both being 'typifying constructs of objects of thought' - together constitute the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives.

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[6] Schutz, CP 1, p. 11.

[7] CP 1, pp. 11-12.

More precisely, as a realm of objectivated meanings, the realm of objective or intersubjective reality is a world of culture:

> . . .from the outset, the world of everyday life is a universe of significance to us, that is a texture of meaning which we have to interpret in order to find our bearings within it and come to terms with it [my emphasis].[8]

This 'texture of meaning' or culture has its foundation in the process of meaning objectivation referred to earlier, namely in the many modes of human expressivity (language systems, writing, art, dance, music, gesture, etc.). All such cultural objects refer back by their origin and meaning to activities of human subjects. The sedimentation of the meanings of these activities constitutes the historicity of culture.[9] Thus the sedimentation of the meanings of human acts of expression into socially shared meanings - the constitution of culture - is what we mean by the notion "objectivation of meanings."

The complete analysis of the realm of sociality would entail setting out this dimension as it is meant by constituents of that world, i.e., engaged subjects. To do so would constitute in effect a 'sociology of knowledge,' or an analysis of the process by which reality is socially constructed, by which everything passing for "knowledge" is constituted in society.[10] This, however, is not our present aim. Our concern with the matter at this point rests on setting out clearly the total situation within which an ego-consciousness undergoes transformation. Thus we are not concerned with laying open to full view

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[8] Schutz, CP 1, p. 10.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, pp. 1-13.

the process by which reality is socially constructed but only to the degree sufficient to provide an adequate description of the phenomenon upon which we are focused. Thus, as the primary unit of our attention is the self, we must clarify our earlier intimations that the self is only in situation and that an essential, not to be disregarded, aspect of the latter is the self's relations with others. Fully conceptualized the self to which we refer is to a great extent a 'social self,' i.e. that segment of the self which is objectified in terms of socially available typifications.[11] This is extremely important for the understanding of identity formation. As one is 'born into' and has his being in situation, so too, the encounter of the self in reflection as to the meaning of one's life as a being among others is conditioned by the elements and circumstances of this situation. Thus ". . . identity is objectively defined as location in a certain world and can be subjectively appropriated only along with that world. Put differently, all identifications take place within the horizons that imply a specific social world."[12] This is for us the precise statement of what we have heretofore referred to as the 'dialectic of self and society.'

This process has, according to Berger and Luckmann, three moments. The first is 'externalization' whereby man 'externalizes' himself through work and other activities producing society in the process. These productions are likewise 'objectivated,' i.e. socially shared as remembered, communicated,

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[11] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 68.

[12] Ibid., p. 122.

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and transmitted to others (future generations). Hence the 'second moment,' society as objective reality. Finally, man, as has been indicated, is a social product, having his being in a situation constituted in large part by others (fellowmen, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors). His continuous coming into being thus involves internalization, or the process by which "the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization."[13] Hence the 'third moment' of the dialectic. The treatment of 'objective reality' is, thereby, no more than the interruption of this process in order to focus upon socially objectivated meanings in constrast to meanings experiences as subjectively real, matters which we have just treated extensively. Still our task is not that of explicating the world of objective reality in its totality,[14] but to understand it as it relates explicitly to subjective reality. In this case the task is that of illuminating social reality within the context of its dialectic with subjective reality. More specifically it involves the in-depth analysis of the third moment of the dialectic, the internalization of objective reality by consciousness, as prolegomena to an explication of transformation.

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[13] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 57.

[14] Cf. Social Construction, Part II, "Society as Objective Reality," p. 45f.

B. Objective Reality as the Realm of Objectivated Meanings

But what of the other two moments? The first of these, the human production of society, is exemplified in the diverse modes of activities through and by which human subjects 'construct' their world whether religiously, philosophically, politically, socially, or however. What is important is that this production takes place within the context of, and on the basis of, the shared participation of numerous individuals. These activities result in, in addition to things immediately perceivable or can be seen (i.e. buildings, automobiles - cultural artifacts of all sorts), the creation of a fund of socially objectivated meanings (knowledge, socially distributed), the second moment of the dialectic. This moment is of particular importance for us. For here we have in view the results of the process of the 'social construction of reality,' as Berger and Luckmann refer to it. This fund of socially shared meanings constitutes, in their words, a "social stock of knowledge" which includes knowledge of my situation and its limits.[15] The key to the understanding of this social collectivity of meanings is the fact that as accumulated it is transmitted from generation to generation and is available to the individual living within the structures of the lebenswelt, the taken for granted world of the social group (ethnic, radical, cultural, political, etc.).[16] Further, what is crucial for us is the fact that the foundation for the build-up of this social stock of knowledge is language:

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[15] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 39.

[16] Ibid.

> Language builds up semantic fields or zones of meaning that are linguistically circumscribed. Vocabulary, grammar and syntax are geared to the organization of these fields. . . Within the semantic fields thus built up it is possible for both biographical and historical experience to be objectified, retained and accumulated. The accumulation. . . is selective, with the semantic fields determining what will be retained and what 'forgotten' of the total experience of both the individual and the society. By virtue of this accumulation a social stock of knowledge is constituted. . .[17]

The importance of the role of language in the constitution of the social stock of knowledge brings to the fore once again what we set out earlier (Introduction), namely that language provides the mode of access to the description of the subjective experience of transformation. This is now becoming gradually clearer. For what is central in both instances (the constitution of the social stock of knowledge and the expression of self-transformation) is the fact that "human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world."[18] And language represents a medium *par excellence* of and for the 'objectivation of experience,' and, in the words of Schutz, for the "typification" of experience, its organization and classification under various schemes. Thus the conjunction of language (the 'sign system') and speech (an act of oral meaning intending) in an "instance of communication"[19] is a primary instance of the objectivation of meaning, i.e. the process by which subjective meanings become intersubjectively established.

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[17] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, p. 39.

[18] Ibid., p. 33.

What is important for us at this point is the fact that the objective reality of society has its being and manifests itself in and for individual consciousness in terms of the social stock of knowledge. Functioning as it does as the ultimate "symbolic universe"[20] by which social meanings are integrated, this social stock of knowledge provides the ultimate horizon within which subjective experience is unified. As Berger and Luckmann point out:

> The symbolic universe provides order for the subjective apprehension of biographical experience. Experiences belonging to different spheres of reality are integrated by incorporation in the same, overarching universe of meaning.[21]

It is in terms of this social stock of knowledge that one comes to understand and define his 'situation' in terms of which one 'finds his place' in the

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[19] Paul Ricoeur, "New Developments in Phenomenology in France - The Phenomenology of Language," Social Research, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring, 1967, pp. 1-30.

[20] ". . . bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality." Social Construction, p. 88.

[21] Ibid., p. 90.

world. It will be within this same universe of social meanings that one will experience self-transformation, that is, transformation of the way in which the self is reflectively typified. For with respect to social reality, the self is typified in terms of its roles or the typification of conduct in the context of an "objectified stock of knowledge common to a collectivity of actors."[22] Thus it is that many modes of self-typification are dialectically related to the realm of social reality, to socially objectivated meanings congealed and sedimented into the social stock of knowledge. To the degree that certain segments of the self (fragments of the many faceted ego) are conceptualized (typified) in terms of concepts and categories drawn from the social stock of knowledge, so it is that the self so conceived constitutes a social self. Hence the problematic involving the self-transformation of the man of color is one which involves the transformation of self as conceived in terms of intersubjective relations, primarily those constituting the social realities of people of color in their situation of relations with non-African peoples.

Further, this social stock of knowledge of which we speak must be understood in terms of its relativity to its social base. Not all knowledge of all types is shared by all in a society. Rather, knowledge is, as we said, socially distributed: it is shared in varying degrees by different individuals. This is especially important for a problem such as ours. American society is by no means homogeneous. It is a somewhat loose and fluid conglomerate of different ethnic, cultural, and regional groups and their corresponding schemes of meanings, values and systems of relevances. This relativity of knowledge to a social base, well discussed by Berger and Luckmann,[23] was rather pointedly laid out by Schutz in the paper "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," in which he undertook the "theoretical analysis of various aspects of the notion of equality in the common-sense thinking of concrete social groups."[24]

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[22] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 69.

As indicated by Schutz, each social group has what he termed a "relative natural concept of the social world" in terms of which the individual (and the group as a subjective and/or objective collectivity) lives his life:

> The social world into which man is born and within which he has to find his bearings is experienced by him as a tight knit web of social relationships, of systems of signs and symbols with their particular meaning structure, of institutionalized forms of social organization, of systems of status and prestige, etc. The meaning of all these elements of the social world in all its diversity and stratification, as well as the pattern of its texture itself, is by those living within it just taken for granted. The sum-total of the relative natural aspects the social world has for those living within it constitutes. . . the folkways of the in-group which are socially accepted as the good ways and the right ways for coming to terms with things and fellow-men. They are taken for granted because they have stood the test so far, and, being socially approved, are held as

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[23] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, Cf. especially pp. 110-11, regarding the 'social-structure base for competition between definitions and reality.'

[24] Schutz, CP 2, p. 22f.

> requiring neither an explanation nor a justification (my emphasis).[25]

These "folkways," as noted by Schutz, become the "social heritage" into which new individuals and children are 'socialized' and establish also the standards in terms of which the group defines its situation, this system of interpretation thus becoming an actual element of the *situation* of the group.[26] Further, this 'relative natural conception' of the world 'approved' (i.e. operative as taken for granted) by a social group is both partially formed by and expressed through the *language* which the group employs: "The vocabulary and the syntax of the vernacular of everyday language represent the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group."[27]

This 'relative natural conception of the world' constituting the meaning province or world of reality of the social group is, in effect, a *system of relevances and typifications*, in the words of Schutz. This system is neither necessarily fully integrated or consistent and may even contain conflicting elements.[28] Moreover, it is not static but changing, "from generation to generation, and its dynamic development is one of the main causes for changes in the social structure itself."[29] This system of typifications and relevances has several important functions of which Schutz takes note. It determines, first, which matters must be treated as typically equal for the purpose of solving in a typical fashion problems which do or might arise in typical situations. Secondly, this system of typifications and relevances transforms the unique actions of unique individuals into the typical functions of typical social roles, grounded in typical motives seeking typical ends. The taking of a role thus involves self-typification. Again, this system serves as both a scheme of orientation and a scheme of interpretation and thus constitutes a 'universe of discourse' among members of the in-group. Moreover, if the scheme of typification is standardized and the system of relevances institutionalized via the various means of social control (mores, morals, rules, rituals, laws), the chance of success of human interpretation is enhanced. And, finally, this "socially approved" system of typifications and relevances constitutes the common horizon within which originate the private typifications and relevance structures of individual members.[30]

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[25] Schutz, CP 2, pp. 230-31.

[26] CP 2, p. 231.

[27] CP 2, p. 233.

[28] CP 2, p. 236.

[29] CP 2, pp. 236-237.

This final point is extremely crucial for us. It clarifies to a great degree our earlier statements regarding the 'situation' within which the process of transformation of consciousness occurs. For now we see that the objective (that is, socially real) aspects of the situation of the individual (his biographical situation) are constituted to a great extent by the realities (provinces of) constituted and approved by the social group in which he has his social being. Here again is the exemplification of the dialectic between subjective and objective realities. Further, it indicates even more how absurd it would be to attempt the description of the self-transformation of the man of color without in the process giving sufficient attention to the wider realm of social reality within which and in dialectic with which this transformation takes place. Thus the fact of the relativity of knowledge to its social base is for us extremely crucial.

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[30] Schutz, CP 2, pp. 237-38.

This is so, not only as a result of the socio-cultural facticity of the pluralism of American society (the concrete socio-cultural, historical horizon of transformation for us) but for reasons corollary to this: the conflict produced when different social groups apply competing reality definitions to the same phenomena.[31]

A rather interesting case of this, for us especially, is that treated by Schutz in the paper "Equality and the Meaning Structure. . ." In this instance he was concerned with the taken for granted interpretations of the world by "in-groups" and "out-groups." The point of conflict is the interpretation of self and world by the in-group (e. g. the ideal typifications of the "dominant American culture"). The view of the in-group is dominated by "ethnocentrism," or, "the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything and

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[31] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 110f.

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all others are scaled and rated with reference to it."[32] Ethnocentrism is but another name for what we have called, employing the terminology of a sociology of knowledge set out by Schutz, the 'relative natural conception of the world.' What is at issue here, however, is the fact that the in-group takes its conception of the world for granted, hence it becomes for them self-evident.

On the other hand, the "out-group" (e.g. black, Mexican-Americans, poor, and other "marginal" peoples, as Marcuse refers to them[33]), for the most part, does not respond to the ways of life and interpretations of the world of the in-group as self-evident truths.[34] This is particularly true in cases involving instances in which there are serious and diverging interpretations of either group by the other. A continuing classic case of this on the contemporary scene is the conflict emerging out of the competing/conflicting 'relative natural conceptions of the world' that are held by the racial/ethnic groups of white and black Americans, particularly with respect to the former's interpretations of the latter which are now being strenuously countered by an explicitly evolved self-interpretation on the part of black people. Herein in simplified form is the wider horizon of objective or social reality within which the phenomenon of transformation experienced by the black man occurs.

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[32] Schutz, CP 2, p. 244.

[33] Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, Beacon Press: Boston Mass., 1969.

[34] Schutz, CP 2, p. 245.

Still further, Schutz pointed out that "the self-interpretation by the in-group and the in-group's natural conception of the world by the out-group are frequently interrelated" in a 'double' fashion.[35] For purposes of greater clarity let us have the term "in-group" refer to the concrete social groupings of black peoples engaged in varying degrees of self-interpretation; the term "out-group" to the various general groupings of non-black peoples in America. Thus, as Schutz pointed out, there is the frequent feeling on the part of the in-group that it has been misinterpreted by the out-group, a failure rooted in hostile prejudices and bad faith - racism, as we now term it - "since the truths held by the in-group are 'matters of course,' self-evident and, therefore, understandable by any human being."[36] This feeling, said Schutz, may lead to a shifting of the prevailing system of relevances within the in-group by "originating a solidarity of resistance against outside criticism."[37] As a result the out-group is regarded with hatred, fear, disgust, aversion, repugnance, or antipathy.[38]

There is abundant empirical evidence of this process by which the activities of one social group evoke changes and responses in another in the history of the social thought of black people in America.[39] This process has reached a high degree of intensity in the last four or five years as large numbers of black people have again undertaken the task of radical self-definition within the contexts of Black Power and black nationalism (cultural, political, social, etc.).

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[35] Schutz, CP 2, p. 246.

[36] Schutz, CP 2, p. 247.

[37] Ibid.

[38] CP 2, p. 247.

On the other hand, there is developed, in response to the changes of the in-group, what Schutz referred to as a 'vicious circle' ". . .because the out-group, by the changed reaction of the in-group, is fortified in its interpretation of the traits of the in-group as highly detestable."[40] Thus,

> Such a situation may lead to various attitudes of the in-group toward the out-group: the in-group may stick to its way of life and try to change the attitude of the out-group by an educational process of spreading information, or by persuasion, or by appropriate propaganda. Or the in-group may try to adjust its way of thinking to that of the out-group by accepting the latter's pattern of relevances at least partially. Or a policy of iron curtain or of appeasement might be established; and finally, there will be no other way to disrupt the vicious circle but war at any temperature.[41]

Each of these possible modes of group reaction on the part of the in-group may be empirically verified by referring to particular "sub-groups" within the black population in this country. That this is so brings to light in slightly different fashion the pluralistic nature of American society even within particular racial-ethnic collectivities.

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[39] Cf., for example. Floyd Barbour, ed., The Black Power Revolt, Porter Sargent: Boston, Mass., 1968.

[40] Schutz, CP 2, p. 247.

[41] Ibid.

At any rate, what is of value to be drawn from all of this is the exemplification of what we have referred to previously as conflicts among competing definitions of reality. For it cannot be denied that the issues of conflict between and among concrete social groups are matters which are of the highest degree real to the members of the respective groups. This is especially the case when the matter at issue is the definition of the people of either of the groups, matters of interpretation which are extremely crucial in that they serve to fix the place of the people in the cosmos, literally. Whatever the matter at issue the resulting situation of conflict brings into play varying degrees of elaborate mechanisms for the defense or 'maintenance' of the group's challenged universe of reality or its 'relative natural conception of the world.' Two such methods of "universe maintenace" were treated by Berger and Luckmann, i.e. "conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance,"[42] and "social organization for universe-maintenance."[43]

In the former case, the universe of reality which the members of the social group "inhabit" is rationalized through processes of reflection into cognitive, theoretical constructions which are socially objectivated thus linking the universe of reality to its roots in concrete social institutions. The group's universe of reality thus is rendered indubitable "no matter how unsystematic or illogical such a universe may seem to an 'unsympathetic' outsider."[44] This process serves to "legitimate" the institutions and social order of the group as a whole, that is, to produce "new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes. . . to make objectively available and subjectively plausible the 'first order' objectivations that have been institutionalized."[45] The intent therefore manifested in the legitimating activities of a social group by its appropriate legitimators (i.e. the group's 'leaders' or spokesman) is that of integrating meanings, specifically the complexes of meaning which express the group's sense of reality.

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[42] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 96f.

[43] Ibid., p. 107f.

It is noted by Berger and Luckmann that in instances of conflict between social groups wherein the conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance are brought into play these conceptual machineries are products of and related to social activity. Specifically, "the success of particular machineries is related to the power possessed by those who operate them."[46] Which definition of reality will win out in cases of conflict is, they point, dependent upon the power (social, political, etc.) of the legitimators advancing the reality claim, rather than upon the 'theoretical ingenuity' of the claim.

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[44] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 96.

[45] Ibid., p. 85.

[46] Ibid., p. 100.

On the other hand, universe-maintenance is also related to the organization of a social collectivity, a fact which reiterates the founding of social universes of reality in human activity. As the authors of Social Construction point out:

> Reality is socially defined. But the definitions are always embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality.[47]

Thus, they note, if one is to understand the state of any socially constructed universe of meaning or reality at any given time, or its change through time, then one must also understand the organization of that society or social group which "permits the definers to do their defining."[48] Within a society or social group advancing a reality claim one must note the position and status of the person who is the "spokesman" for the group, i.e. whether he be an "expert" such as a political leader, theologian, philosopher, or whatever, who claims to know the ultimate significance of what everyone knows and does, or just a "layman" or non-expert.[49]

Further, rival definitions of reality may emerge not only between social groups but also within a particular group. Such a case would be one wherein different experts or spokesmen advance the claim for, say, the proper social being of the group. An instance of this in terms of our own history is the continuing competition among numerous social philosophies simultaneously being advocated by different individuals and groups within the collective population of black Americans: separation? integration? liberation?[50] What all of this implies for us is that "there will always be a social-structural base for a competition between rival definitions of reality and that the outcome of the rivalry will be affected, if not always determined outright, by the development of this base."[51] And, "Rival definitions of reality are. . .decided upon in the sphere of rival social interests whose rivalry is in turn 'translated' into theoretical terms."[52] In terms of a sociology of knowledge this is the basis of ideology:

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[47] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 107.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Social Construction, especially pp. 108-9.

> when a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology.[53]

As these writers point out, what is distinctive about the range of the concept of ideology is that the same overall universe of reality is being interpreted in

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[50] Cf. especially along this line, Theodore Draper, The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism, The Viking Press: New York, 1970, and the special issue of Ebony magazine, "Which Way Black America?," Vol. xxv, No. 10, August, 1970.

[51] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 110.

[52] Ibid., p. 111.

[53] Ibid., p. 113.

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different ways depending upon the concrete vested interests of the group within the society.[54] The ideology serves to enhance and promote the solidarity of the group.

At any rate, even though modern industralized societies are, for the most part, pluralistic they are still not simply random conglomerates of sub-social units as our earlier statements might have suggested. Rather, such societies have what Berger and Luckmann termed a "shared core universe" which is taken for granted and on the basis of which they (the groups) "co-exist in mutual accommodation."[55] This state of mutuality is disturbed, of course, when some issue or matter common to groups becomes problematic, that is, is viewed differently by different groups.[56] The degree to which the issue is important to either or both (or all) groups will determine the level and intensity of the ensuing conflict.

Finally, in discussing the realm of objective or 'social' reality we have been employing the notion of social group without clarifying the meaning of the concept with respect to group membership. What it means to be a member of a group is different depending upon whether or not one is a member of the group in question or an outsider or observer of the group. In the former instance we should refer to the "subjective meaning" of group membership; in the latter, to the "objective meaning" of group membership.

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[54] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 114.

[55] Ibid., p. 115.

[56] N.B., for example, Schutz, CP 2, "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," p. 257f.

Schutz has pointed out that, in the first case,

> the subjective meaning the group has for its members consists in their knowledge of a common situation, and with it of a common system of typifications and relevances. This situation has its history in which the individual member's biographies participate; and the system of typification and relevances determing the situation forms a common relative natural conception of the world.[57]

Here we have explicitated the notion of "relative natural conception of the world" which we have often employed. It consists, as we see, in systems of typifications and relevances shared by members of a racial (ethnic, cultural) group. This is a further elaboration of the notion of "objectivated meanings" which we borrowed from Berger and Luckmann as well as its specification relative to an individual social group. All in all this common system of meanings constitutes for the members of the group their "home," in Schutz's words, in terms of which they 'find their bearings' "guided by a set of recipes of more or less institutionalized habits, mores, folkways, etc., that help them come to terms with beings and fellow-men belonging to the same situation."[58] Most importantly:

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[57] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 251.

[58] Ibid., pp. 251-2.

> The system of typifications and relevances shared with the other members of the group defines the social roles, positions, and statutes of each. This acceptance of a common system of relevances leads the members of the group to a homogeneous self-typification.[59]

Thus it is here, within the common system of relevances and typifications of the social group, that the individual achieves the private definition of his situation and establishes the attitude toward the social role he has to fill within the group. Also it is the primary locus of the individual's attitude toward others, both members and non-members of his social group.

On the other hand, the objective meaning of group membership is a function of the point of view of an "outsider" or non-member of the group in question and is a "conceptual construct" of the observer, that is, a subsumption of the individuals observed showing particular characteristics and traits under a social category derived through the operations of the system of relevances and typifications of the observer.[60]

This interpretation on the part of the observer may in fact correspond to a social reality: "the principles governing such typification are considered also by the individuals thus typified as elements of _their_ situation as defined by _them_ and as being relevant from _their_ point of view."[61] Even so, however, it is pointed out by Schutz that the interpretations of the observer will never

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[59] Berger and Luckmann, _Social Construction_, p. 252.

[60] Ibid., p. 255.

[61] Ibid.

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coincide fully with the self-interpretation of the group. Yet, on the other hand, the homogeneous typification of the group by the observer may in fact include elements which are regarded as heterogeneous by group members. In this case there is a discrepancy between the two interpretations, that of the onlooker and the self-interpretations of the group. The situation in which the group members are viewed is thus not of their own definition. And while it may be taken for granted by the observer, it is not necessarily thereby coincident with the self-interpretation of the group. However, this discrepancy is of little consequence, Schutz noted, as long as the individuals so typified are beyond the control (political, social, or otherwise) of the observer(s). If it is the case that the outsider does have the means to impose upon group members his typifications and to enforce their institutionalization, then serious consequences result for the individuals typified against their will. Not the least important of these consequences are the effects upon the personality structures of the members of the group. These effects vary depending upon the levels of personality involved in the typifications. The most serious is the situation in which the integrity of the personality, that is, its viability as perceived in the self-reflection of the individual, is destroyed through identification, either as a whole, or in broad layers, with the imposed characteristic or personality traits.[62] Thus,

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[62] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, pp. 255-56.

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> . . . if he is compelled to identify himself as a whole with that particular trait or characteristic which places him in terms of the imposed system of heterogeneous relevances into a social category he had never included as a relevant one in the definition of his private situation, then he feels that he is no longer treated as a human being in his own right and freedom, but is degraded to interchangeable specimen of the typified class. He is alienated from himself, a mere representative of the typified traits and characteristics. . .
>
> This may even lead to a complete breakdown of his private order of domains of relevance - that is, to a crisis. . .[63]

This entire phenomenon of imposed typifications is clearly evidenced in the concrete interrelationships among whites and blacks in America and have been clearly captured and articulated in numerous publications. What this entails for the individual consciousness we have just seen. And it means, for us, that the ultimate objective horizon for our problematic phenomenon, self-transformation, is a historical situation of imposed typifications which have come to be assumed as part of the order of meanings and relevances of the individual suffering the imposition. This process by which meanings and relevances of any sort come to be held by the individual consciousness is a matter to which we must now devote our attention.

In so doing our treatment of the process of the internalization of sociality will be further fulfillment of the task of remaining (reflectively) within the horizon of the dialectic of subjective reality and objective reality. In pursuing this task we have so far treated two of the three moments of this dialectic as they have been set out by Berger and Luckmann in *Social Construction*. The first, society as the product of human activities, we have come to grips with in the understanding of the realm of social reality as a dimension which has its foundation in, is a product of, human activity: the world of social reality is a socially constructed world constituted and interpreted - meant - by humans intersubjectively engaged.

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[63] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, pp. 255-56.

The second moment of the dialectic is exemplified in the truly objective nature of society, i. e. the persistence of its institutions and processes in time with change and modification, and the shared nature of meanings, values, and systems of relevances.

The third moment of the dialectic, man as a social product, with which we shall now be concerned, is none other than the process by which these same objectivated, shared meanings are internalized by consciousness, that is, become part of the structure and order of relevances, meanings, and values of the human subject, and operative, specifically (for us), in self-typification. Already we have met this moment in our analysis of the constitution of meaning in consciousness and its structurization via systems of relevance. Our treatment of the dialectic at that point was indirect and one-sided, thus, necessarily incomplete as we were at the time operating within the methodological confines of epoche and reduction. Here, however, the explication of the process of the subjective internalization of social reality is to be such as to highlight it fully as a moment in a complex dynamic (dialectic). Progressively, then, layer by layer, we lay out what is involved in the process of transformation.

C. The Subjective Internalization of Social Reality

In the social sciences, sociology in particular, the process by which social reality (or social meanings) are internalized, i.e. appropriated, is generally referred to as a process of socialization. The notion intends the reciprocal (dialectical) nature of the process, for, on the one hand, there is involved the means by which the individual becomes integrated into the social world (the notion of "world" being understood in both its narrowest and widest senses); and, on the other, the establishment of the social world as meaningful (hence, real in the most radical sense) for the individual.

Both of these aspects, however, are but moments of a single process: socialization. They are, therefore, but complementary, inseparable aspects of a total process.

Still the importance of understanding the socializing process as a process by which socially shared meanings are passed on and appropriated, through the various intersubjective modes in terms of which socialization is carried out, is immensely important for us. It is a necessary complement of our understanding of the constitution of the "problematic" situation which grounds self-transformation (i.e., a situation the assessment of which by an ego-consciousness is found to be unfulfilling, to whatever extent, of the various anticipations and projections of it made in the course of living), and, even, to an understanding of transformation as a subjective process dialectically grounded in sociality. Our interest in understanding this process is thus doubly grounded.

In pursuing this understanding of the process by which social meanings are appropriated we shall be concerned primarily with the structural aspects of the process, rather than with particular empirical manifestations of it. In keeping with our overall project at this stage, we aim at the delineation of the universal, structural relations and processes involved in the historical occurrences of transformation of self-identification by particular people in particular socio-cultural, political situations. Ours is an attempt, therefore, to think the very conditions of possibility of such a phenomenon.

Thus, in the progressive working out of this project we shall be concerned here with a number of things in particular. First, we shall take note of the chief modes through which socialization is achieved. Once we have grasped the essence of the socializing process, we must then move to an understanding of how individual or personal identity is achieved within the matrix of social meanings. Thirdly, the preceeding two understandings must be consolidated by laying open to view the way in which both socialization and and the establishment of personal identity are grounded in consciousness itself. The delineation of these activities of consciousness will, finally, provide us with the appropriate foundation and transition to an explicit discussion of language, actualized in the mediation of meanings, as a primary mode of access to subjective meanings (made objective via discourse and other meaning bearing activities), or, in our case, to subjectively transformed meanings.

D. Socialization, Its Modes

In laying open to view the ways which persons are socialized we shall draw again upon the insights of Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality. For them socialization consists in ". . . the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it."[64] It is characterized by two generally distinguishable phases: primary socialization, and secondary socialization.

> Primary socialization is the first socialization an indivudual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society.[65]

We shall treat each of these modes in turn.

1. Primary Socialization

It should be recognized that the notion of socialization, admittedly not very precise at present, presupposes a great deal. At the very least its employment presupposes what has gone before in our discussions of "society," of objective reality as a realm of objectivated meanings (or, intersubjectively shared meanings). Thus the very process of socialization itself presupposes, has as its foundation, a world of meanings intersubjectively constructed and shared. Full recognition of this important factor (i. e. the intersubjective world as the taken-for-granted foundation and horizon of socialization) reveals again the dialectical nature of social existence. For what is involved in socialization is, first, the imposition upon the individual of the *already constituted* meanings of the inhabitants of the social world into which the individual is being introduced. The importance of understanding this cannot be overstated: *The world into which the individual undergoing socialization is introduced is not a world of his own making.* Rather, it is a world created, defined, and imposed upon him by Others. Thus socialization, the process by which social meanings are acquired by the individual, stands out in its complex and dialectical nature as a process beyond the control of the individual undergoing socialization, involving as its pervasive first moment the imposition of meanings upon the individual.

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[64] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 120.

[65] Ibid.

The force of this comes clearly to the fore when we direct ourselves to the mode of primary socialization. Here we are dealing with the process by which socially founded meanings and relevances - the constitution of the world, ultimately - are imparted to a developing individual. And, understanding that the goal of the process is to have the individual *identify* with, that is, to

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appropriate as his own, the socially derived meanings presented to him, the very key to the achievement of this identification hinges on a crucial aspect of the entire socializing project: the Other(s) through whom the socially derived meanings are mediated. Thus it is here in the process of primary socialization that we find in operation the manner in which the world comes to be perpetuated in its sharedness. Here, from a genetic perspective, is to be found the foundation of the understanding that our being-in-the-world is socially conditioned. For it is only through others that we have a world at all. And the process of socialization, viewed from one of its perspectives, is the manner in which that world is given to us.

But we must go deeper. In terms of primary socialization, not just anyone passes on this world to us. Rather, it is given over to us by those who Berger and Luckmann refer to as significant others,[66] their 'significance' residing in the fact that they are, by whatever combination of factors of circumstance and situation, (i.e. parents, guardians, "loved ones" in general, etc.) those whose task is to impart to the child the meanings and relevances constitutive of the social world which they inhabit. So it is that we speak of the "mediation" of the world to the child. But, even further:

> The significant others who mediate this world to him modify it in the course of mediating it. They select aspects of it in accordance with their own location

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[66] This notion of "Significant Other" the authors derive from the thought of George Mead.

> in the social structure, and also by virtue of their individual, biographically rooted idiosyncrasies. The social world is 'filtered' to the individual through this double selectivity.[67]

This insight, when combined with that recognizing the social heterogeneity of American society as a whole, and that cognizant of the socio-political, cultural implications of the latter, serves to assist in reaching a fundamental insight into the grounds of the historical development of various character structures and their changes or transformations. For here we have in view the fundamental link in the chain of the maintenance of particular realities: the mediation through significant others of the meanings of a social world from generation to generation by way of primary socialization.

The key to the historical continuity of the meanings of the social group via socialization is dependent, however, upon the closing of yet another link in the chain of reciprocities which binds the social world together: the individual undergoing socialization must, if he is to be socialized into the world of the social group, appropriate as his own the meanings, values and relevance systems of the group, that is, he must, as we said, identify with them. And this identification involves all aspects of the personality structure, affective as well as cognitive. In fact, it is the former, namely the emotional dimension of the human personality (feeling structure), which ultimately establishes the intersubjective, dialectical relations of the child and others as significant, the latter term conveying the fact that the relation is grounded in meaning. Thus the dialectic of socialization is achieved when the child identifies with his significant others by internalizing, making his own, their roles and attitudes (meaning and relevance systems, value structures), and, subsequently, the world which they mediate to him.[68]

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[67] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 121.

Yet the mediation of the world via significant others is important to the appropriation of a world of meanings by an individual in yet another respect. It is here, via this mediation, that the child comes to develop a sense of his own being as an individual:

> . . . by this identification with significant others the child becomes capable of identifying himself, of acquiring a subjectively coherent and plausible identity. . . the self is a reflected entity, reflecting the attitudes first taken by significant others toward it; the individual becomes what he is addressed as by his significant others.[69]

This insight comes as confirmation of our earlier statements with respect to the self being a "social" self, that is, having its basis in meaning systems constituted in intersubjective relations. As we see, the formation of self-identity - and its maintenance, we might add - is grounded in the dialectical relations of intersubjectivity and first formed in the early phases of primary socialization. Thus we can, following the authors, say that ". . . identity is objectively defined as location in a certain world and can be subjectively appropriated only along with that world."[70] Or, further. . .

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[68] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 121.

[69] Ibid.

> . . . all identifications take place within horizons that imply a specific social world. The child learns that he is what he is called. Every name implies a nomenclature, which in turn implies a designated social location. To be given an identity involves being assigned a specific place in the world. As this identity is subjectively appropriated by the child, . . . so is the world to which this identity points. Subjective appropriation of identity and subjective appropriation of the social world are merely different aspects of the same process of internalization, mediated by the same significant others.[71]

Yet the constitution of self-identity via the internalization of the world, its meaning, value, and relevance structures as mediated through significant others, is only part of the process of socialization. The formation of self-identity does not, at this stage, constitute the full internalization of a social world. Rather this is achieved progressively as the individual advances through the socialization process and abstracts from an identification with the world as mediated by specific significant others to an identification with generalized roles and attitudes.[72] This mode of identification is referred to by the authors (following G. H. Mead) as identification with the "generalized other," a mode the formation of which in consciousness means that ". . . the individual now identifies not only with concrete others but with a generality of others, that is, with a society."[73] And it is here, they point out, at the level of identification with socially generalized meanings, values, and relevances, that personal identity gains stability and continuity.[74]

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[70] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 122.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

Thus generalized identification marks a decisive stage in the growth of social consciousness or socialization. For. . .

> It implies the internalization of sociality as such and of the objective reality established therein, and, at the same time, the subjective establishment of a coherent and continuous identity. Society and identity are subjectively crystallized in the same process of internalization.[75]

And what is most important for us, given our overall project, is the manner in which this "crystallization," as Berger and Luckmann refer to it, takes place. It is, as they point out, concurrent with the internalization of language which constitutes both the most important instrument and the most important content of socialization![76] For with and by means of the internalization or learning of a language ". . .various motivational and interpretative schemes are internalized as institutionally defined. . ."[77] and thus the world as structured or meant by the socializing society or group. Further, the character of this world as sedimented in the social stock of knowledge in turn affects the character of the process of socialization itself: the transmission of particular modes of knowledge require higher degrees of linguistic complexity than others.[78] Thus we have here the rationale for the progressive, sequential nature of much of all socially based learning, formal and informal. So too, primary socialization will be affected by the requirements of the institutional order, that is, by the socially established orders of possibilities open to the child given his relative position (as defined by his race, color, ethnic grouping, etc.) within the society as a whole. For example, "An upper-class child may learn the 'facts of life' at an age when a lower-class child has mastered the rudiments of abortion technique."[79]

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[73] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 122.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Social Construction, p. 123.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Social Construction, p. 124.

The phase of primary socialization has been fulfilled when in the individual consciousness the world as structured (in terms of meaning, value, and relevance systems) by the social group has been established, i.e. internalized, as the general world of the group, that is, in terms of the generalized other. The individual becomes at this point "an effective member of society and in subjective possession of a self and a world."[80] Still, as Berger and Luckmann note, the

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[78] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 126.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Social Construction, p. 126.

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process is not complete 'once and for all,' never totally finished. Rather, the internalized reality of primary socialization must be "maintained" if the individual is to persist in his orientation to the world established by the socializing (primary) process. To some degree this stability and relative permenance of the world orientation established in primary socialization is grounded in the fact that it is the first world of the individual constructed for him by significant others. Thus, the world the individual comes to inhabit, as well as the identity he comes to hold, is constituted, to some degree, by inevitability. Add to this the high level of affective intensity that accompanies the mediation (on the part of significant others) and, subsequently, the internalization (on the part of the individual undergoing socialization) of social reality during primary socialization we thus begin to get some indication of the degree of force involved in transformations of consciousness, especially of self-identity, if the structures of both have been established during primary socialization. It is the case, however, that socialization is never total; the structure of consciousness, of personality and character, do undergo change and modification via the mediation of meanings through institutionalized "subworlds." Such changes may be broadly characterized as constituting the process of "secondary socialization."

2. Secondary Socialization

Secondary socialization involves the internalization of meaning, value, and relevance systems which have their base in institutional structures (i.e.

objectivated meaning systems of the wider historical, social world), thus involves "the acquisition of role-specific knowledge, the roles being directly or indirectly rooted in the division of labor."[81] Even further:

> Secondary socialization requires the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies, which means, for one thing, the internalization of semantic fields structuring routine interpretations and conduct within an institutional area. At the same time 'tacit understandings,' evaluations and affective colorations of these semantic fields are also acquired.[82]

The worlds which the individual comes to "inhabit" as a result of secondary socialization are, in relation to the world of primary reality acquired during primary socialization, partial or derived worlds, even though they are "more or less" cohesive provinces of reality.[83] Still, it must be realized that the ground for the acquisition of the worlds of secondary socialization is the pervasive and relative permanent world of primary socialization; the socialization of individuals (or, viewed from another perspective, the internalization of secondary worlds of reality) presupposes an already socialized individual, an individual already in possession of a formed self and an already internalized world, a situation which constitutes a fundamental problem for secondary socialization and determines its very process.[84]

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[81] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 127.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Social Construction, p. 127.

[84] Ibid., p. 129.

> It [secondary socialization] cannot construct subjective reality ex nihilo. This presents a problem because the already internalized reality has a tendency to persist. Whatever new contents are now to be internalized must somehow be superimposed upon this already present reality. There is, therefore, a problem of consistency between the original and the new internalizations. . . To establish and maintain consistency secondary socialization presupposes conceptual procedures to integrate different bodies of knowledge.[85]

Viewing this from another perspective, one grounded in our overall project, the above insights lay open to view what is required if reality definitions, encompassing either part of or the whole of the world with which the individual identifies, are offered as counter to that appropriated by the individual during primary socialization. Such an attempt would involve very particular and special "legitimating" apparatuses if the replacement or transformation is to take place. For normally secondary socialization is a process involving low degrees of affectivity; the mediators of these secondary worlds are, for the most part, "non-significant others," or, social functionaries. And the process itself is for the most part highly formal (e.g. the process of formal education, job training, etc.). The individual's insertion into the various worlds of secondary socialization is mediated through social roles, i.e. socially based (objectified) typified modes of behavior.[86] And roles as structured (intersubjectively) modes of behavior are highly anonymous: "they are readily detached from their individual performers."[87] The effect of all of this is that the realities internalized during secondary socialization have less "subjective inevitability" than those of primary socialization. Thus. . .

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[85] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 129.

[86] Natanson, op. cit., The Journeying Self, p. 33f.

> . . . the reality accent of knowledge internalized in secondary socialization is more easily bracketed (that is, the subjective sense that these internalizations are real is more fugitive). It takes severe biographical shocks to disintegrate the massive reality internalized in early childhood; much less to destroy the realities internalized later. Beyond this, it is relatively easy to set aside the reality of the secondary internalizations.[88]

A number of interesting consequences follow from this. On the one hand it means that the individual can "distance" himself (or a 'part' of himself) from certain realities contact with which is grounded in "role-specific situations" (e.g. a job role and other such activities engaged in only fragmentarily). That this is so is possible in that the primary world and self-identification of the individual are previously established and grounded, and it is on the basis of these that the individual engages in secondary roles and situations.[89]

On the other hand, the high degree of anonymity and formalization underlying the structures of the worlds of secondary socialization allow for learning situations (role and world insertion processes) that are rational and relatively

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[87] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 131.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Social Construction, p. 131.

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emotionally controlled.[90] Such conditions, which render the internalized meaning, value, and relevance systems "brittle" in their structure, may require special techniques to produce the identification necessary for the successful internalization/socialization by/of the individual.[91] This being the case, the transformation of the subjective realities of already socialized individuals, particularly radical transformation, i. e. of personality/character structures (of self-identity) looms as a highly significant happening, especially so when such a transformation stands as the forward term of a radical project. For the preliminary indications (so far laid open by the analysis) suggest that extremely important political consequences lie within the horizon of the unfolding of such a project, indicated by the understanding that if secondary socialization is indeed radical, that is, seeks the transformation of identifications (social and personal) established during primary socialization, then operations and techniques of legitimation become necessary. And, depending upon the nature of the new or counter-reality definitions to be internalized, and the socio-political situation (i. e. the social world as comprised of different and, in this case, competing social groups and their relations of conflict) within which they are projected, their successful internalization and maintenance might require transformation of the structure and organization of the objective socio-political world itself, in whole or significant part. Thus we have within the project of transformation itself very important political implications: the ground, perhaps, of revolution!

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[90] Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction, p. 132.

[91] Ibid.

Pursuit of this matter would, however, take us beyond the range of our present study. In keeping with our stated aims, we must return to a further, more explicit, examination of the process of socialization. Here however we seek to explore an important theme uncovered in our earlier discussions of primary socialization, that is, the emergence of the sense of personal or self-identity in the socializing process. For it is this that constitutes the central thrust of our analysis.

E. The Emergence of Self-Identity

What we seek at this point is a further refinement of the dialectic of "self" and "society." Our discussion of the modes of socialization as processes by which the human individual comes to be woven into the social fabric and (simultaneously) comes to appropriate as his own the meaning, value, and relevance systems of the social order(s) as mediated to him by others, might conceivably leave one with the understanding that we are advancing (perhaps even inadvertantly) some form of "social determinism." Even if this is not the case, however, we wish to further explore the matter such that there can be no doubt as to where we stand. For the recognition of existential freedom, the freedom of the conscious subject in situation, is essential to the grasp of the phenomenon we have in view.

Freedom therefore must be disclosed as a constitutive aspect of the total structure of human existence in sociality if its disclosure is to have the necessary grounding and validity in our analysis. And to the degree that we have repeatedly referred heuristically to the transformation of consciousness as a transformation of meaning, we must look to the human subject in its sociality as a meaning-bestowing/meaning-interpreting being so as to allow the fullest possible understanding of self-identity within the horizon of sociality such that the freedom within situation stands forth clearly. We must move, then, from our characterization of the human subject as a social self to an understanding of it as an intentional self.[92]

The importance of this distinction with respect to an analysis of the "social world" and/or the "social being" of the human subject must not be overlooked. For the proper disclosure of the human subject in the situation of sociality as an intentional self makes clear the dimension of freedom as constitutive of human existence, a matter that has been problematic in the theories and methodologies of the social sciences.[93]

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[92] The distinction between "social self" and "intentional self" is drawn from Gibson Winter's, Elements for a Social Ethic, The Macmillan Company: New York, 1966, p. 85f. Hereafter referred to as Social Ethic.

[93] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 85. Cf. also Herber Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Human Behavior and Social Processes, Arnold Rose, ed., Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, Mass., 1962, pp. 179-192.

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To be sure, the founding matrix of self-identification, of being-in-the-world, is, as our analysis of primary socialization disclosed (i. e. the mediation of social reality through significant others), intersubjectivity. Particularly, as disclosed by Schutz,[94] the "we-relation" is the most primordial mode of intersubjectivity, all other modes being derivative of or built upon this basic form. In the dimension of we-relatedness there persists the "simultaneity of consciousness" which is the foundation of the intersubjective constitution of meaning, thus the priority form of sociality itself.[95] And the key aspect to the establishment of sociality in the we-relation is communication in all of its forms (i. e. gesture, sign, symbol, language). Thus, in the co-constituted horizon of lived simultaneity constituted by temporal and spatial immediacy in the face-to-face situation of the we-relation, a meaning-intending act on the part of one participant (i. e. a gesture, sign, symbol or speech-act) evokes an interpretive response from the other, which is in turn interpreted by the first actor. In this latter moment of the dialectic of communication the meaning the first actor gives to his act is mediated by his interpretation of the meaning which the other gives to it. Generalizing this perspective to all other forms of intersubjectivity, the self is thus seen as a reflection of society,[96] that is, has its being grounded in the dialectics of intersubjectivity. Even so, to the degree that the process of communication remains primordial in the we-relation (and, derivatively in all others) it is the actualization of gesture, sign, symbol, and language in the event of communication (the 'coming to consciousness as mind of sociality through gesture, sign, and symbol,' as Winter refers to it[97]) that is foundational to the development of self-consciousness. Structurally the conditions of possibility of this communicative situation involve what Schutz terms the "reciprocity of perspectives" including the *idealizations*: a) the idealization of interchangeability of standpoints, and b) the idealization of the congruency of systems of relevance of the subjects involved.[98]

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[94] Schutz, PSW, pp. 163-172; CP 2, pp. 23-33. Cf. Richard Zaner, "Schutz on Intersubjectivity," Social Research, Vol. 1, No. 28, Spring, 1961, pp. 71-93.

[95] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 97.

[96] Ibid., p. 99.

What is crucial in all of this (what is in fact sought) is the aspect of *unity*:

> The dominance of unification becomes fully manifest in the reciprocity of perspectives, which is presupposed in seeing the gesture from the perspective of the other. . . *The unity of self and other is actualized as a social world through the sharing of gestures, signs, and language; the unity of the self is actualized simultaneously, as personal identity in the consistency of the intentionality of the self with the responses of the social world and particularly the world of significant others* [my emphasis].[99]

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[97] Winter, *Social Ethic*, p. 101. Cf. Ricoeur, op. cit., "New Developments in Phenomenology. . .," *Social Research*, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring, 1967, pp. 1-30.

[98] For the discussion of this important matter see above, PART II, Section 4, and CP 1, pp. 10-15.

[99] Winter, *Social Ethic*, pp. 102-3.

This fruitful view of intersubjectivity as a "thrust toward unity" on the part of the selves intersubjectively engaged, unity being the "third moment" of the intersubjective dialectic, is significantly developed by Winter. The other two moments include, first, dynamic (the gesture as a meaning intention reflecting relatedness and need for response), and form (the interpretive response as a meaning-giving (form-receiving and form-giving) act.[100] Its importance for us resides in the disclosure of the intentional self (the self as meaning intending) as a dialectical counterpart of the social self (the self as constituted via the shared forms of socialtiy). The unity of the self, i.e. self-identity, is thus constituted not by way of social determinations but by the dialectical development of these two aspects of the human being. Thus. . .

> The shared forms of a public world mediate the self-consciousness of personal identity and reflect the sociality which underlies the communicative process itself. In turn, the relatedness of being is presupposed in this social process - appearing in the form of immediacy as the 'We-relation' and amplified in a social and cultural milieu through the dialogue of gesture, sign, and higher-order symbols. Hence, the 'We-relation' is the immediate giveness of language and mind. In this respect, self and symbolization are interdependent expressions of creativity (dynamics) and shared meanings (forms) which emerge as the coming to consciousness of sociality in evolution [my emphasis].[101]

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[100] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 102.

[101] Ibid., p. 104.

What, then, is this "intentional self" so important in the dialectic of self and society? It is, simply, consciousness as being-in-the-world, as meaning-endowing and meaning-interpreting. It is the recognition of existence as a constant dynamic process of constituting the world, i.e. ordering it in terms of meaning, value, and relevance, constituted and shared - mediated - through others.

> The human world is. . . an intersubjective world in which self and other are united in their essential relatedness and yet separated in their actualization of this relationship. In affirming the other, the self expresses its distance and freedom. The self is ultimately, then, a freedom or distance from the self, the other, and the world - a freedom made possible by sociality and yet a freedom through which sociality emerges.[102]

And in what does this freedom of the self consist? Precisely in its power to constitute (or to reconstitute) any situation in which one finds oneself with respect to its meaning and value, its relevance or, in total, one's world. Such a reconstitution would be, in our words, a transformation of reality and, if of self-identity as well, a radical transformation.

Thus the clarification we have sought rests in the recognition of the self as an intentional self or consciousness free to constitute or give meaning to its world though the foundation upon which it does is the fund of sedimented social knowledge mediated to it through others. As sedimented in the stock of knowledge of the individual we call this the social self. It is the distinction, simply put, between the "I" and the "me," the two factors constituting the basic structures of the self:

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[102] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 106.

> . . . the self has a twofold aspect: it is at once the unified history of its past performances and the agency which gives valence to immediate action. In one direction. . . the self is continuous, memorially directed, and indexed with clues and keys to past actions; in another direction, it is the force which moves action at any given time. On the one side: the organized accumulation of what happened to the individual; on the other: the present moment which may either call some aspect of the past into question or ignore it.[103]

The contribution to an understanding of self-transformation with the grasp of the twofold nature of the structure of the self is substantial. It makes clear to us the self as a dialectical dynamic of conditioned freedom. And once we clothe this self as uncovered in analysis with the socio-cultural covering of a particular historical period we shall then be prepared to set out the process of transformation of identity. The analysis will thus emerge as fully dialectical, showing the realization of the universal (analysis of transformation in general, in thought) in the particular (black people of a particular socio-cultural, historical period), and the particular as an instance of the universal.

Thus, in terms of our heuristic anticipations as to the nature of our project and the mode of access to the laying out of the phenomenon of transformation, the grasp of consciousness, of the self (i.e. the "historicized ego. . . the ego clothed with the garments of society."[104]) as an intentional

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[103] Nathanson, The Journeying Self, p. 17.

[104] Ibid.

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self in dialectic with a social self, brings us very near to the threshold of laying out the ground of transformation (its conditions of possibility on the subjective side) and, continuously, the ground for its possible disclosure through a hermenuetic of language or discourse. For what the notion of intentional self opens up to us is an understanding of human existence as a continuous process of meaning endowment. And the endeavor of a hermenuetic is nothing more than an attempt to reclaim this meaning, i.e. to interpret it.

The movement into a hermenuetic of language or discourse must then proceed by way of a disclosure of the self, of being-in-the-world-with-others, as the intention of meaning in general. A full and proper pursuit of this matter would entail our setting forth the many modes in terms of which the self discloses itself meaningfully (and discloses itself to itself): language, myth, religion, science, art, philosophy, history - culture, in general. Ours, however, is a more restricted task, and we will set out the process of meaning disclosure only to the degree sufficient to provide a foundation for a discussion of a hermeneutic of language.

Provisionally we may, following Cassirer, refer to the intentional or meaning-endowing activities of consciousness in all forms disclosed as symbolic functions.[105] What we achieve with this characterization of consciousness and its activities is a grasp of the self as openness or self-disclosure, as intending.

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[105] Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. 1, Language, Ralph Manheim, trns., Yale University Press: New Haven, 1953, especially pp. 73-93.

For we mean by 'symbol,' provisionally, a vehicle conveying meaning, and the "symbolizing functions of consciousness" the activities of consciousness by and through which experience (understood here as intentional relation to the world in general) is meaningfully ordered. Thus. . .

> a symbol is the mode of the self's openness toward the world; it is also the mode of its distance from the world - distance through which it surpasses the immediacy of its environment and transforms what surrounds it from an environment into a situation . . . being 'situated' rather than being 'conditioned by an environment' implies a self which can set itself apart from its world while at the same time being open toward that world. Symbolization is precisely this possibility. Reality is given through the symbol. . . and the reality is both intended by the self in the symbol and set at a distance from the self through the symbol.[106]

Even further, the intention of meaning through the power of symbolization serves to disclose consciousness to itself:

> Being conscious of oneself. . . is reflective awareness that one is the intentional source of encounter; . . . self-consciousness, or distance from oneself as acting, thinking, feeling, etc., is dependent upon the symbolization through which the process of consciousness can be given to itself. The self as self-consciousness comes into being not only through the response of the other but also through the process of symbolization.[107]

Yet the possibility of the realization of self in and through symbolic meanings is grounded in intersubjective dialectics. That is, as we acknowledged with

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[106] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 104.

[107] Ibid., pp. 104-5.

Hegel above (p. 46), self-consciousness is grounded in recognition. Put differently it is to say that self-appropriation, self-identification, is mediated through the other:

> . . . the self receives from the other the meaning of gesture and symbol through which its own consciousness can become an object of reflective awareness. The self discovers its intentional structure through the fulfillment of its meaning-intention in the response of the other.[108]

The other or others, in terms of various degrees of intersubjectivity (i.e. fellowmen, contemporaries, predecessors, successors), thus are essential constituents of the total situation of any self's existence. One's freedom as a self is conditioned and mediated through others, by society and culture, sedimented structurally into the biography of the self as the 'social self;' and the self is simultaneously "the intentionality toward the future through which that sedimented past is reconstituted in a grasping at enlarged meaning and fuller integrity."[109]

This notion of "enlarged meaning and fuller integrity" is but another way of characterizing the situation of consciousness of self which we have been referring to as identity: in short, integrity of self-appraisal. Perhaps the richer concept here is unification (of self-disclosed meanings, values, relevances):

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[108] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 105.

[109] Ibid., p. 106.

> Unification discloses itself as the internal thrust of embodies consciousness to achieve a richer world and thus an enlarged scope of internal meaning; this thrust to self-surpassing involves simultaneously a reaching beyond any unity of the world which is already given toward a more comprehensive meaning. The reach for embracing unity thus includes the self-surpassing dynamic of freedom toward richer experience for the self within a world of more comprehensive meaning.[110]

Thus it is that we have referred (heuristically) to the transformation of consciousness as an endeavor in the transformation of meanings fundamentally. To the degree that we recognize the dynamic self-surpassing activity of human consciousness as the activities of the intentional self, so do we thereby anticipate the ground of the constitution of the world by consciousness as a process by which unity is achieved through the organization of the many modes of experience into complexes, patterns, and schemes of meaning (see above, Part II, section 3.b., sub-sections 3, 4, and 5). We can, therefore, speak with Winter of a "passion for unity" which "presses the self beyond any level of integration of self or world which is already achieved; any coherence of the world already grasped is subject to reconsideration and new levels of formulation."[111] And while we may designate this dynamic thrust toward unity as an activity of the "I" it must be also recognized that the content of the "I" is mediated through the cultural, social, and physical world, the enrichment of the "I" thus being inseparable from the enrichment of its environment.[112] This recognition thus opens us to an understanding of the foundation of political praxis, an understanding essential in an analysis of radical transformation:

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[110] Winter, Social Ethic, pp. 106-107.

[111] Ibid., p. 107.

> The infinite concern of the 'I' for integrity also implies that the objective reality of its ultimate commitment becomes creative or desctructive for the content of its fulfillment or defeat. The internal unity of the 'I' is inseparable from the richness of its ultimate horizon. The 'I' constitutes itself in its intentionality toward the social and cultural world, but it is in turn constituted by the meaning of the world toward which it moves.[113]

In this we have an understanding of the foundation of political activities seeking socio-political structural changes to the degree that these structures are regarded as obstacles to the realization of self-integrity, the unification of (positive) self-disclosive meanings, of a person or socio-political group. It springs, on the subjective side, from the dialectic of intentional and social self, the latter being constituted by the sedimentation of meanings derived from objectivated (social) reality (society, culture) mediated through others. Viewed from the perspective of the structurization of consciousness they (the sedimented meanings of the social self) constitute imposed relevances (see above, p. 8b), manifestly so in the case wherein the theme of consciousness is the self (reflected) as conceived by others. The reconstitution of the meaning of self and its establishment as such, to the degree that self-consciousness is mediated through others, may then require, as in the life and death struggle in the relations between master and slave,[114] activities designed to elicit from the other(s) the desired recognition. Hence the implicit political ramifications of the transformation.

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[112] Winter, Social Ethic, p. 108.

[113] Ibid.

We may now bring our project to a higher degree of clarity. We have referred to the phenomenon of transformation of consciousness variously as a transformation of self-identity, meaning, and otherwise. We have spoken also of unity and integrity. All of these are notions which refer, however, to a central process which we may now designate as the phenomenon of the transformation of self-disclosive meanings aimed at the re-constitution of self-integrity, of the unity of the appropriated self. Meaning is the category of ultimate priority, a matter established earlier when we laid out the process by which it is constituted, its constitution being synonymous with experience itself: the intentional constitution of both self and world, of self-in-the-world-with-others.

Yet the uncovering accomplished to this point in this section treating "objective reality" and its "internalization" is an accomplishment on the side of thought. We have elaborated at best but a "theoretical structure" which, it is hoped, is sufficient to clarify (i. e. to provide an understanding of) the process by which the world as socially meaningful is established and passed on, on the one hand, and appropriated by consciousness, on the other. What the "thought-structure" lacks is the filling out of practice, that is, the laying out of concrete evidence of the situations and processes of which we have been speaking. Thus a full and complete discussion would present examples drawn from life of processes of socialization of black persons which would exemplify the establishment of realities as socially defined and the ways in which these realities are passed on to others through socialization. In our case in particular, we might fill out our structure with content by drawing upon the wealth of empirical studies of the realities of black life (sociological, political, religious, educational, historical, etc.). In doing so the task would be, at this point, to elaborate upon the content of the socialization process in terms of the lived meaning, value, and relevance systems passed on. And a very key aspect of this task would entail the laying out of the way in which the self-conceptions of black individuals mediated or reflected by others come to be negative views of self, i.e. how the process of living in America, say, on the part of black people, in their relations with non-blacks, has produced in self-conceptualizations and self- actualizations dis-unity and lack of self-integrity, in terms of the way we have come to understand these notions: how is it, in short, that black people in any situation having involved their subjugation or colonization by non-African peoples have had as an outcome the dissolution of self-integrity, have come to live modes of existence which have as their basic meaning content the sense of divided self, "two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings."[115]

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[114] Hegel, op. cit., The Phenomenology of Mind, "Lordship and Bondage," pp. 229-240.

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[115] DuBois, "The Souls of Black Folk," op. cit., p. 215.

Such concrete relevations of the "self-systems"[116] of black peoples abound in autobiographical (Dusk of Dawn by DuBois; The Autobiography of Malcolm X; Claude Brown's Manchild in the Promise Land); poetic (cf. American Negro Poetry, Arna Bontemps, ed.); literary (e.g. Richard Wright's Native Son and Black Boy) and many, many other works by black authors. There is, in fact, no shortage of such materials.

On the other hand there are the analyses/interpretations of black life, of the character structures of black people, in particular, by people in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, social psychology, political science.[117] The study by Clark and Clark is an excellent presentation, via the empirical scientific method of social psychology, of the self-negating character structures of black children. Where we add to these concrete findings the autobiographical and literary relevations of particular black figures, revelations of their life history and socialization, we have then the full blown picture of the processes of reality (social and self) appropriation with respect to the genesis of the situation of identity conflict (self-negation) lived by black people.

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[116] Bingham Dai, "Some Problems of Personality Development Among Negro Children," Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry Murray, eds., Alfred Knopf: New York, 1956, pp. 545-566.

[117] Cf. Bingham Dai, ibid.; Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark, "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children," Readings in Social Psychology, Eleanor Macoby, et. al., Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1958, pp. 602-611; Negro Self-Concept: Implications for School and Citizenship, McGraw-Hill: New York, 1965, especially, "The Self-Concept: Basis for Reeducation of Negro Youth," Jean Grambs, pp. 11-15; "Political Socialization of Negroes: Image Development of Self and Polity," Bradbury Seasholes, pp. 52-90.

Ours, however, is an analysis which seeks to bracket to some degree discussion of lived experiences in their full concreteness. We are directing ourselves rather to the conditions of possibility as revealed to thought of such concrete experiences. Thus the *obvious* abstract character of the writing. Still, this abstractness is but one moment of a total process involving the dialectic of thought and life. And while we choose, at this point, to restrict ourselves to thought *about* life it is not to be regarded as a neglect or non-recognition of life in terms of lived experiences. Quite the contrary. Once We have fully laid out our theoretical structure, we will move to its application, its rejoining with life, via a hermeneutic of *expressed* lived experiences. Thus it is that language as discourse of speech stands as our point of access to transformed self-systems.

What we are now led to is the disclosure of the manner in which this self-system, the world, is meaningfully constituted by consciousness and to do so such that we lay open to view the ground for the possibility of a hermeneutic of language or discourse as reavealing of (for us) the meaning-structure of the self as reflectively grasped and revealed by the speaking subject (or, in general, through *symbolizing activities* of consciousness of a self-disclosive nature). What we anticipate here is a *vital link* between the intentional, constituting activities of consciousness and the actualization of language in situations of discourse (communication or *expression*) as an activity of meaning-projection accessible to a hermeneutic. This link is nothing more than the *intentional* activities of consciousness which result in the structuring and ordering of the

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various worlds or provinces of reality within which consciousness is in-the-world, processes which are fundamentally grounded in (or mediated through) language. Thus, while it might have seemed initially that we had at hand two separate activities externally related by some third mediating activity of consciousness, we have in truth but one continuous process distinguishable into moments only in thought or analysis. And the key to the grasping of this process in thought rests on our coming to understand the way in which the world for consciousness comes to be constituted in its meaningfulness. Thus to advance beyond our earlier treatment of the constitution of meaning in consciousness' reflection upon its already lived-through experiences, we must now get hold of the key process of consciousness in its fullness, i.e. the process of typification.

PART IV

Typification: Foundational Activity of Consciousness

In the analysis of the process by which meaning is constituted by consciousness we focused at that time upon the importance of the "ray of attention," i.e. the attentional modification of consciousness grounded in a prevailing system of interest. It was this activity of consciousness to which we referred as the key to the constitution of meaning. Here, however, we seek to bring to view yet another important facet of this same process, namely, the acts in terms of which consciousness orders its world meaningfully. Thus our point of concern here is with the activities of ordering per se and not specifically with the constitution of meaning. We are led to the consideration of this particular function of consciousness in anticipation of the disclosure of the typifying activities of consciousness as the vital link between the ordering of the world by consciousness, the endowing of the world with meaning, and the disclosure of the same in symbolic expressions.

The notion of typicality is in phenomenological thought a complex and important one. In a highly illuminating essay, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy,"[1] Schutz undertook an analysis of the various uses of this concept in the thoughts of Husserl across various pieces of writings. In so doing he based his analysis upon a set of distinctions drawn by Eugene Fink constrasting the "thematic" and "operative" notions in the thought of any major thinker:

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[1] Schutz, CP 3, pp. 92-115.

> . . . the former (thematic) aim at the fixation and preservation of the fundamental concepts, the latter (operative) are used in a vague manner as tools in forming the thematic notions; they are models of thought or intellectual schemata which are not brought to objectifying fixation, but remain opaque and thematically unclarified.[2]

According to Schutz the employment of the notion of type or typification on the part of Husserl is operative rather than thematic. Still, Schutz himself makes heavy use of this notion throughout his own writings.[3] The particularly decisive way in which he employs it is of special significance for us. For in the process he thematizes, clarifies, and advances considerably the function of this concept in philosophical thought, particularly with respect to explorations of the world of social reality. The concept comes to refer, in Schutz's thought, to the process by which the world is constituted as world, that is, as a meaningful unity, joining in living experience the poles of subjectivity and sociality.

In terms of human subjectivity, the notion of typification has reference to the process by which consciousness meaningfully orders its world through the step by step construction of discrete unities of experience (i. e. of objects, and experiences such as retention, reproduction, willing, fanticizing, believing, etc.). The notion, therefore, bespeaks the process by which consciousness organizes its dialogal experiences of the world into types:

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[2] Schutz, CP 3, p. 92.

[3] Cf. Maurice Natanson, "Phenomenology and Typification: A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz," Social Research, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring, 1970, pp. 1-22.

classificatory schemes of experiences, which then become the ground for the further meaningful ordering of experience (cf. above, section 3. B., subsections 3, 4, 5). It is this process which makes for the "horizonal familiarity" which surrounds the objectivities of our experiences and which provides us with an unquestioned (thought at any time questionable) background or "stock of knowledge at hand" (see above, PART II, Section 4. B), the sedimented totality of previous experiences available to the recall of the subject. This process, in the mode of naive living, goes on pre-predicatively, i. e. pre-reflectively, nonthematically (though Husserl, according to Schutz, does distinguish higher level type constructions, i. e. *pure universals*, in constrast to the pre-predicative *empirical* types[4]). Thus we come to experience the world in its typicality; the intentional corrolates of consciousness are *meant* as *typical*, as "similar to" or "unlike" previous experiences: *that* which is experienced is experienced as carrying open horizons of anticipated similar experiences which may or may not be fulfilled by future experiences.[5] Thus. . .

> . . . the outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as 'mountains,' 'trees,' 'animals,' 'fellow-men.' I may have never seen an Irish setter but if I see one, I know that it is an animal and in particular a dog, showing all the familiar features and the typical behavior of a dog and not, say, of a cat. . . In the more technical language of Husserl. . .

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[4] Schutz, CP 3, "Type and Eidos. . ."

[5] CP 1, op. cit., p. 7.

> what is experienced in the actual perception of an object is appreceptively transferred to any other similar object, perceived merely as to its type.[6]

To the degree that this typifying activity of consciousness takes place within a horizon having a theme (i. e. involves the setting out of certain objects as standing over against an unquestioned field of other objects), and against a backdrop of sedimented past experiences, it is a function of the selecting activity of consciousness (a matter discussed above, PART II, Section 4). Hence which aspects of the total horizon of our experiences are experienced as unique and individual and which as typical is, as we pointed out above, a function of our then prevailing system of interest (a problem, thereby, of relevance):

> All typification consists in the pragmatic reduction or equalization of attributes relevant to the particular purpose at hand for which the type has been formed, and involves disregarding those individual differences of the typified objects that are not relevant to such purpose. This purpose resides in the theoretical problem. . . or practical problem . . . which, as a result of our selective interest has emerged as questionable from the unquestioned world in the background.[7]

Typification, the process by which experience is organized, is to be understood as a primary feature of consciousness. As such it is, in the words of McKinney (just quoted), a "central feature of cognition. . ."

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[6] Schutz, CP 1, pp. 7-8.

[7] John C. McKinney, "Typification, Typologies, and Sociological Theory," Social Forces, Vol. 48, No. 1, September, 1969, p. 3.

> the development of a selective and persistent attitude of an actor toward his environment... . . . a process in conduct that so organizes the field of action that interaction can proceed on an orderly basis. Typification, perceiving the world and structuring it by means of categorial types, is evidently an essential and intrinsic aspect of the basic orientation of actors to their situation.[8]

What this means for us is that the world as meaningful is a constituted or constructed world the foundation of its meaningfulness being the constituting activity of consciousness, a process we refer to as typification. In the words of Schutz:

> The world, as has been shown by Husserl, is from the outset experienced in the pre-scientific thinking of everyday life in the mode of typicality. The unique objects and events given to us in a unique aspect are unique within a horizon of typical familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship.[9]

This organization of the world under classificatory and interpretive categories constitutes what McKinney refers to as the formation of existential types, "typifications or types constructed by participants in social systems."[10] Thus,

> The everyday activity of people, their behavior within the vast complex of social interaction,

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[8] McKinney, op. cit., p. 3.

[9] Schutz, CP 1, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," p. 59.

[10] McKinney, op. cit., p. 2.

> results in the residue of a vast number of "folk typifications" or existential types which in effect structure society. . .[11]

This system of 'folk typifications' is none other than what we, following Schutz, referred to above as the 'relative natural conception of the world' shared by members of a social group (racial, nationalistic, ethnic or otherwise).

This brings us again to the reality of the world as a socially constituted world; to the foundation of sociality in shared orders of meaning, value, and relevance; to the dialectical founding of consciousness in a world of Others. For even the typifications of an individual consciousness (collectively, its life-world) are to a great extent derived from others. That this is the case is clear from what we have said about the "social stock of knowledge" as the ultimate sedimented fund of social knowledge which is passed on to the individual in socializing processes, which, as a result, becomes the base for a subject's being-in-the-world. Thus there is a continuous horizon from the personally constructed world of an individual consciousness (i. e. its intentionally constituted or socially derived meaning, value, and relevance structures) and that of the social collectivity (i. e. the social stock of knowledge), the latter having its being in sedimented intersubjective experiences. Genetically, therefore, the typifications of an individual consciousness are to some extent socialized in that "the greater part of our knowledge, as to its content and the particular forms of typification under which it is organized, is socially derived, and this in socially approved terms."[12] It is, finally, a function of the purpose at hand, the prevailing system of interest, as we said, which accounts for the structure of the typifications (individual and/or group) which arise out of experience. And it is *language* which serves as the primary medium for the constitution, maintenance, and transmission of these structures:

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[11] McKinney, op. cit., p. 2.

> The typifying medium *par excellence* by which socially derived knowledge is transmitted is the vocabulary and the syntax of everyday language. The vernacular of everyday life is primarily a language of named things and events, and any name includes a typification and generalization referring to the relevance system prevailing in the linguistic in-group which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate term for it.[13]

With this we have succeeded in laying out, through progressive analysis, the ground of our original analytical framework which offered (heuristically) that language, in the actualization of communication and expression, provides, with the application of a proper hermeneutic, access to the meaning-structures of self-identity (to *self-systems*). The analysis has been but the laying out or discourse of the ground of such an understanding. In order to complete this project disclosing the foundations of our heuristic structure we have now only to explicate language as structure in its actualization in discourse. With that done and our "theoretical structure" complete we will have only to "apply" this

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[12] Schutz, CP 1, "Concept and Theory Formation. . .," op. cit., p. 61.

[13] Ibid., "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," p. 14.

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structure in the way of a hermeneutic of concrete discoursive situations as disclosive of the self-transformation, the transformation of consciousness, of persons of color.

Yet what is it for which we now search? What serves us heuristically at this stage of our pursuit? It is none other than the yet to be explicated, anticipatory understanding of the actualization of language in speech as resting on the intention of meaning: that is, that speaking has as its grounding project the conveyance of meaning. Thus to speak of the typifying activities of consciousness mediated through language as resting in a prevailing system of interest is but another way of recognizing the centrality of the intended meanings of the speaking subject in its actualization of a language system. And so it is that the task of moving from particular concrete expressions to their meaning as revelatory of particular, concrete self-appropriated self-systems is an endeavor in hermeneutics: the reconstitution and capture of projected meanings, i. e. an act of interpretation.

PART V

The Life-World

A. The Life-World as the Ultimate Horizon of the Transformation of Consciousness

B. Structures of the Life-World: A Reiteration

C. Transformation

A. The Life-World as the Ultimate Horizon of the Transformation of Consciousness

The groundwork for the proper understanding of the disclosure of meaning in linguistic communication and for the elaboration of a hermeneutic sufficient to grasp these meanings in terms of their revelations of self-systems lies in the progressive analyses completed to this point. We have now only to bring together the necessary elements in order to assemble full blown our desired picture. Such a "full-blown picture" in the way of a philosophical stance from which to interpret transformations of consciousness is to be had in the understanding of the notion of life-world as a concept which captures the process of living as a meaning-endowing, meaning-interpreting, world constituting process. Thus in the explication of this concept we shall have the elaboration of the process of living experience itself, its structures and modes, within and in terms of which the activity of discourse plays a decisive role.

Yet, as we enter upon the explication of the concept of life-world what, if anything, is added to the analysis? In reply to this we can say without absurdity that the 'addition' is nothing less than a more unified view of what the analysis has provided in its progressive unfoldings. The notion has reference to the totality of structures, processes, and activities in terms of which we live in and experience the world naively (non-reflectively), as unquestionably given until further notice in terms [illegible] its existence and the typicality of its contents.[1]

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[1] Schutz, CP 3, "Some Structures of the Life-World," p. 116.

The concept intends the fundamental assumptions characterizing the attitude in terms of which we live naturally: ". . . the assumptions of the validity of our experience of the world, and of the constancy of the structure of our ability. . . to act upon the world and within the world."[2]

The structures girding these fundamental assumptions we have already given though not under the explicit heading of structures of the life-world. We have only now to recall them with the explicit aim of setting out in full, radical philosophical fashion the ultimate horizon within which language has its being and actualization in speech and to which we must go if a hermeneutic of particular languages or modes of discourse is to be properly grounded. Here it is, therefore, in the living experience of the world, that transformation of consciousness has its being and, finally, is disclosed in speech and other modes of symbolic expression.

B. Structures of the Life-World: A Reiteration

The life-world is, in its basic structurization, the 'taken for granted as familiar' attitude, the form of understanding which characterizes the process of our being-in-the-world in the natural attitude. Still, any aspect of the world may be put in question at any time; our fundamental assumptions may be disconfirmed.

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[2] Schutz, CP 3, p. 116.

> What had been accepted as unquestionably given then becomes a problem, a theoretical, practical or emotional problem, which must be formulated, analyzed and solved. All problems arise on the background of what had been given as unquestionable (it is the latter which in the proper sense of the word becomes questionable). . . .and all solutions of problems consist in transforming, by the very process of questioning, that which has become questionable into something new which now in turn appears as unquestionable.[3]

It is here in *the problematicity of the once taken for granted nature of some aspects of the life-world* that transformation occurs though we may discuss this fully only when we have recalled all of the component structures.

Further structures of the life-world include its spatio-temporal and social stratifications. In the case of the former there are the strata of experienced or experienceable *world within actual reach* (of hearing, seeing, manipulation, etc.) which can be perceived, known, acted in (and acts upon me) immediately; *world within restorable reach*, the world which formerly was, but no longer is, within my reach can be *restored* to my reach; and the *world within potential reach*, the segment of the world which neither was, nor is, within actual reach, though it might be brought within such reach.[4]

Socially the life-world is stratified in terms of *fellowmen*, or subjects encountered in the domain of actual reach, hence constitutes the realm of

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[3] Schutz, CP 3, p. 117.

[4] Ibid., pp. 117-118.

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'direct social experience'[5]; contemporaries, or subjects coexisting with me in time without being in reciprocal spatial reach with me; successors, or subjects coming after me; and, predecessors, or those who came before me.

Further, there is the "culture" of the life-world defined primarily by the social group to which we belong and constituted by. . .

> the typifications and symbolization on terms of which we distinguish the several strata of our social world, construe and interpret their contents, determine our action in it and upon it and its action upon us according to all degrees of ability. . .predefined as unquestionably given by virtue of the socially conditioned schemata of expression and interpretation prevailing in the group to which we belong.[6]

These typifications and symbolizations of the social group (its culture) are sedimented and passed on as the social stock of knowledge. The individual is "socialized" into and thus comes to participate in and share this social stock of knowledge in varying ways and degrees. The manner and degree to which he does is a function of his personal stock of knowledge the structure and characterization of which is determined by the nature of his own experiences collectively constituting his biographical situation. The differentiation of this personal stock of knowledge into its several forms is determined by the systems of relevances which are in turn governed by zones of interests corresponding to these various

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[5] Schutz, CP 3, pp. 118-119.

[6] Ibid., p. 119.

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forms of knowledge.[7] Collectively all of these structures constitute the structures of the situation of existence, of the particular mode of being-in-the-world of any human subject, the particularity of the situation being a function of the meaning-establishing acts of definition and interpretation in terms of which consciousness "articulates" its world. The components of this situation include the ontological structure of the pre-given world, and the actual biographical state of the individual including his stock of knowledge in its actual articulation.[8]

The full definition and interpretation of the situation, the articulation of the world into its different strata and zones, and the individual's assessment of himself in his being-in-the-world, past, present, and projected future, constitute the life-plan of the individual:

> To the experiencing subject's mind, the elements singled out of the pregiven structure of the world always stand in sense-connections, connections of orientation as well as of mastery of thought or action. The causal relations of the objective world are subjectively experienced as means and ends, as hindrances or aids, of the spontaneous activity of thought or action. They manifest themselves as complexes of interest, complexes of problems, as systems of projects. The system of these complexes, which are interwoven in manifold ways, is subjectively experienced by the individual as a system of his plans for the hour or

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[7] Schutz, CP 3, p. 121.

[8] Ibid., p. 122.

> day, for work and leisure; all these particular plans being integrated into one supreme system which, without being free from contradictions, encompasses all the other plans. We shall call the supreme system the 'life-plan.'[9]

This life-plan determines particular plans which determine current interests (interests prevailing at any time), which in turn determine the selection of elements out of the surrounding world in the definition and interpretation of the situation, i. e. determine their relevance. This process by which consciousness and the stock of knowledge of the biographical situation are structured by way of systems of relevance we have treated in full above (Part II, Section 4).

C. Transformation

All of the elements which we have just recalled, taken in their totality and in the grasp of their proper interrelations, constitute the life-world, its structures, in terms of which we live and experience the world in the non-reflective, non-critical attitude of daily life. It is here, in the process of living against the background of the taken for granted, that the problematicity of being arises. It involves the thematization of self and character systems, a thematization requiring the transformation of the problematic into the "no longer questionable" (the resolution we spoke of at the beginning) and the restoration of unity and integrity (of meaning) to the meaning-complexes of self-conception. The source of the problematic lies in conflict, in the incompatibility of situation definitions (specifically character interpretations) available to inclusion in the personal stock of knowledge. Such interpretations may, as we have seen, be imposed or intrinsic: spring from sources 'external' to the self-questioning subject (i.e. other social groups or persons), or, from the thematic pursuit on the part of the individual (or group) of the intrinsic horizonal meanings of its own being contained in its own self-conceptions. Nonetheless what we refer to as a resolution of the existential problematic of the sense of divided self via a transformation of consciousness is the process or phenomenon of rendering unquestionable (though in principle questionable in the future) that which was thematic as problematic in the consciousness of the person in question. To the degree that this problem of being in terms of identity may be a shared problem, informing to a significant extent the typifications and symbolizations of a social group as evidenced in their literature, art, music - their life style in general - we may refer to this as a cultural problem and its resolution as a cultural transformation. Thus the disclosure of this problem of being is manifested in all of the forms of consciousness in terms of which people (consciousnesses) give expression to their experiences of and in the world, to their collective (and individual) definitions of their situation. To choose therefore language, as actualized in expression, for a hermeneutic of the self-systems of a person or people is to choose but one of various symbolic dimensions available to interpretation, art and music being others. Yet in the sharing of

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[9] Schutz, CP 3, p. 122.

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meaning, a condition which must prevail if a hermeneutic is to be valid,[10] the various modes in which language as structure is actualized in speech and expression constitute the primary means of access to disclosed meanings. Thus it is that we have offered repeatedly the insight of Schutz that language constitutes the medium par excellence in terms of which consciousness structures its world in the process of living in the way of giving meaning. This process, the intending of meaning in expression as the ground of hermeneutics, must now be given consideration.

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[10] One is reminded here of the "hermeneutic circle" drawn by Ricoeur: "We must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order to understand." The Symbolism of Evil, Beacon Press: Boston, Mass, 1969, p. 351.

PART VI

Foundations for a Cultural Hermeneutic

A. Speech

B. Symbolic Meaning

> ...given a certain cultural world as the cultural world of a certain socio-historical group, the task is to find and to lay bare the acts of consciousness which in their systematic concatenation and interpretation make this specific world possible as their correlate. Answering this question for a particular cultural world amounts to understanding that world from within by referring it to the mental life in which it originates.[1]

> Confession always manifests itself in the element of language. Now, that language is essentially symbolic. Hence a philosophy that is concerned to integrate confession with the consciousness of self cannot escape the task of elaborating, at least in outline, a criteriology of symbols.[2]

The quotes from Gurwitsch and Ricoeur, respectively, bring sharply into focus two key aspects of the philosophical endeavor in which we are engaged. The first clarifies the task ahead as an endeavor involving the systematic interpretation of the cultural world of Afro-Americans with respect to which this analysis stands as the theoretical foundation. Secondly, the Ricoeur quote makes clear what is required if the goal of this stage is to be had, i.e. the proper laying of the foundation for such a cultural hermeneutic by way of setting out the conditions of possibility for treating particular modes of expression as points of access to the cultural world of a people, into the life-world of an individual. The poignancy of the quote from Ricoeur rests further on its guidance in giving form to the interpretive endeavor itself. His task in The Symbolism of Evil was that of setting out the reality of evil as given in the existential dimension of religious experience revealed in the "language of confession." And as we seek to uncover the structures of consciousness and existence involved in the transition from an experience of self-denial, of "divided self," to the experience of self as united, and to do so through an interpretation of particular modes of expression, we engage in a similar task distinguished by the difference in particular objects of concern in terms of the modes of experience investigated. Thus our task involves a hermeneutic of the languages of self-denial and self-affirmation and the existential transition from the expressing of one to the expressing of the other. We must now make clear the possibility of such a hermeneutic.

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[1] Aron Gurwitsch, "Problems of the Life-World," Pheonmenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz, Maurice Natanson, ed., Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1970, pp. 53-4. Cf. also in this work, "On the Boundaries of the Social," Thomas Luckmann, pp. 73-100.

[2] Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, op. cit., p. 10.

A. Speech

The ultimate foundations for a hermeneutic of language (hermeneutic being the recovery of meaning - meaning interpretation or understanding) have already been given in the analyses of meaning constitution and organization, of the structurization of consciousness, of the constitution of the world of sociality (i.e. the social stock of knowledge or meanings), and most fundamentally, of the typifying activity of consciousness, language having been given as the typifying medium par excellence. What is now required is but a rounding out of our understanding in terms of a wider, more inclusive view of the use of language in expression within the life-world as a mode of conveying and grasping meaning.

On the one hand one may look at language as a closed system of signs to be understood *scientifically*:

> But what is language [*langue*]? It is not to be confused with human speech [*langage*], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. . . Taken as a whole, speech is many sided and heterogeneous;. . .
>
> Language, on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification.[3]

For us, however, such an approach is insufficient. For what we seek are the meanings which come into being in an "instance of communication," as Ricoeur refers to it, wherein the structure of language is actualized in an episode of meaning intention.[4] Our concern therefore is with *language: speech.*

> . . . the establishment of an empire must have a corresponding centralization of language. Any important reform, any revolution demands a renewal of vocabulary. Men have not been transformed so long as their way of speaking has remained unchanged. . . Every spiritual or intellectual revolution demands a previous transformation of the established language.[5]

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[3] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, McGraw-Hill Company: New York, 1959, p. 9.

[4] Ricoeur, "Structure-Word-Event," *Philosophy Today*, op. cit.

[5] Gusdorf, *Speaking*, op. cit., pp. 15-23.

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Our saying that a science of language is insufficient to the task at hand, i.e., to laying the foundation for a philosophical hermeneutic of the conversions of self-reflective meaning and value systems, rests on the guiding understanding that what is required for the proper realization of the project rests on an appropriation of the process of language actualization itself: it involves in short a phenomenology of speech within, ultimately, a metaphysics of language as part of an overall, global philosophical anthropology. While we shall not at this point attempt the full elaboration of this philosophical anthropology, still its anticipation serves to guide us heuristically and to situate and give structure to our explorations of the human activity of speaking. That speaking, rather than language, requires our attention is provided in the understanding that "language does not exist before that personal initiative which brings it into being,"[6] that a living system of meanings, i.e. a "living language" is not identical with a collection of words. Rather, the unit of speech (the unification of meaning and value) is a "complex whole, given vitality by the intended meaning of the speaker,"[7] a unity achieved in an 'event' or 'instance of communication' wherein through a signifying intention the closure of language as a sign system is broken in the "saying of something," a moment, says Ricoeur, which is contemporaneous with the expression of the sentence.[8] Speaking therefore is an activity.[9] And as every act is part of and draws its meaning from the overall project of which it is a part, the proper grasp of the meaning of any instance of discourse or of speaking in general requires that we appropriate it in its full situation. Here is to be found the authenticity of speech: an act having its ground in the situation of the speaker.

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[6] Gusdorf, Speaking, op. cit., p. 35.

[7] Ibid., p. 36.

[8] Ricoeur, "Structure-Word-Event," Philosophy Today, p. 121.

> Authentic language intervenes in a given situation as a moment of that situation or as a reaction to that situation. Its function is to maintain or re-establish a balance, to assure the insertion of the person in the world, to achieve communication.[10]

Herein rests the ground of speaking, the actualization of language (and here too must one return in a hermeneutic of modes of discourse): an act of meaning intention. With the act of speaking man becomes self-transcendent, constitutes his world.

> Before speech, the world is merely the present and continually disappearing context of human activities, a context in which even the limits between personality and environment are not clearly defined. Language supplies denomination, precision, decision; both awareness and knowledge. The name creates the object; it alone reaches it beyond the inconstancy of appearences. But as well it creates personal existence. . . The use of language creates for us beyond the present an enduring nature fit to explain the past and determine the future.
>
> Speaking constitutes the essence of the world and the essence of man [my emphasis].[11]

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[9] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 36.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 37.

Thus it is that Gusdorf rightly offers that "language is reality,"[12] in that it is through language primarily that we meaningfully constitute the world in acts of constituting, typifying intentionality. The primary way in which, at the level of speech, this is accomplished is in the activity of naming, an act which serves to "call into existence,"[13] or through which Being becomes open to us.[14] So too are we driven, in the philosophical description of speaking, to consider the ground itself of discourse (hence a metaphysics of language), namely, man's relation to the world as constituted meaningfully and interpreted in situation. For "signification brings into play the relation of man and world, and in the final analysis, it is this relation that we should reflect upon in order to do justice to language."[15] Herein is the power of language as actualized in speech revealed, foremost, in the activity of naming.

> Naming establishes a right to existence. It is words that make things and beings, that define the relations according to which the order of the world is constituted. To situate oneself in the world, for each of us, is to be at peace with the network of words that put everything in its place in the environment.[16]

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[12] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 38.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Existence and Being, Henry Regner Company: Chicago, 1968.

[15] Mikel Dufrenne, Language and Philosophy, H. B. Veatch, trans., Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1963, p. 40.

[16] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 39.

Thus do we have the ground for a hermeneutic of the language of self-affirmation involving, for example, in the case of people of African descent, the dropping of "slave names" (names given to us which have their ultimate historical ground in our prescence in America as slaves) for names drawn from the cultures of Africa. In so doing the lines of history and culture are properly restored thus overcoming the "break" so radically and consciously created when captured Africans were enslaved in the Western Hemisphere. The true grounds (historical, cultural, anthropological) of a people or person are once again restored. The importance of this, its foundation, rests on what Gusdorf terms man's rupture [illegible] is alienation, accompanied always by an anxiety about la[illegible] t language issuing from the experience of alie[illegible] er or the establishment of a new order. To [illegible] nts in order and to put men in order."[17] Hen[illegible] ersion via a conversion of meaning.

In the actualization of language rests man's power of creation of the world, himself, being, in terms of "giving sense to," of giving meaning. Language thus is the "currency of being," though it is all too often "counterfeit:" to the degree that speech is an intention of truth there is also falsity grounded in erroneous speech and bad faith.[18] Further, there is what Gusdorf terms the "social degradation of language" wherein words come to have th meaning frozen or fossilized into public sedimentations of meaning and val which may be improperly utilized in meaning appropriations and projection

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[17] Gusdorf, *Speaking*, p. 39.

[18] Ibid., p. 40.

> There is truth only at the level of speech, but error is contemporaneous with truth. A goodly number of words that we pronounce in the course of the day are false, attestations of a sympathy, a cordiality, or an interest we do not feel. . . Instead of coinciding with value, the word is now only its label.[19]

Herein lies a great danger. One may, as Gusdorf puts it, take suc publicly grounded meanings as the "coin of the realm" and thus be subject t manipulation (thus the political power of propaganda and 'thought-control' through the control of language and meaning). Moreover. . .

> Language inserts itself into the self-consciousness of each man as a screen that distorts him in his own eyes. The intimate being of man is in fact confused, indistinct, and multiple. Language intervenes as a power destined to expropriate us from ourselves in order to bring us into line with those around, in order to model us to the common measure of all. It defines and perfects us, it terminates and determines us. The control of consciousness it exercises makes it the accomplice of having, in its monolithic poverty, as opposed to the plurality of being. To the degree that we are forced to resort to language we renounce our interior life because language imposes the discipline of exteriority. The use of speech is thus one of the essential causes of the unhappy conscience, all the more essential because we cannot be without it.[20]

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[19] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 43.

[20] Ibid.

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[19] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 43.

[20] Ibid.

The importance of these insights must not be missed. For they bring into relief serious problems to be faced by a person or people seeking authenticity of being in a situation involving conflicting definitions of realities.[21] The resolution of the problematic thus imposed requires a personal affirmation of value, ". . . a kind of recovery of the elements of language by an awareness which rediscovers them and which alone is able to attest to their authenticity."[22] Therefore whoever is here "duped" by the public, sedimented meanings and values embodied in language has not, says Gusdorf, attained spiritual maturity.

> Crisis is a sign of graduation to manhood. It is resolved when the person succeeds in finding within himself a more solid foundation than the shifting sands of the common language.
>
> To toss recriminations against language is to be the dupe of language, wrongfully to attribute to it a capacity it does not possess. And the very revolt is perhaps not exempt from self-deception. . . It is not only others who break their word, but most of all he who entered with others into a community founded upon a misconception, the collective work of all those who participate in it.[23]

The task therefore involves not the indicting of others but a movement from revolt to conversion, to a positive and decisive affirmation of oneself.[24]

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[21] Cf. above the discussion of Schutz's, "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," CP 2, pp. 226-273.

[22] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 44.

[23] Ibid.

> . . . Language cannot justify anything and everything. It is up to each person to assume the responsibility for his own language by searching for the right word. . . . Discourse is merely an affirmation of being that it behooves each to make authentic.[25]

Even more, this same creativity in the actualization of language in speech is crucial to a people, a "fixed tongue" being a sign of decay.[26] So too with regard to personal affirmation: its truth and authenticity must be constantly remade, a task ending only with the cessation of existence itself.[27] Herein, in all of this, lies the ultimate ground of speaking, the actualization of language as system. Thus does speaking stand as the "threshold" through which man passes to (the constitution of) realities and so to himself!

Still, there is more involved than the simple opposition of self and world. There is the other to whom I speak, for each man a condition of existence.[28]

> . . . language is not one but many; it is between. It expresses the relational being of man.[29]

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[24] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 44.

[25] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[26] Ibid., p. 45.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Speaking, pp. 47-48.

[29] Ibid., p. 48.

This dialectic which grounds the speaking activity makes for a corresponding dialectical strain between two poles of intent at work in the situation of speaking: expression and communication. There is, on the one hand, the need and intent of the speaker to "express himself," to lay out and authenticate himself before the world. On the other, there is the need and intent to say something to someone and have them understand what is said. The successful completion of this endeavor requires that one employ the medium of publicly established and sustained meanings. And the more one attempts to be successful in communication, the less one is able to be successful in the endeavor of self-expression. Or, the more successfully one expresses himself, the less one communicates in terms of publicly grounded meanings.[30]

This speaking in terms of publicly grounded meanings in a communicative endeavor - even more radically, to appropriate these same meanings for purposes of self-expression - is to live and speak from a condition of varying degrees of "social control" over the individual consciousness, a condition of which none of can be completely free:

> . . . man is at once the collective consciousness, reason, and the pure self who refuses society and reason. . .
>
> Each man is all of these together. The concrete person achieves a balance for himself between these various aspects. Speaking formulates that

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[30] Gusdorf, Speaking, pp. 50-52.

> balance in the process of achievement, at one and the same time expressive of pure self and participation in the social and the national.[31]

The nature of this balance is crucial. For in terms of self-affirmation in a social situation involving conflicting interpretations of one (or of a people or nation), the degree to which the language of affirmation is grounded in the self's own constructed and affirmed self-systems will be the ground of the authenticity of being of the speaking person. Still, this authenticity is itself dialectically grounded; the other must confirm my self-affirmation. Thus. . .

> Every expression seeks to obtain the recognition of other people. I want to be known as I am, in my basic sincerity, to men and to God himself. I expect this recognition as a confirmation of my being and as a contribution to my being.[32]

Thus both functions of speaking, i.e., expression and communication, are dialectical polarities of the same process: the invocation of meaning and its interpretive grasp. Language as system provides the medium through which, in an encounter situation (a situation bringing together I and other), this endeavor takes place. As such language, though vital and indispensable to the process, is but a medium, one element among others comprising the total life-world of any existence. The actualization of given (social) meanings, their transformation, and most importantly, the creation of new meanings in the depths of one's existence and their subsequent expression - all of these possibilities testify, not only to the creative capabilities open in living, but also the the reality of freedom as a central aspect of the existential situation. It is this freedom, this power of command over the language we speak, the communal "tongue"[33] in terms of which we speak, which makes possible transformation of consciousness by way of conversions of linguistic and symbolic meanings. The limits to these transformations are determined by man himself, his assessment of his situation in the world. Thus. . .

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[31] Gusdorf, Speaking, p. 54.

[32] Ibid., p. 56.

> . . . there is no fixed frontier of language, but there are frontiers of man, frontiers that it behooves every person to extend as far as he thinks fit. Language is one of the agents of our incarnation. Within it are embodied the needs of man struggling to express themselves. The human labor is the endeavor to be present to the world and the pursuit of values.[34]

Thus do we have the grounds of speech which must be appropriated if one is to engage himself in a hermeneutic sufficient to its task. We have crossed these grounds in order to insure that our projected hermeneutic of the languages and symbols of self-denial and self-affirmation would be properly foundered. Still, if speaking involves the invocation of meaning, and hermeneutics the recovery of that same meaning, then we must be more precise with regard to what is required for a hermeneutic.

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[33] ". . . a social phenomenon which sums up within itself the institutions of a national community. . . upon the cloak of words. . . the symbol of a communion in value. . . a field of comprehension, [a] cultural horizon," Gusdorf, Speaking, pp. 61-63.

[34] Ibid., p. 90.

B. Symbolic Meaning

What is the need, one might ask, for this concern with the hermeneutic process? Why can't one simply meet and accept straightforwardly an attestation of, say, self-affirmation ("I am black and proud!" "I am proud of my African heritage!") for what it says?

The answer to these queries rests on understanding that the meaning to be drawn from "what is said" is multiple: meanings historical in reach and import; futuristic in terms of implications of great significance indicating, say, a ground of many possibilities in terms of interracial relationships on social, political, educational levels. . . Thus, this multivalance (or multi-significance) of the expressions, especially when found in contexts of literary, poetic, and/or religious expression, makes them symbolic, i.e., spontaneously formed and immediately significant analogical meanings.[35] And the recovery of these meanings requires the application of a proper frame of interpretation which respects their integrity. For us this will mean setting out reflectively the meaning-structures of the life-world of Afro-Americans. In the words of Ricoeur, the task will thus be that of ". . . starting from symbols, to elaborate existential concepts - that is to say, not only structures of reflection but structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of man."[36]

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[35] Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, op. cit., p. 18.

[36] Ibid., pp. 356-57.

There is a ground even more radical to support a hermeneutic. Ricoeur notes that "the consciousness of self seems to constitute itself at its lowest level by means of symbolism and to work out an abstract language only subsequently, by means of a spontaneous hermeneutics of its primary symbols."[37] Thus the full reflective grasp of a radical process of self-transformation by way of an interpretation of the languages of self-denial and self-affirmation, revealing as well of the nature and condition of existence of those investigated, must go by way of the richest and most revealing meaning-constructions of any people - their symbolic systems. An interpretive endeavor of such nature as that we propose must thereby involve itself in the various multiplicities of meanings which reflect the diverse modes of self-denial and self-affirmation of those in question. This would, properly executed, involve the performing of numerous hermeneutics, i.e., of art, religion, peotry, drama, philosophy, etc. Together they would constitute a cultural hermeneutic of the black world.

For ourselves we have, for purposes of the present writing, limited ourselves to laying out a framework sufficient to support such a hermeneutic of culture in terms of revelations of particular modes of self-reflection. Having begun with a characterization of the existential/historical situation of black peoples as one the lived experience of which is that of a sense of divided self, we have projected ourselves toward reflections upon a different or transformed sense of self wherein the original problematic situation has been resolved. Further, we offered that a point of access to these modes of consciousness was to be had in particular expressions of the actualized, living language and symbols of the people in question. Still, what is necessary to achieve this sought for understanding is no less operative in a more restricted hermeneutic: an understanding of the manners in which symbolic meaning is constituted. For having noted the multiple meaning possibilities of radically self-reflective speech, one must be prepared to reclaim them all in a manner proper to their mode of givenness. Thus, in our case it will mean being continuous with the cultural/experiential world of black peoples. As we noted at the very beginning, this requirement is met by the autobiographical grounding of the inquiry itself. The satisfaction of this first requirement for a successful hermeneutic, namely, the fact of my being a living member of the world to be interpreted, a world which prior to its reflective investigation is the ground of the first level of concern with symbols set out by Ricoeur - the naive, immediate[38] - provides the ground for transition to the second level of concern: the elaboration of a proper reflective/interpretive framework. As Ricoeur notes, the reflective level of concern with the symbol is intelligible only if it is connected with the dimensions of the naive, immediate function of symbolism, i.e., the symbol as operative at the level of immediate experience.[39]

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[37] Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 9.

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[38] Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 10.

[39] Ibid.

Reflective concern with symbols involves grasping symbols and symbolic meaning in their own right. This understanding Ricoeur has provided, in the context of a hermeneutic of the symbolic language of confession, in the way of a "criteriology" of symbols.[40]

There are, Ricoeur offers, three dimensions of symbolism: cosmic, oneiric (or the world of dreams), and poetic.[41] These are three interrelated dimensions the structure of each (say, of a dream) participating in and informing the others (say, of poetry). Concretely put, one can investigate the symbolic structure of the poetry of black writers for its revelation of their psychic structures as Franz Fanon has done for various aspects of black life in Black Skin, White Masks.[42] And all three dimensions are, according to Ricoeur, present in every authentic symbol.[43]

This 'authentic symbol' can be revealed in its essence by what Ricoeur terms "a series of increasingly close approximations."[44] Symbols are, firstly, signs: ". . . they are expressions that communicate a meaning; this meaning is declared in an intention of signifying which has speech as its vehicle."[45]

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[40] Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, pp. 10-18.

[41] Ibid., p. 10.

[42] op. cit.

[43] The Symbolism of Evil, p. 10.

[44] Ibid., p. 14.

[45] Ibid.

Further, the symbol is of greater complexity than a sign - "not every sign is a symbol"[46] - in the aim of the symbol there is concealed a double intentionality:

> . . . contrary to perfectly transparent technical signs, which say only what they want to say in positing that which they signify, symbolic signs are opaque, because the first, literal, obvious meaning itself points analogically to a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in it. . . This opacity constitutes the depth of the symbol, which. . . is inexhaustible.[47]

Thirdly, this analogical meaning connecting the first meaning with the second cannot be objectified; it is a similitude which cannot be grasped intellectually. Rather,

> It is by living in the first meaning that I am led by it beyond itself; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and by the literal meaning which effects the analogy in giving the analogue.[48]

By participating in the symbol by way of grasping its primary meaning, we are assimilated to and thus come to participate in its latent meaning via the movement of the bond of analogical meaning.[49]

Fourthly, this analogical meaning bonding the symbol to the symbolized is not identical with allegory:

> symbols precede hermeneutics; allegories are already hermeneutic.[50]

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[46] Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 15.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., p. 16.

[50] Ibid.

The meaning of the symbol is presented "transparently" and without translation as is the case with allegories.

Finally, the symbols of lived experience are in stark contrast to the formalized symbols of logic. They are, according to Ricoeur, intimately bound with their contents in a manner such that the literal, obvious meaning points analogically to the second meaning which is not given except in and through the first.

What this criteriology of symbols means for us is that, like Ricoeur's concern with the "language of confession," so too our reflections upon transformations of consciousness must go by way of hermeneutics of the languages of self-denial and self-affirmation (already, to have so designated modes of discourse and expression as self-denying and/or self-affirmative is to have offered an initial interpretation of them as to their meanings). For ultimately it is only by way of a consciousness's self-disclosures that we have access to the radical (i.e., self-reflective) meaning-structures of his existence. And to the degree that these self-disclosures are given to us in speech, thus does language stand as our point of access. Again, to the degree that these self-disclosures are given to us in speech, thus does language stand as our point of access. Again, to the degree that the meanings to be had via this speech are multiple, thus is this language essentially symbolic.

To focus upon the centrality of language in the context of the qualitative modes of self-reflective consciousness and their transformations as experienced

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by black peoples is to bring one into the realm of massive, complex problems. As Fanon has noted in his psychological interpretations of the colonized minds of black people in a chapter devoted specifically to the question of language:

> Every colonized people - in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality - finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle.[51]

Thus there are, from the very beginning, at least two very important matters to look for. First, it must be noted whether or not the language a people speaks is authentic, that is, consistent with their historical, cultural being. Beyond that, it must be noted whether or not the life-world of the people in question in all of its values, meanings and structures as revealed in the language spoken is authentic for the people speaking it. We mean by "authentic" the identity of a language or symbolic system, the meanings and values mediated through it, with the cultural, historical grounds of a people, and with their present and projected existence in terms of contributing to their well being, this latter condition being determined by present and projected demands of existence and continuity with the cultural and historical ground. By these requirements, heuristic anticipations of a fully elaborated philosophical anthropology yet to come, we have in hand grounds upon which to interpret modes of speaking as self-denying and/or self-affirmative. The insights of Fanon aid greatly in making these judgments: if a colonized people (e. g. the black man in America) speaks the language of the colonizer, then he assumes with that language aspects of the culture - the life-world - of the colonizer. The ultimate result of this assumption on the part of colonized people - slaves - is, in great measure, the assumption and self-sustaining of their own subjugation - until such time as they can become master of their own existence, i. e., *free*, and thus creative in the use of the colonizer's language out of that freedom for *self*-definition. Prior to that the speaking of the colonized people is *self*-*denying*. Only when the situation of subjugation has been rectified and the formerly colonized people in pursuit of an authentic existence can we talk about speech which is truly self-affirming. The passage from the speech of self-denial to that of self-affirmation is what we have referred to throughout as self-transformation. To the degree that we understand the concrete (socio-political, cultural) situation constituting the world of sociality (i. e., colonization, subjugation, subordination) and what, consequently, would be required to alter it to make possible full authentic, self-affirming speaking, then will we understand the *revolutionary* potential imbedded in the transforming of a people's consciousness!

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[51] Black Skin, White Masks, p. 18.

PART VII

Transition to a Cultural Hermeneutics

A. The Hermeneutics of Franz Fanon: The Disclosure of Radical Self-Denial

B. Hermeneutic Sources: The Task Ahead

We began this project by orienting ourselves to laying out the structures and processes of consciousness involved in its transformation. We sought to do so in a context which gave instant recognition to the dimension of sociality as comprising the ultimate framework and foundation for the entire process. Still ours has been, almost wholly, a *descriptive* discussion elaborating conditions, processes, and structures of consciousness, language, and the ground of speaking, *in general*. What is now required is the application of this framework in the way of a hermeneutic of actual expressions of black peoples. We need now to move to a concrete investigation of the various symbolic dimensions of the life-world of black people employing all that we have set out to this point, particularly our understanding of the nature of the symbol and the constitution of meaning and its expression, of the availability of meaning and value in the social stock of knowledge, the function of knowledge, the function of the latter in structuring the life-world of a people.

The proper fulfillment of this task can only be achieved in a full hermeneutic of the cultural world of black peoples. Our aim in this part has been that of laying out the framework of understanding necessary to such an endeavor. Still, we can provide for the transition to such an investigation by observing a similar hermeneutic already performed, and by indicating possible routes to be taken in terms of important activities presently being engaged in of relevance to the question in view.

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A. The Hermeneutics of Fanon: The Disclosure of Radical Self-Denial

Ricoeur turned to the work of Freud as a source of profound interpretations of culture and for understanding language philosophically. In his words. . .

> A meditation of Freud's work has the advantage of revealing that work's broadest aim: not only the renovation of psychiatry, but a reinterpretation of all psychical productions pertaining to culture, from dreams, through art and morality, to religion. This is how psychoanalysis belongs to modern culture. By interpreting culture it modifies it; by giving it an instrument of reflection it stamps it with a lasting mark.[1]

In like fashion we turn to the psychoanalytic work of the revolutionary black psychiatrist Franz Fanon in which we have systematic probings of the psyche of black people in colonial situations. Fanon's studies provide the filling out of our proposed analytic/interpretive structure.

Fanon, in the chapter "The Negro and Language"(Black Skin, White Masks), seeks to understand the origin of the personality change (transformation of consciousness, in our terms) experienced by black people of colonized countries who visit the "mother country" (in the case of this work, France) and return to the home country (the French Antilles). The focus of the problematic is the black man's strenous efforts to learn the language of the white man, an achievement which will serve to complete his very being, a standard of being established by the white man, the controller of existence. Thus. . .

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[1] Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1970, p. 4.

> The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter - that is, he will come closer to being a real human being - in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language. I am not unaware that this is one of man's attitudes face to face with Being. A man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language.[2]

Yet we have already noted that this adopted world, based as it is on violent subjugation, discrimination, and racism, works not for the well being, but to the detriment, of the black man. The adopted language is thus inauthentic; his speaking self-denying. Radically self-denying, in fact, for, as the passage quoted earlier from Fanon reveals, the ground of the choice of the language of the master is the feeling of inferiority created in the slave through the radical denunciation of the slave and his culture. Thus, for the slave, the colonized consciousness, freedom and non-enslaved existence is to be had in the world of the master: one must become like the master - speak his language, adopt his culture. In short, ones own culture must be renounced. Hence, self-denial, inauthenticity. The language or dialect of ones culture must thereby be replaced. In America, for example, ghetto language must give way to standard English - the "proper" way for "civilized" people to speak - though the former, by virtue of its origin, is more authentic and proficient for ghetto living. Yet the pervasive history of effort on the part of Afro-Americans has been that involving the attempt to learn well the ways of white dominated America, feeling that the reduplication of this life-world constituted the path to freedom and equality, to acceptance. Learning to speak like the white man, mastering his language, was but one among many endeavors intending the resolution of a problematic existence through assimilation into the cultural life-world of whites.

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[2] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 18.

The ramifications of this endeavor are, as Fanon reveals, dramatic:

> The black man who has lived in France for a length of time returns radically changed. To express it in genetic terms, his phenotype undergoes a definitive, an absolute mutation.[3]

The mutation is even greater if the black man has mastered the white man's language. Yet this adoption is confirmation of the living death of the black man. As Fanon notes: ". . . the fact that the newly returned Negro adopts a language different from that of the group into which he was born is evidence of a dislocation, a separation."[4] It is evidence, in our words, of a radical self-denial further revealed in the adoption of European modes of dress, manners, etc. Thus learning to speak like the white man is but part of a more radical project. Still. . .

> To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture. The Antilles Negro who wants to be white will be the whiter as he gains mastery of the cultural tool that language is. . .

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[3] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 19.

[4] Ibid., p. 25.

> . . . Historically, it must be understood that the Negro wants to speak French because it is the key that can open doors. . .[5]

There rests the key to understanding the basis of self-denial: the expectation - the wish, perhaps - that the adoption of the language, and ultimately the culture, of the white world will lead to acceptance, freedom - full being.

Throughout the historical presence of black people in this country much has, at different points in this history, worked to leave unfulfilled - and bring into view for some the unfulfillable nature of - this expectation setting the ground for the rise of radical self-reflection leading to the (historic) re-emergence of self-affirmation: affirmations of the integrity of black cultural life, of the nationality of black peoples, i. e., their racial solidarity:

> . . . nationalist sentiment, although present throughout the black man's experience in America, tends to be most pronounced when the Negro's status has declined, or when they have experienced intense disillusionment following a period of heightened but unfulfilled expectations.[6]

Such a situation, i. e., the failure of the fulfillment of expectations, is one which, as we noted above, renders certain aspects of the life-world problematic leading to a transformation of consciousness - to self-affirmation. That is to say, the black man, having failed to be made whole and free by the adoption of the white man's culture, is thrown back upon himself. Out of this has and continues to come the realizations regarding the previous modes of self-denial and the emergence of new modes of self-affirmation. Abundant evidence of this is available in the various and many modes of "black (self-) awareness" now prevalent. Such is what we looked to when, at the very beginning, we spoke of a "resolution" of the problematic of a sense of divided self: the finding of self in self, in ones authentic culture, history, and projections for the future. The concrete unveiling of the modes of expression of self affirming self and of forms of self-denial is what awaits our endeavors in hermeneutics.

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[5] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 38.

[6] Black Nationalism in America, John Bracey, Jr., et. al., Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.: New York, 1970, p. xxvi.

B. Hermeneutic Sources: The Task Ahead

Much material awaits the application of a proper hermeneutic for revelations and philosophical interpretations of the life-world of Afro-Americans. For example, we can turn to black spirituals as a symbolic dimension which reveals the wishes and hopes of black people in slavery and after. Thus the spiritual stands as a symbolic form which when properly understood can reveal the life-world of the slave in terms of how he dealt with, on a symbolic level, the situation of slavery. Black sociologist, E. Franklin Frazier, in his monumental work, Black Bourgeoisie,[7] says of this element of black "folk culture:"

> In these religious folk songs the Negro attempted
> to find meaning for his existence and at the same

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[7] The Free Press: Glencoe, Illinois, 1957.

> time an escape from his tragic fate. . .In his Spirituals the Negro expressed his conception of the creation of man and the mystery of death and the hope of a better fate beyond the grave. But there was also a note of protest against the hard lot of the Negro in this world.[8]

Through the seminal insights of Frazier, particularly his references to the "folk culture" of black people in America thriving prior to its disruption by factors connected with the two world wars, we are led to cultural sources which are richly suggestive of revelations of modes of black consciousness, affirmative and self-denying, as we understand these latter two concepts. There are others. The entire dimension comprising the religious experiences of black people stands as an enormously fruitful area of investigation. Again, there are other institutions of early black life, e. g., the mutual aid societies.[9] Further, there are the music forms of jazz and blues, both of which are regarded by many as being the two most authentic cultural forms of black people in America to have emerged. There is also the poetry reflecting the various periods of black life, i. e., Harlem Renaissance and contemporary "black" poetry, etc. And, finally, the various modes of political language ranging from the most simplistic and pragmatic (say, political rhetoric seeking to encourage black voter registration), to more highly charged, symbolic, militant political discourse (cultural nationalism, Pan-Africanism, revolutionary nationalism, etc.). All of these various forms can, when properly understood, serve to illuminate the structure of black consciousness, both in a static or contemporary sense, and from a temporal or historic perspective, their transformation. In this latter sense, particular modes of contemporary expressions, philosophies and ideologies, poetry, are particularly revealing: say, the political language of the Black Panthers as compared to that of the National Urban League now and ten years ago.

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[8] Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie, pp. 117-18.

[9] Ibid., p. 117; Black Nationalism in America, op. cit.

The fact that all of these diverse modes of consciousness are expressed in particular "languages" and symbolic systems out of living experiences makes possible their understanding. Thus have we prepared ourselves for a hermeneutic of them by seeking to understand in general the nature of language and speech, meaning constitution, the structurization of consciousness, the world of sociality - its foundation and constitution - the individual's and group's relations to this world relative to existence, to the structures and qualities of a people's life-world. Our specific issue of concern has been the phenomenon of the transformation of consciousness in the resolution of an existential problematic. This resolution has been achieved - and continues to be - for this writer, as well as for others. At this point we can only state this. We can, however, come to know it via a reflective-living in the experiences of transformation when the relevant life - (cultural) - forms are met by an appropriate mode of interpretation. The development of the latter has been the whole attempt of this writing.

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